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Introduction
This thesis consists of three separate and self-contained papers. Chapter 1 is
co-authored by Marc Möller and Chapter 3 is joint work with Ann-Kathrin
Crede and Jonas Gehrlein. While the first two chapters apply microeconomic
theory, the third chapter presents the design of an experimental study.
Although individual chapters are rather different with respect to the
precise research question, there exist certain themes they have in common.
Theoretical findings give us advice on how to optimally act when facing
heterogeneous agents. However, we often observe less sophistication in
reality. Monopolists use price discrimination less than expected, while equal
sharing can be observed in teams surprisingly often. In the first two chapters,
I consider these two puzzles. Chapter 1 shows how equal shares can be
optimal for team surplus when there are asymmetric information and project
selection, even in the presence of considerable heterogeneity. Chapter 2
provides a rationale for the prevalence of pooling of heterogeneous consumers
by considering consumers who focus on salient attributes.
In Chapter 2, consumers with salience-driven preferences consider two
attributes in their decision, the quality and the price of a product. In Chapter
3, we also consider individuals who focus on salient attributes. However, the
two attributes of a decision are the consequences and the moral cost of an
action.
Chapter 1 provides a rationale for equal revenue-sharing in heteroge-
neous partnerships. We introduce project choice and information sharing to
a standard team production setting. A team with two agents can choose
whether to work on a status quo project or on an alternative project. While
INTRODUCTION
the alternative’s quality is commonly known, the status quo project can have
high or low quality with equal probability. If both agents receive information
about the quality of the status quo project, it would be optimal for team
surplus to give a higher share to the more productive agent. However, we
consider the case when only one of the agents receives information. The
information is verifiable and an informed agent can choose whether to disclose
this information to the partner. Disclosing information yields the benefit of
better adaptation but might also demotivate the partner, if he expected a
higher quality when receiving no information. It turns out that it would be
optimal for information sharing, in the sense that it maximizes the probability
of full information sharing, if we give a higher share to the less productive
agent. We characterize the optimal sharing rule in situations in which
inducing full information sharing is feasible. Equal revenue-sharing strikes a
balance between the two objectives of adaptation and motivation and can be
efficient even in the presence of considerable productivity differences across
partners.
Chapter 2 generalizes the price discrimination framework of Mussa and
Rosen (1978) by considering salience-driven consumer preferences in the sense
of Bordalo et al. (2013b). Consumers with salience-driven preferences give
a higher weight to attributes that vary more. When restricted to offering
two products to heterogeneous consumers, it turns out that the monopolist
can only separate with products that let consumers focus on the price.
Since focussing on price reduces the willingness to pay of consumers, profits
from separation decrease compared to the benchmark when consumers have
standard preferences. In contrast, the alternative strategies of pooling or
excluding low types become more profitable, since it is always possible to
additionally offer a decoy that lets consumers focus on quality. Salience thus
reduces the monopolist’s propensity to separate different types of consumers.
I characterize the conditions under which the monopolist induces consumers
to focus on quality rather than on price. Quality is salient in a market
whenever the heterogeneity is low and the share of high types is low or when
heterogeneity is high and the share of low types is high.
The result that the monopolist is less likely to separate generalizes to
2
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the case when the monopolist is not restricted in the number of products he
can offer, but there are non-zero development costs of decoys. It is then
always possible to find enough decoys such that quality becomes salient
while separating. However, as long as there are some development costs,
separation is relatively less attractive than in the case of consumers with
standard preferences.
Chapter 3 contributes to the long ongoing debate on whether interaction
in a market influences moral decisions of individuals. While some studies
show that individuals tend to decide less morally when being exposed
to a market environment, other studies argue that the experience of
market interaction promotes moral behavior. We add to this discussion
by distinguishing between two moral concepts: consequentialism and de-
ontology. According to consequentialism, actions are evaluated only by their
consequences. Contrary to that, deontology focuses solely on the morality of
the action itself. Evidence shows that whether individuals behave according
to consequentialism or according to deontology depends on the context.
Furthermore, individuals often consider both, the consequences and the moral
cost of an action, when taking moral decisions.
We hypothesize that participants are more likely to take decisions
according to consequentialism if they interacted in a market before. This
hypothesis is based on the assumption that market interactions make
cost-benefit considerations more salient, which increases the weight that
consequences get in the decision. Individuals who consider consequences
and moral cost are then torn towards more consequentialist decisions. Since
it has been shown that moral decision making is moderated by emotions, we
expect that the attitude towards markets moderates the effect.
We design an online experiment in order to investigate the effect of market
interaction on moral decision making in a subsequent moral dilemma. In the
first stage, participants are randomly assigned either to a market game or to
a non-market game. The market game consists of a double auction, which
lets participants experience a typical market environment with competition,
interaction, market framing and cost-benefit considerations. The non-market
game is a lottery which is designed such that the payoff distribution is equal
3
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to the distribution in the double auction, but there is neither competition
nor interaction, market framing or cost-benefit considerations. In the second
stage, participants face a hypothetical moral trolley dilemma, in which they
have to decide whether they would be willing to kill one person in order
to save three. While the consequentialist decision would be to sacrifice the
person, deontological principals would not allow to actively sacrifice this
person. In order to elicit the attitude towards markets, we use the Fair
Market Ideology scale of Jost et al. (2003) in a subsequent questionnaire.
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CHAPTER 1. PARTNERSHIPS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
1.1 Introduction
Evidence shows that teams are often organized as partnerships, i.e. team
members work together on a project and share the revenue. Partnerships can
for example be found in service professions (Hansmann, 1996) as law firms
(Leibowitz and Tollison, 1980), medical practices (Encinosa et al., 2007),
architecture firms and accounting firms (Greenwood and Empson, 2003).
If the partners share the revenue, free-riding leads to inefficiently low
effort provision since each partner only considers his own share of revenue.
Experimental evidence for such free-riding can be found in Nalbantian and
Schotter (1997) and Chao and Croson (2013). In case of heterogeneous
partners, this free-riding problem can be mitigated by giving higher shares
to more productive partners. This result is quite robust and also holds if
partners differ in ability and self-select (McAfee and McMillan, 1991) or
when production is of repeated nature (Rayo, 2007; Kobayashi et al., 2016).
However, we often observe equal revenue sharing even in partnerships
in which we would expect heterogeneity.1 Encinosa et al. (2007) find that
54% of small medical-group practices (3 to 5 members) share equally. In
larger practices (16 to 24 members), equal sharing still plays an important
role (24%). Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) find equal shares among partners
of similar seniority in law firms and argue that for example marriage and
coauthorship in economics are close to equal sharing.2
Such equal sharing in partnerships can be rationalized e.g. by preferences
for equality (Bartling and von Siemens, 2010; Gill and Stone, 2015), concerns
for sabotage (Bose et al., 2010) or market reputation and moral hazard
(Jeon, 1996). Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) argue that equal sharing is
a social convention and people want to satisfy some concept of justice.
However, evidence suggests that it might actually be teamwork that leads
to preferences for equal sharing in the first place (Hamann et al., 2011).
1Prat (2002) provides arguments in favor of heterogeneity in a team theory setting à
la Marschak and Radner (1972).
2Ray and Robson (2018) suggest to randomize the order of the names in economic
coauthorship, which is a further step towards equal sharing.
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Furthermore, discussions about how revenue should be shared, if not equally,
could give rise to inefficient rent-seeking.
We show in this paper that in a standard team production setting à
la Holmström (1982) with project quality and effort being complementary
inputs, equal sharing can be optimal for heterogeneous agents if we introduce
team project choice and asymmetric information about projects’ qualities.
The changes we incorporate in the standard model can be justified by
observations in reality. In partnerships, agents do often not only work
together but also decide which project they want to work on. This seems
natural when considering firms or countries working together. Within
organizations, the share of self-managed teams has increased in recent years
(Lazear and Shaw, 2007; Osterman, 2000; Manz and Sims Jr, 1993).
Consider for example a team that is organizing an event and wants to book
a newcomer band. The band’s quality is uncertain but the team expects it
to be better, and hence attract more people, than the alternative of a well-
known local artist. However, one of the partners in the organizing team
might get “bad news” about the quality, as e.g. that the last concert of the
band was a flop. If he reveals this information to the team, they can adapt
to the alternative, which is known to have higher quality in the presence of
such “bad news”.
The possibility to disclose information and the project choice introduce a
trade-off between improving adaptation and motivating effort. The disclosure
of information allows the team to choose a better project. However, it also
demotivates the partners if the information is “bad news”. In order to study
this trade-off, we use a similar model of team production as Blanes i Vidal and
Möller (2016). We consider a team which consists of two agents. They can
jointly choose between two projects. Before they decide on a project, one of
them might receive private information about the quality of the projects.
Information is private but verifiable, so an informed agent can credibly
disclose the news to his partner. When an informed agent decides whether to
disclose, he compares the benefit from better adaptation to a potential loss
of his partner’s motivation. A loss of motivation can occur if the news is bad
in the sense that the partner’s expectation about quality was higher without
7
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information. Since the informed agent only takes into account his own share
of revenue, his disclosure strategy might not be optimal for team surplus. By
carefully choosing the revenue sharing rule, we do not only affect motivation
but also whether agents disclose their information. While Blanes i Vidal
and Möller (2016) find the optimal mechanism for homogeneous agents, we
consider heterogeneous agents and restrict attention to the case in which
shares are independent of revenue and disclosure strategies.
In the benchmark of project selection with symmetric information, the
expected surplus of the team is maximized if the more productive agent
receives a higher share. The percentage loss in surplus if shares are equal
rather than optimal can be substantial, up to 25%.
If we introduce asymmetric information, we have to take into account the
impact of the revenue sharing rule not only on the effort but also on whether
agents disclose private information. Given the optimal sharing rule in the
benchmark case, the less productive agent is less willing to disclose because
the reaction of the more productive agent on changes in expected quality
is stronger. Increasing the share of the less productive agent and thereby
decreasing the share of the more productive agent reduces this reaction and
thus makes it more likely that the less productive agent is willing to disclose.
It turns out that the propensity to share information in the team is maximized
if the shares are just opposite to the shares in the benchmark with symmetric
information: The less productive agent needs a higher share while the more
productive agent gets a lower share. Compared to the optimal sharing rule
with symmetric information, giving a higher share to the less productive
agent can increase surplus since better information sharing leads to better
adaptation.
Our main result characterizes the optimal sharing rule in situations in
which full disclosure is feasible. The optimal sharing rule balances incentives
to disclose information and incentives to provide effort and thus lies between
the optimal information sharing rule and the optimal sharing rule given
symmetric information. Hence, the optimal sharing rule is torn towards
equal shares and it turns out that there exist situations in which sharing
equally amongst unequals is optimal for the partnership even in the presence
8
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of considerable heterogeneity. Where we can determine the optimal sharing
rule, the percentage loss in surplus due to equal sharing is weakly lower than
in the benchmark case.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the
literature on equal sharing and information problems in teams. Section 1.3
sets up the model of team production with project choice. In Section 1.4,
we consider the benchmark of symmetric information. In Section 1.5, we
introduce asymmetric information and consider the effect of the sharing rule
on disclosure strategies. In Section 1.6, we characterize the optimal sharing
rule and discuss the optimality of equal sharing. Section 1.7 examines the
robustness of the model and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Literature
In partnerships, the problem of free-riding can be mitigated by carefully
designing the sharing rule (Legros and Matthews, 1993). There are several
papers providing arguments against equal sharing. If a partnership forms
endogenously, equal revenue sharing leads to partnerships that are too small
(Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988) and not diverse enough (Sherstyuk, 1998).
Wilson (1968) shows that equal sharing is not optimal when agents are
heterogeneous in risk preferences. Kräkel and Steiner (2001) adapt the LEN
framework of the standard principal-agent model to partnerships. They show
that equal sharing is not optimal even if agents are homogeneous. While
equal sharing would induce optimal risk-sharing, optimal motivation pushes
the shares towards giving each agent his own profit. Balancing risk-sharing
and motivation, they find that the optimal shares lie between equal sharing
and no sharing (keeping the own profits). Equal sharing would only be
optimal in the extreme case of variance or risk aversion going to infinity.
Similarly, Winter (2004) shows that equal sharing is typically not optimal
even for homogeneous agents in the presence of complementarities in efforts
and asymmetric information about efforts.
Nevertheless, as mentioned in the introduction, we often observe equal
9
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sharing in reality and equal shares are assumed in many papers considering
partnerships (e.g. Huck and Rey-Biel, 2006; Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988;
Levin and Tadelis, 2005). The authors typically argue that equal shares
are a social convention or there is a social preference of agents (Farrell
and Scotchmer, 1988). Theoretically, it has been shown that equal shares
can be optimal in order to foreclose sabotage (Bose et al., 2010) or if
there are market reputation and moral hazard (Jeon, 1996). Bose et al.
(2010) show that agents would sabotage each other if the principal cannot
commit to a reward structure ex-ante. Hence, the possibility to commit to
equal shares could be beneficial for the principal because agents would not
sabotage each other. They argue that equal sharing is the only distribution
to which the principal could commit since this commitment is facilitated
by legal obligations. Bevia and Corchón (2006) also find that sabotage
is rational in cooperative production when revenue is shared among the
agents. Even though a saboteur suffers from lower revenue, he benefits from
a better relative standing. Such sabotage is more likely under meritocratic
systems than under equal sharing. Jeon (1996) consider a model with two
periods in which the effort in the first period signals higher ability and thus
increases the wage in the second period. It turns out that when the sharing
arrangement is such that revenue from abilities is shared, equal sharing is
efficient. Furthermore, social preferences as inequality aversion, make equal
shares more attractive. Bartling and von Siemens (2010) show that if agents
are sufficiently inequality averse, equal shares are the only renegotiation proof
option. We provide an argument in favor of equal sharing in a simple team
setting.
In our model, we find a force driving in the direction of equal shares
when introducing asymmetric information and project selection. Information
is private but can be shared with the partners. We thus also relate to the
literature on teams and information sharing. In this literature, information
sharing would typically be optimal for surplus but teams fail to share
information because of conflicting preferences (Li et al., 2001; Dessein, 2007),
career concerns (Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2001; Levy, 2007; Visser and Swank,
2007) or distortions by voting rules (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996). In
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some settings, however, restricting information about the quality of a project
is beneficial because it mitigates the free-riding problem in team production.
In Teoh (1997), the social planner can restrict access to information ex-ante
in a public goods game. This is optimal if “bad news” decrease contributions
more than “good news” would increase them. Hermalin (1998) only informs
one agent who can then exert effort first. The possibility of leading by
example increases the informed agent’s effort above the optimal free-riding
effort. Similarly, in our paper, full information sharing is not necessarily
optimal. It has the positive effect of better adaptation and the negative effect
of demotivating team members. Agents possibly fail to share information
because it can be optimal to keep the other agent motivated, rather than
realistic.
This trade-off between adaptation and motivation is considered in some
other papers. Banal-Estañol and Seldeslachts (2011) study merger decisions
and the incentives to free-ride on a partner’s post-merger decision. Zábojńık
(2002), Blanes i Vidal and Möller (2007), and Landier et al. (2009) consider
the trade-off in settings in which decision making and execution of effort
lie at different hierarchical levels. Zábojńık (2002) shows that in case of
liquidity constraints and thus limited punishment possibilities, it might be
optimal to delegate the decision to the worker in order to keep his motivation
high. Landier et al. (2009) find that dissent in the preferences of the decision
maker and the implementer can be beneficial since it implies a better use
of information. This results in better adaptation and higher credibility of
the decision maker but also demotivates the implementer. Blanes i Vidal
and Möller (2007) ask whether a worker should get hard information given
a leader has additional soft information. Giving a worker hard information
might induce the leader to give a too high weight to this hard information
in order to avoid demotivating the worker. These studies consider decision
making and implementation at different hierarchical levels. We contribute
to this literature by considering agents who take decisions and implement
projects jointly.
Similarly, Guo and Roesler (2016) consider the trade-off between adapta-
tion and motivation in a dynamic setting with two agents working together
11
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on a project. Agents’ efforts increase the success probability of the project.
While working on the project, an agent might receive private information
about the success probability. He can then either exit the project and
thereby disclose his information or he can stick to the project and shirk
on the other agent’s effort. However, Guo and Roesler (2016) consider
homogeneous agents who share equally and focus on the effort and exit
decisions in equilibrium.
Campbell et al. (2014) and Gershkov and Szentes (2009) also consider
teams with private information and group members who may not share their
information in order to manipulate beliefs about the marginal return of effort.
Their settings differ from ours since their agents provide effort in order to
acquire information rather than for the implementation of a joint project.
Our paper adds information sharing in the same way as Blanes i Vidal and
Möller (2016). They introduce asymmetric information about the production
technology and information sharing into a model of team production. They
use a mechanism design approach and consider homogeneous agents. But
team members, whether they are different firms or different workers, are
often heterogeneous. Given heterogeneous agents, we restrict attention to
partnerships, i.e. team members share the revenue of the project.
Gershkov et al. (2016) take a similar approach when introducing asym-
metric information in a team production setting with moral hazard. However,
they assume that revenue distribution can depend on a signal about
the ranking of efforts. They find a simple rank-based contract which
can implement first best information sharing and first best efforts given
homogeneous agents in many situations. With heterogeneous agents, first
best is possible if private information is given to one agent only. Without
the ranking of efforts, we find that there is no revenue distribution which
implements first best information sharing and effort choices. In order to
minimize free-riding, we would want to give a higher share to more productive
agents. However, the need to incentivize information sharing promotes giving
a higher share to less productive agents.
Our result thus provides a rationale for why sometimes equal shares could
be preferred given heterogeneous agents: If transfers cannot depend on the
12
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disclosure strategy, information sharing has to be incentivized by the choice
of the shares. Since equal shares always lie between the optimal shares given
symmetric information and the optimal shares for information sharing, trying
to balance the incentives to provide effort and to share information leads us
in the direction of equal shares.
1.3 Model
Consider a team that consists of two agents i = L,H, who work on a joint
project X. The revenue of the project depends on whether it is successful
or not. A successful project yields revenue 1 while a failed project generates
no revenue. The probability of success of a project depends on the efforts of
the agents, eL and eH , on the productivities of their effort, γL and γH , and
on the quality of the project, which, with slight abuse of notation, we also
denote as X:
RX(eL, eH) = (eLγL + eHγH)X. (1)
Since revenue in case of success is equal to 1, RX(eL, eH) is equivalent to
the expected revenue of a project X. Agents are heterogeneous in the sense
that the effort of agent H is more productive γL < γH ≤ 1. If the project
is successful, the revenue is shared between the two agents according to the
sharing rule α = (αL, αH) with αL + αH = 1.
3 Effort is not contractible.






3Since revenue is always either 0 or 1, the sharing rule cannot depend on revenue.
Another argument for the sharing rule being independent of revenue would be that team
revenue is not verifiable by a third party. Furthermore, the sharing rule cannot depend
on the probability of success, since it cannot be observed. Such linear contracts are
“particularly suitable for organizations in which individual goals coincide: partnerships,
political parties, NGOs.” (Blanes i Vidal and Möller, 2007)
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Hence, agents differ only in their effort productivity.4 Agents choose effort
in order to maximize their expected utility, which consists of their share of
the expected revenue minus their costs of effort:
Ui = αiRX(eL, eH)− C(ei), i = L,H. (3)
Total expected surplus of a project with quality X is the sum of agents’
expected utilities. It is thus the total expected revenue of the project, reduced
by the costs of effort of the two team members:
SX(eL, eH) = RX(eL, eH)− C(eL)− C(eH). (4)
Efficiency would require that marginal revenue equals marginal cost for each
agent i = L,H:
R′ei(eL, eH) = C
′(ei). (5)
It is, however, a standard result that team production leads to inefficient
effort provision (Holmström, 1982). To see this, consider the first order




(eL, eH) = C
′(ei). (6)
Since αi ≤ 1 with strict inequality for at least one of the agents, marginal
cost must remain at a lower level than efficient. At least one of the agents
will thus choose an inefficiently low effort. They only take into account
their own share of the revenue and ignore the impact of their effort on their
partner’s utility. Given the specific functions for effort costs and revenue,
agents i = L,H choose efforts which maximize their utility:
e∗i = αiγiÊi[X], (7)
where Êi[X] is agent i’s expectation of quality X.
We consider the situation of a team working on a status quo project Q
which can have either low quality Q = q or high quality Q = 1 > q. It is
4The model is equivalent to a model in which agents have equal effort productivity but







common knowledge that the states are equally likely ex-ante and hence the
ex-ante expected quality is E[Q] = 1+q
2
. Conditional on the quality of the
status quo project Q being low, one of the agents will receive private and
verifiable information.5 Since information is verifiable, the informed agent
can choose to disclose this new information to his partner. After the decision
of disclosing potential evidence, the team chooses whether to stick to the
status quo project Q or whether to switch to an alternative project P with
quality P .6 We abstract from a specific voting procedure and use the rule
that the team switches to alternative P if and only if evidence was disclosed.
We show at the end of Section 1.5.3 that this rule can be rationalized as the
outcome of an arbitrary voting procedure.
We assume that project Q has a higher ex-ante expected quality than
project P . However, project P would be preferred to project Q if project Q
is known to be of low quality.
Assumption 1 (Status quo vs. alternative project). P ∈ (q, E[Q]).
This assumption brings us to the interesting case in which project Q is
preferred ex-ante and project P would be preferred in case of evidence for
the low quality of project Q. It would thus be beneficial for the team to
adopt project P in case of receiving evidence. Note that for all relevant
expectations q ≤ Êi[X] ≤ 1, optimal efforts are such that the probability of
success RX(eL, eH) is well defined in [0, 1].
To summarize, the timing is as follows: First, nature decides whether the
quality of project Q is high or low. If quality is low, there is evidence which
is observed by one of the agents. Second, an informed agent can decide
whether to disclose the information to his partner. Third, agents jointly
choose whether to switch to project P and forth, each agent contributes
5The assumption that there is information only if the quality of project Q is low
simplifies the analysis but is not crucial for the result that optimal information sharing
requires giving a higher share to the less productive agent. Similarly, allowing that both
or none of the agents receives information does not change this result. We will discuss this
in Section 1.7.1.
6If there was uncertainty about the quality of project P , the analysis would be
analogous, with P replaced by E[P ].
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with effort to the success of the chosen project. Finally, nature determines
whether the project is successful, in which case the revenue is shared among
the agents according to the sharing rule α.
We assume that the sharing rule is independent of the choice of the project
X ∈ {Q,P} and of the disclosure history D ∈ {0, L,H}.
Assumption 2 (Simple revenue sharing). α(X,D) is independent of X ∈
{Q,P} and D ∈ {0, L,H}.
Rewarding the disclosure of information would provide incentives to
disclose information (Blanes i Vidal and Möller, 2016). However, we focus
on the problem of a social planner when he has to incentivize efforts and
disclosure with a simple revenue sharing rule.
We use the equilibrium concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, i.e.
beliefs are consistent given strategies on the equilibrium path and strategies
are sequentially rational given beliefs.
1.4 Benchmark: Symmetric information
As a benchmark, consider the situation of symmetric information: If the
quality of project Q is low, both agents receive evidence. The disclosure
strategies are thus irrelevant in this benchmark case. Agents will agree to
choose the project with the higher expected quality. Therefore, they stick to
the status quo project Q if there is no evidence and change to the alternative
















Maximizing expected surplus (8) given individually optimal effort choices,
we find the optimal shares αsymL and α
sym




Proposition 1.1 (Optimal shares with symmetric information). In the
















The proof can be found in the Appendix. In the situation of moral hazard
and symmetric information, it is surplus-maximizing to give a higher share
to the more productive agent H than to the less productive agent L, since
the team benefits more from agent H’s effort. This implies that it is optimal
to let the more productive agent work harder. He works harder not only
because his effort is more productive but also because he gets more than half
of the project’s revenue.





) even in the presence of different productivities. In our setting with
symmetric information, equal sharing leads to a loss in surplus relative to















The percentage loss in surplus increases in the heterogeneity of agents,
i.e. it increases in γH and decreases in γL. It can amount to 25% for γL → 0
and γH → 1.
1.5 Information sharing
We now consider the case when, conditional on quality of project Q being
low, only one of the agents receives evidence. Hence, the disclosure
strategies of agents become relevant. In this section, we first determine the
optimal revenue shares given disclosure strategies. Then, we show how the
individually optimal disclosure strategies depend on the revenue sharing rule
and find the sharing rule that optimizes information sharing in the sense that
17
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the propensity of full disclosure is maximized. Finally, we characterize the
surplus-maximizing sharing rule under the constraint of full disclosure.
1.5.1 Optimal sharing given disclosure strategies
We showed before that with symmetric information, it would be optimal to
reduce free-riding with the distribution αsym. It turns out that the same
distribution is optimal if there is asymmetric information and both agents
choose the same disclosure strategy dL = dH .
Given project X, agents choose their efforts to maximize utility, i.e.
according to (7). The effort of agent i depends on his expectation about the
quality of the project. Since agents might have asymmetric information, their
expectations about the quality of project Q may differ. An informed agent
knows that the quality of project Q is low. Whenever an agent i remains
uninformed, he updates his belief about the quality of project Q. He knows
that with ex-ante probability 1
2
, quality is high and both agents remained
uninformed. However, with ex-ante probability 1
2
, quality is low and the
other agent was informed but conceals this information. The uninformed













where dj ∈ [0, 1] is the (equilibrium) probability that the other agent j
discloses information given he receives evidence. Receiving no evidence and
no information of the other agent increases the belief that project Q has high









The expected quality of project Q with updated beliefs is higher than its ex-
ante expected quality since a higher weight is given to the high quality state.
Since the quality of project P is not affected by the information, project Q
is now even more attractive than ex-ante.
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Taking the disclosure strategies dL and dH as given, the ex-ante expected
surplus must take into account several cases. With probability 1
4
the quality
of project Q is low and agent i gets information. If agent i receives
information, he discloses it with probability di to his uninformed partner
j. Project P is then chosen and both agents know the quality of the project.
With probability (1 − di), the informed agent does not disclose, so project
Q is chosen. While the informed agent i knows that the quality of the
project is low, the uninformed agent j updates beliefs to Êj[Q]. Finally, with
probability 1
2
, the quality of project Q is high, agents are not informed and
will both update beliefs. The choice of project Q is optimal in this case.
Considering all these cases, the ex-ante expected surplus is
























This surplus is maximized by the sharing rule α∗(dL, dH), characterized in
Proposition 1.2.
Proposition 1.2 (Optimal sharing given disclosure strategies). The surplus-






and α∗H(dL, dH) =
γ2H q̂H










2 + (1− di)q2 + [(1− d−i)q + 2]Êi[Q]
}
, i = L,H.
(15)
The less productive agent receives a higher share if and only if heterogeneity
is not too strong γ2L ≥ γ2H q̂Hq̂L .
The proof is in the Appendix. For given disclosure strategies dH and
dL, we can determine the optimal distribution of revenue. Whenever both
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agents choose the same disclosure strategy dH = dL, the same sharing rule
α
sym as in the case of symmetric information is optimal. The reason is that
even though agents do not have symmetric expectations in every situation,
they have ex-ante the same expectation about what situations can arise. It is
then surplus-maximizing to give a higher share to the more productive agent.
Whenever agents differ in their disclosure strategies, the sharing rule αsym is
not optimal anymore. The optimal share for an agent decreases in his own
probability of disclosing and increases in the probability of disclosing of the
other agent. Hence, the optimal share of the less productive agent α∗L(dL, dH)
is higher than αsymL whenever dL < dH . The less productive agent might even
get a higher share than the more productive agent if his effort productivity
is high enough.
If we want to find the overall optimal shares, however, we have to take
into account that disclosure strategies depend on the sharing rule and are
chosen by the agents to maximize their expected utility. Therefore, we will
now look at the individually rational disclosure strategies of the agents.
1.5.2 Disclosure strategies
When an agent decides whether to disclose information or not, he has to
anticipate which project will be chosen and which efforts will be provided by
himself and his partner.
Project P is chosen if and only if information was disclosed. Therefore,
agent i discloses information if he expects a higher utility from project P
than if he conceals and the team sticks to the status quo project Q:
Ei[U
d
i ] ≥ Ei[U ci ] (16)









If agent i discloses, the team will choose project P and efforts will be
individually optimal given quality P . After concealing, project Q is chosen.
While agent i then knows that the quality of project Q is low, agent j has to
form expectations. As shown before, his expectation Êj[Q], given by (12),
is higher than the quality of project P , so the uninformed agent would be
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more motivated when the informed agent did not disclose and they work on
project Q.
Agent i discloses information if and only if the gain in project’s quality
due to switching to project P dominates the loss from lower effort. Hence,
the quality of project P must be high enough to make an agent willing to
disclose. From condition (16), we get two thresholds for P , which depend on
the sharing rule α. If the quality of P is high enough,












agent i is willing to disclose his information. If the quality of P is low,













agent i would conceal any information he gets. The disclosure decisions, and
hence the thresholds, are independent of the disclosure strategy of the other
agent since an informed agent knows that the other agent did not receive
information. For an agent i the thresholds are thus unique. Furthermore,
P ci < P
d
i because the expectation of the uninformed agent Êj[Q] increases
in the probability of disclosing di and thus incentives to disclose decrease in
di. Therefore, full disclosure di = 1 with Êj[Q] = 1, requires a higher P




following graph shows the thresholds and the optimal disclosure strategy of







The two thresholds lie in the range [q, E[Q]]. If P = q, agents will
always conceal since adaptation has no benefit and discourages the partner.
If P = E[Q], the benefit of adaptation is always high enough to induce
full disclosure. Between his two thresholds, an agent is not willing to fully
disclose or to fully conceal. If the agent fully discloses, the other agent has
high motivation whenever he does not get any information, since he is then
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rather sure that the quality of project Q is high. This makes concealing more
attractive for the informed agent. If the agent fully conceals, the effect on
the other agent’s motivation is weak. Full disclosure would then be better for
the informed agent. Between the thresholds, an equilibrium thus only exists
when the agent partially discloses with probability δi(α) ∈ (0, 1) that makes
him just indifferent between disclosing and concealing. Being indifferent, he

















P 2 − q
P 2 − q2 . (19)





1 if P ≥ P di
δi(α) if P ∈ (P ci , P di )
0 if P ≤ P ci .
(20)
Since there is a unique optimal disclosure strategy for each agent (which
is independent of the disclosure strategy of the other agent), there is always
a unique equilibrium. An equilibrium in which both agents fully disclose
arises whenever adaptation is important enough, i.e. if and only if P is high
and lies above the disclosure thresholds of both agents P ≥ max[P dL, P dH ].
Full concealment is the equilibrium when adaptation is not important, i.e.
if and only if P lies below the concealment thresholds of both agents P ≤
min[P cL, P
c
H ]. For intermediate values of P , asymmetric equilibria arise in
which agents adapt different disclosure strategies.
Whether agents want to disclose or conceal depends on the share of
revenue they receive. An increase in the own share (which implies a decrease
in the other’s share) has three effects on the disclosure strategy of an agent.
First, he benefits more from a better adaptation to the state of the world.
Second, the effect on the other agent’s motivation is weaker, since the other
agent reacts less to changes in expected quality. And finally, the agent
benefits more from the difference in motivation of the other agent. While
the first two effects are in favor of disclosure, the third effect is in favor of
concealing. It turns out that the first and second effect always dominate and
an agent is more likely to disclose if he gets a higher share.
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Lemma 1.1. The propensity of an agent to disclose private information
increases in his own share of revenue and decreases in the other agent’s share
of revenue.
The thresholds P di and P
c
i decrease in the own share of revenue. If the
own share increases, budget balance implies that the other’s share decreases,
which lowers P di and P
c
i even more. The probability of disclosing δi(α) in the
range of P between the thresholds increases in the own share and decreases
in the partner’s share. The proofs can be found in the Appendix.
1.5.3 Full information sharing
Since the disclosure of information leads to the choice of the project with
higher quality, one question we can ask is which sharing rule is optimal for
information sharing in the sense that it maximizes the probability that agents
fully share their information. The two agents fully disclose if P lies above
their thresholds P dL and P
d
H . Hence, we want to find the sharing rule α that
minimizes the maximum of the thresholds. As stated in Lemma 1.1, any
change in the sharing rule α moves the thresholds in opposite directions.
Therefore, the maximum is minimized when the thresholds are equalized,
i.e. when α is such that P dL(α) = P
d
H(α). This equation gives us the optimal
shares for information sharing αdisL and α
dis
H = 1− αdisL :
Proposition 1.3 (Full Information Sharing). If agents receive private
information, the partnership’s ability to share information is optimized (i.e.
the range of parameters for which d∗L = d
∗
















The intuition for this result is as follows. The incentives to conceal are
higher if the other agent reacts strongly to changes in expected quality of the
project. Given equal shares, the more productive agent would react more
strongly than the less productive agent, since his effort has a higher effect
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on revenue. The less productive agent thus has a higher incentive to conceal
when sharing equally. Increasing the share of the less productive agent (and
thereby decreasing the share of the more productive agent) balances the
effort reactions to changes in expected quality and thereby the incentives to
disclose.
This result is in contrast to the result from our benchmark case, where
the more productive agent should get a higher share and provide higher effort
in order to maximize surplus. If we want to induce full information sharing,
the less productive agent should get a higher share and will potentially even
provide higher effort. Corollary 1.1 follows directly from Propositions 1.1
and 1.3.
Corollary 1.1. The revenue allocation that optimizes information sharing
is diametrically opposed to the revenue allocation that maximizes surplus in
the absence of informational asymmetries, i.e. αdisL = 1− αsymL .
Since αdis equalizes the thresholds, both agents will fully disclose if P ≥






. If the quality of project P is high enough









, agents would disclose also with the
shares αsym. Figure 1.1 depicts total expected surplus (13) given optimal
disclosure strategies as a function of P , once with αdis and once with αsym.
In this example with q = 0.1, γL = 0.8 and γH = 1, we find that for
values of P close to P̄ , αsym is preferred to αdis. However, given αsym, agent
L starts to conceal when P decreases, which leads to a loss in surplus. We
find a range of P in which inducing full disclosure with αdis is preferred to
α
sym.











L ), suggest that equal sharing could optimally balance the incentives
between information sharing and effort provision.
1.5.4 Inducing full disclosure
Instead of choosing optimal disclosure shares αdis, a smaller distortion of the
sharing rule αsym might be enough to keep agents disclosing when P falls
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Figure 1.1: Surplus with optimal symmetric and optimal disclosure shares.
Surplus as a function of the alternative project’s quality P , given αsym (solid) and αdis
(dotted) when q = 0.1, γL = 0.8 and γH = 1.
below P̄ . In other words, when full disclosure is possible, i.e. P ≥ P , we
can maximize surplus subject to the constraint that both agents are willing
to disclose. Since incentives to disclose increase in the agent’s own share and
decrease in the other’s share, agent L is willing to disclose if his share is high
enough:




2 − q)− γ2L(P 2 − q2)
. (22)
For values of P below the threshold P̄ , agent L needs a higher share than
αsymL in order to be willing to disclose. Therefore, we know that α > α
sym
L if
P ∈ [P , P̄ ). Agent H is willing to disclose if the share of agent L is not too
high:




2 − q2)− 2γ2L(P 2 − q)
. (23)
Inducing full disclosure requires choosing a sharing rule for which α ≤
αL ≤ ᾱ. This is possible if α ≤ ᾱ which is true for all P ≥ P .
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As shown in Section 1.5.1, surplus given full disclosure is strictly concave
in αL and maximized at α
sym
L . In order to maximize surplus under the
constraint of full disclosure, we thus need to get as close as possible to αsymL .
Taking into account that αsymL < α ≤ ᾱ if P ∈ [P , P̄ ) and αsymL ∈ [α, ᾱ] if
P ≥ P̄ , we find the optimal constraint sharing rule αf = (αfL, αfH):
Proposition 1.4 (Optimal sharing rule under the constraint of full disclo-
sure). If it is possible to induce full disclosure with αsym, i.e. P ≥ P̄ , the









If it is not possible to induce full disclosure with αsym but full disclosure is
feasible, i.e. P ∈ [P , P̄ ), the optimal constraint shares are
αfL = α and α
f
H = 1− α. (25)
The less productive agent gets a higher share, i.e. αfL >
1
2
, if P ∈ [P , P e)










In contrast to αsym and αdis, the optimal constraint distribution of
revenue depends on P . When P falls below P̄ , the share for the less
productive agent has to increase compared to αsymL in order to keep him
disclosing. For decreasing P , his share increases from αsymL at P̄ until it
reaches αdisL at P . Equal sharing is constraint optimal at P




and always lies in [P , P̄ ). Hence, the less productive agent
receives a higher share than the more productive agent whenever P ∈ [P , P e).
Figure 1.2 depicts the total expected surplus (13) given optimal disclosure
strategies and given αf (P ), αsym and αdis. Whenever it is possible to induce
full disclosure, i.e. P ≥ P , the sharing rule αf (P ) is preferred to αdis, since
both induce full disclosure but αf (P ) is closer to the optimal sharing rule
given full disclosure αsym. In our example, αf (P ) is also weakly preferred
to αsym. However, this is not necessarily general, since it might be surplus
increasing to allow for some concealment. This is true if the loss of motivation
dominates the gain due to better adaptation.
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Figure 1.2: Surplus under the constraint of full disclosure. Surplus as a function of
the alternative project’s quality P , given αsym (solid), αdis (dotted) and αf (P ) (dashed)
when q = 0.1, γL = 0.8 and γH = 1.
Before considering the overall optimal sharing rule in Section 1.6, we show
that our assumption with respect to the project selection rule comes without
loss of generality.
Project selection. Take any voting rule such that if an agent votes for
project X, the probability that this project is chosen increases. Furthermore,
if agents both vote for the same project, that project is chosen. This implies
that both agents would always vote for the project from which they expect
a higher utility.
If one of the agents was informed and discloses this information, both
agents vote in favor of project P . This is implied by Assumption 1 and the
fact that once evidence is disclosed, project Q is known to have low quality
for sure. If an agent does not receive any evidence, it is not immediately clear
which project he would vote for. On the one hand, no evidence strengthens
the belief that project Q is of good quality. On the other hand, given the
quality is low, the other agent is expected to have evidence and to provide
low effort. An uninformed agent i expects that if project Q is chosen, he gets
27




























. Given individually optimal
effort choices and our assumption that P < E[Q], we show in the Appendix
that surplus from project P is strictly lower in this situation. Hence, the
uninformed agent would vote for project Q. An informed agent who did
not disclose will also vote for project Q. Otherwise, he would have made
sure that project P is chosen by disclosing his evidence in the first place.
Consequently, agents will agree on the status quo project Q whenever no
evidence was disclosed.
1.6 Optimal allocation of revenue
In this section, we first determine the sharing rule α∗ that maximizes total
expected surplus, taking into account that disclosure strategies are chosen
by the agents. Then, we discuss the optimality of equal sharing.
1.6.1 Optimal sharing rule
Total expected surplus of the two agents takes into account the same cases

























Figure 1.3 shows the thresholds P for full disclosure and full concealment
of the two agents as a function of αL. As long as P ≥ P , adaptation is
important enough such that at least one of the agents will fully disclose and
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Figure 1.3: Disclosure and concealment thresholds. Thresholds P di and P
c
i for agents
i = L,H as a function of the less productive agent’s share αL given q = 0.1, γL = 0.8 and
γH = 1.
none of the agents would ever fully conceal. For P ≥ √q, both agents fully
disclose independent of the revenue sharing rule α.
Lemma 1.2. Suppose P ∈ [P ,E[Q]). For any αL ∈ [0, 1], at least one agent
fully discloses and none of the agents fully conceals.
You find the proof in the Appendix. Lemma 1.2 implies that in the range
of P in which full disclosure is possible to induce, we can restrict attention
to three types of equilibria: both agents fully disclose, agent L partially
discloses while agent H fully discloses and agent H partially discloses while
agent L fully discloses.
In the following, we normalize γL = γ < 1 and γH = 1. Proposition
1.5 characterizes the surplus-maximizing sharing rule α∗ = (α∗L, 1 − α∗L)
when inducing full disclosure is possible. A question of particular interest is
whether the optimal sharing rule α∗ induces full adaptation, i.e. the certain
adoption of the project with the higher (expected) quality.
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Proposition 1.5. Suppose that P ∈ [P ,E[Q]). The revenue allocation that
maximizes total expected surplus can be characterized as follows:
❼ If P ∈ [P̄ , E[Q]) then α∗L = αsymL is optimal. The project with the
higher (expected) quality is always adopted, i.e. d∗L = d
∗
H = 1.
❼ If P ∈ [P̂ , P̄ ) then α∗L = αfL is optimal. The project with the higher
(expected) quality is always adopted, i.e. d∗L = d
∗
H = 1.
❼ If P ∈ [P , P̂ ) then α∗L ∈ (αsymL , αfL) is optimal. The project with the
higher (expected) quality fails to be adopted with positive probability,
i.e. d∗L < d
∗
H = 1.




, then P̂ = P , i.e. inducing full adaptation is
optimal whenever feasible.
If P ≥ √q, agents fully disclose independent of the sharing rule. It is
thus straightforward that αsym is optimal. For P <
√
q, we have to consider
that different sharing rules imply different disclosure strategies. Agents fully
disclose if αL ∈ [α, ᾱ]. We argued in Section 1.5.4 that within this range of
αL, α would be the optimal choice for total surplus if P ∈ [P , P̄ ) and αsymL
is optimal if P ≥ P̄ . However, it might be surplus increasing to choose a
sharing rule that does not lie in this range, i.e. such that one of the agents
starts concealing, since this could mitigate the free-riding problem of the
team. If αL > ᾱ, agent H starts concealing partially. The surplus is then
decreasing in αL for all P ∈ [P ,
√
q). Hence, the highest surplus we can get
in [ᾱ, 1] is at ᾱ. This brings us back to full disclosure. If αL < α, agent L
starts concealing partially. We can show that the surplus when agent L is
disclosing and agent H partially conceals is concave in αL. Furthermore, it
is strictly increasing at α for P ∈ [P̂ ,√q), with P̂ ∈ [P , P̄ ). Hence, for such
P , all αL < α would yield lower surplus than α. α maximizes surplus and
again brings us back to full disclosure. For P ∈ [P , P̂ ), allowing for some
concealment increases the surplus. The proofs can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 1.4: Adaptation. Characterization of the degree of adaptation under the
surplus-maximizing sharing rule α∗ in dependence of the partners’ heterogeneity and the
alternative project’s quality P for given q.
Whether full adaptation is optimal whenever feasible, i.e. for the whole
range [P ,E[Q]), depends on the heterogeneity of agents γ and on the low
quality of project Q. If agents are rather heterogeneous, i.e. γ < γ(q), it is
not optimal to always adopt the project with the higher (expected) quality.
The cost of inducing full adaptation is suboptimal motivation and this cost
is higher if agents are heterogeneous. The threshold γ(q) is increasing in q.
Hence, a higher low quality of project Q implies that full adaptation is less
likely to be optimal. This is intuitive since a higher low quality of project Q
makes disclosure and adaptation less important for surplus. Moreover, the
size of the range in which full adaptation is feasible is decreasing in q and
thus smaller for high q’s.
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1.6.2 On the optimality of equal sharing




, equal shares have the advantage that the less productive agent
is rather willing to disclose: From Lemma 1.1 we know that an increase
in the own share increases the incentives to disclose. On the other hand,
equal shares have the disadvantage that they do not optimally motivate given
full disclosure. The benefit from improved information sharing potentially
outweighs the loss from sub-optimal motivation. In our example with q = 0.1
and γ = 0.8, equal shares are indeed preferred to αsym for a range of values
of P , as we see in Figure 1.5.












Figure 1.5: Surplus with equal sharing rule. Surplus as a function of the alternative
project’s quality P , given αsym (solid), αdis (dotted) and αequal (dashed) when q = 0.1
and γ = 0.8.
Given the distributionαsym, both agents fully disclose for P ≥ 0.291 while
they disclose for P ≥ 0.28 with equal sharing. With partial concealment of
the less productive agent, surplus decreases faster if P decreases, and in
our example, this implies equal sharing is preferred to αsym for the range
P ∈ [0.240, 0.287].
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Instead of comparing equal shares with αsym, we can directly consider




. Hence, α∗L =
1
2
is indeed optimal in some situations.
Proposition 1.6 (Optimal equal sharing). If γ > γ̃ ≡ (
√





∈ (0, 1), there exists a range P ∈ [P̂ , P e)
in which giving a higher than equal share to the less productive agent α∗L >
1
2
is optimal and equal shares α∗L =
1
2
are optimal for P e ∈ [P , P̄ ).
You find the proof in the Appendix. In other words, Proposition 1.6
states that for some range of P it is optimal to give a higher share to the
less productive agent if agents are rather homogeneous and the low quality
of project Q is rather low. If agents are homogeneous, the loss of motivation
is less severe than the loss due to worse adaptation when agents start to
conceal. Furthermore, it is more likely to benefit from equal sharing if the
low quality of project Q is low since the gain of better adaptation is high. In
such a situation, inducing full disclosure and thereby adaptation is important
and not the costs of sub-optimal motivation are not too high. Optimality
then requires increasing the share of the less productive agent.
Consider the percentage loss of equal sharing relative to optimal sharing
in this team situation with asymmetric information. In the symmetric
information benchmark, we found that the percentage loss only depends on
effort productivities and can go up to 25%. In the asymmetric information
case with project selection, the percentage loss is a function of effort
productivity γ, the low quality of project Q and the quality of project P . In
our range of interest P ∈ [P ,E[Q]), we can calculate the loss whenever we





For q < q̄ and γ > γ, we can determine α∗ for the full range P ∈
[P ,E[Q]). In such a situation, Figure 1.6 depicts the percentage loss from
equal sharing in the symmetric information benchmark ∆Esym[S] and in the
asymmetric information case ∆E[S] as a function of quality P .
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Figure 1.6: Percentage loss in surplus from equal revenue sharing. ∆Esym[S] and
∆E[S] in dependence of the alternative project’s quality P for given γ > γ and q < q̄.
The percentage loss in surplus in the benchmark case is independent
of P . The percentage loss in surplus given asymmetric information and
project selection is lower for P ∈ (P , P̄ ), i.e. in the range of P in which
full information sharing cannot be induced with αsym but would actually
be surplus-maximizing. The loss is zero at P e since equal sharing is then
optimal.
Consider a team that only deviates from equal sharing if the gain is
large enough. Such a decision rule would take into account that there
are typically bureaucratic cost and rent-seeking when deviating from equal
shares. Given asymmetric information and project selection, there is a larger
set of parameters for which a team would stick to the default of equal sharing
than in the symmetric information benchmark. In that sense, our model
provides a rationale for more equal revenue sharing.
1.7 Robustness
In this section, we relax some assumptions of our model and show that
Propositions 1.1 and 1.3 remain unchanged. Hence, our result that
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optimal incentives given symmetric information and optimal incentives for
information sharing are diametrically opposed is robust regarding these
assumptions. More specifically, we allow agents to differ in their ability
to acquire information (1.7.1), we consider unverifiable evidence (1.7.2) and
the possibility of “good news” (1.7.3). Finally, we let project success depend
non-linearly on efforts which introduces inter-dependency of efforts (1.7.4).
1.7.1 Information acquisition
So far, we assumed that both agents are equally likely to receive information.
In this section, we consider the case when agents differ in their ability to
acquire information, i.e. in the likelihood of receiving information. Given
the quality of project Q is low, agent L receives evidence with probability
πL ∈ (0, 1) while agent H gets evidence with πH ∈ (0, 1). We assume that
these probabilities are independent, i.e. it is possible that both, one or none
of the agents is informed about the low quality of the status quo project.
When an informed agent i decides whether to disclose, he knows that with
some probability πj, the other agent j is informed too and will then disclose
his information with dj. With some probability (1− dj), the other agent will
not disclose given he is informed. Finally, with probability (1−πj), the other
agent is not informed and updates his beliefs. We assume again that project
P is selected if and only if evidence was disclosed.
If an agent j remains uninformed, his updated beliefs reflect the fact that
being uninformed could mean that quality is high or that quality is low and
the other agent was not informed either or that he was informed but conceals.
These beliefs thus depend on the probabilities of being informed, πi and πj,
of both agents:
Êj[Q] =
(1− diπi)(1− πj)q + 1
(1− diπi)(1− πj) + 1
. (29)
Since the incentives to disclose depend on the uninformed agent’s beliefs,
the threshold for disclosure now also depends on the probabilities of receiving
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information. The informed agent i discloses if and only if P ≥ P di , with
P di =
[
q{qαiγ2i [2− πi − πj(1− πi)] + 2αjγ2j [1 + (1− πj)(1− πi)q]}
(αiγ2i + 2αjγ
2




As in the case of symmetric ability of information acquisition, this
threshold decreases in the own share αi and increases in the other’s share
αj. We show that in the Appendix. Therefore, we again maximize the range
of P in which both agents disclose by minimizing the maximum of these two
thresholds. The range is maximized when the thresholds are just equal which





. Hence, our result that the less productive agent
needs a higher share to disclose information holds. The benchmark case
does not change, i.e. αsym would be optimal with symmetric information.
Information sharing and project selection provide a reason for more balanced
sharing also in this setting. Since the overall optimal shares have to balance
the incentives to provide effort and to disclose information, they are tilted
towards more equality even if one agent is more productive and better at
information acquisition.
1.7.2 Unverifiability
In this section, we consider the possibility that agents receive unverifiable
and imperfect information about the status quo’s quality. In comparison to
our model with hard evidence, two novelties arise. First, agents are able to
misrepresent their information and truth-telling becomes the issue. Second,
agents are more motivated to exert effort on a given project when their
“opinions” agree rather than disagree.
More specifically, we modify our model as follows. In Stage 1 each
agent i receives a private, unverifiable, imperfect signal si ∈ {q, 1} about
the status quo’s quality. Signals are independent and each signal has the
same probability σ ∈ (1
2
, 1) of being correct. In Stage 2 agents communicate
by sending a message mi ∈ {q, 1}. As signals are unverifiable, agents may
misrepresent their information by choosing mi 6= si. In Stage 3 the status
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quo project is maintained unless both agents report low quality by issuing
mL = mH = q.
7
In the following, we derive the conditions that have to be satisfied
for truth-telling mi = si to constitute an equilibrium. In a truth-telling







≡ Q̄ if sL = sH = 1
1+q
2
= E[Q] if sL 6= sH
σ2q+(1−σ)2
σ2+(1−σ)2
≡ Q if sL = sH = q
(31)
and agent i with revenue-share αi and productivity γi who expects project
X’s quality to be Êi[X] exerts effort e
∗
i (Êi[X]) = αiγiÊi[X]. Not surprisingly,
agents have no incentive to lie when they observe “good news”, si = 1,
but might be tempted to misrepresent “bad news” by issuing mi = 1 upon
observation of si = q. Agent i’s payoff from truth-telling mi = si = q is given
by
U ti = [σ

























whereas lying by issuing mi = 1 when si = q gives
U li = [σ


























Truth-telling is optimal for agent i if and only if U ti ≥ U li or equivalently


























7We modify Assumption 1 by requiring P > Q rather than P > q with Q as defined in
(31). This ensures that, as in the model with evidence, the specified project selection rule
can be rationalized as the outcome of an arbitrary voting procedure.
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Truth-telling, (mL,mH) = (sL, sH), forms an equilibrium if and only if P ≥
max{P dL, P dH}. Perhaps surprisingly, the range of parameters for which truth-







Our analysis in this section shows that Proposition 1.1 and the corre-
sponding Corollary 1.1 remain valid in settings with non-verifiable informa-
tion. In the model with signals, the economic mechanisms involved are similar
to the ones in the model with evidence. However, there exists one additional
mechanism. This mechanism is similar to a subordinate’s propensity to
conform with the views of his superior (Prendergast, 1993). Each agent
has an incentive to issue a message that reinforces rather than contradicts
his partner’s signal. Since messages are issued simultaneously and signals
are more likely to coincide than to contradict each other, agents therefore
have an additional incentive to tell the truth. It is reassuring that our results
remain unchanged even in the presence of such a propensity to agree.
1.7.3 Good news
Assume that agents also get information if there is “good news”, i.e. if the
quality of project Q is high. This means that there is always one agent
informed and one agent uninformed. Given an agent receives “good news”,
he would want to work on project Q and the other agent to provide high
effort. Both can be attained by disclosure and thus the only sub-game perfect
strategy is to disclose whenever there is “good news”. If an agent gets “bad
news” and conceals, the uninformed agent knows that quality of project Q
is low. He will thus provide low effort and the informed agent prefers to
disclose and adopt project P . Hence, if there is always one agent who gets
information, there is always full disclosure.
Alternatively, assume that if there is “good news”, each agent gets
information with independent probability π ∈ (0, 1). Again, if an agent gets
“good news”, he would always disclose since there is no trade-off between
motivation and adaptation. If an agent remains uninformed, he knows for
sure that there was no “good news”. However, he is not sure whether there
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was “bad news” or “no news”. With probability 1
2
(1 − π)2, the quality of
project Q is high but there was no information. With probability 1
4
(1− di),
there was “bad news” but the other agent conceals. Hence, the uninformed




(1− di)q + 12(1− π)2
1
4
(1− di) + 12(1− π)2
. (35)
In a full disclosure equilibrium, i.e. when d∗L = d
∗
H = 1, uninformed agents
are sure again that there was no “bad news”. Hence, the disclosure thresholds








maximize surplus given symmetric information.
1.7.4 Technology
Our model assumes a linear relation between individual efforts and the
projects’ likelihood of success. In the following, we relax this assumption
by requiring that, instead of (1),
RX(eL, eH) = r(Σ)X with Σ = γeL + eH . (36)
The function r is assumed to be increasing and concave and to take values
in [0, 1]. Agents share the revenue according to the sharing rule αL = α and
αH = 1−α. Note first that when the project’s quality is (commonly) known
to be X then equilibrium efforts, e∗L(X) and e
∗
H(X), are uniquely defined as
the solution to the system of equations
eL =αγr
′(Σ)X (37)
eH =(1− α)r′(Σ)X. (38)
By the definition of Σ it must therefore hold that
Σ
r′(Σ)
= (αγ2 + 1− α)X. (39)
Define the solution to this equation as Σ∗(α) and note that Σ∗(α) is
decreasing by the concavity of r.
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Using Σ∗(α), we can write e∗L =
αγ
αγ2+1−α




the symmetric information benchmark, the surplus-maximizing sharing rule
is thus given by




α2γ2 + (1− α)2
(αγ2 + 1− α)2 Σ
∗(α)2. (40)




2γ2 + (1− α)2







(αγ2 + 1− α)3Σ
∗(α)2 = 0.
(41)
As the first term is negative, for the first order condition to hold, the second
term must be positive. This shows that in the symmetric information
benchmark, αsym < 1
2
, i.e. surplus is maximized by granting the more
productive agent a larger share of revenue.
Next, consider the agents’ disclosure incentives. Full disclosure is an
equilibrium if and only if the following two inequalities are satisfied:
UdL = αr(γe
∗






























From (37) and (38) it follows that e∗L(X) =
γα
1−α









8 Hence, UdL ≥ U cL if
and only if UdH ≥ U cH or, in other words, disclosure incentives are equalized,
P dL(α) = P
d
H(α), when α = α
dis. As before, the parameter space for which full
disclosure constitutes an equilibrium is maximized when the less productive
agent receives a larger share of revenue α = αdis > 1
2
.
8To see that U cH = γ




the fact that for α = γ
2
1+γ2
, γeL(1) = eH(1).
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While for technologies such as (36) a characterization of the partnership’s
surplus-maximizing sharing rule α∗ proves elusive, our analysis in this section
reveals that optimal incentives for motivation (αsym < 1
2
) and optimal
incentives for adaptation (αdis > 1
2
) can be expected to be opposed quite
generally.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper considers a standard situation of team production with effort
substitutes, asymmetric information and project selection. When designing
the optimal sharing rule, we find that there is a trade-off between motivation
and information sharing. Optimal motivation given symmetric information
requires giving a higher share to the more productive agent. Maximizing
the propensity of information sharing requires the opposite distribution of
revenue: to give a high share to the less productive agent. This result is
robust to changes in the assumptions regarding the informational structure.
The trade-off gives a rationale for more equal sharing since there is a need
to balance the incentives to provide effort and to share information.
Our main result characterizes the optimal shares when full disclosure is
feasible. It turns out that if agents are rather heterogeneous and projects do
not differ too much in quality in case of “bad news”, some concealment is
optimal. Furthermore, giving a higher or equal share to the less productive
agent is optimal in a range of parameters, since the team benefits from
improved information sharing.
A limitation of our results comes from the specific form of the revenue
function. We do not consider complementary effort. However, complemen-
tarities would only bring more symmetry into the model and would therefore
work in favor of equal sharing. Hence, we considered the most conservative
case regarding equal sharing. Complementarities are left to future research.
In this paper, we took the organizational form (partnership) as given and
determined the optimal shape (sharing rule). Our model could also be used
to study the benefits of partnerships compared to other organizational forms.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1

























] 1 + P 2
2
. (45)
Take αH = 1−αL. We want to choose αL in order to maximize the total
















The second order condition is
∂2Esym[S(α)]
∂α2L
= −(γ2L + γ2H)
1 + P 2
2
< 0 (47)
Strictly concave in αL, hence we found the unique maximum.
1.9.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Total expected surplus given disclosure strategies is






































































We can simplify this expression by separating revenues and costs for each
agent:









































































(1 − di)qÊj[Q] + 12Êj[Q] = 14(1 − di)Êj[Q]2 + 12Êj[Q]2 for
i = L,H. Hence, the expected surplus can be written as































, i = L,H. (52)
Take αH = 1−αL. We want to choose αL in order to maximize the total
expected surplus. The optimal shares given disclosure strategies follow from
the first order condition
∂E[S(α, dL, dH)]
∂αL
= γ2Lq̂L − γ2H q̂H − αLγ2Lq̂L + (1− αL)γ2H q̂H
!
= 0 (53)






The second order condition is
∂2E[S(α, dL, dH)]
∂α2L
= −γ2Lq̂L − γ2H q̂H < 0. (55)
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Expected surplus given disclosure strategies is strictly concave in αL, hence
we found the unique maximum.
Note that dL = dH implies that q̂L = q̂H . Hence, if both agents play the
same disclosure strategy, we are back to the shares αsym.








1.9.3 Proof of Lemma 1.1











































































(P 2 − q2)(αiγ2i + 2αjγ2j )2
> 0. (61)









1.9.4 Proof of Proposition 1.3
Agent L discloses if P ≥ P dL while agent H discloses if P ≥ P dH . We want to
find the shares αL and αH = 1− αL that maximize the range of P in which
both agents fully disclose. Hence, we need to find the αL that minimizes
the maximum of the two thresholds P dL and P
d
H . We know from (57) and
(58) that the threshold P dL strictly decreases in αL and P
d
H strictly increases
in αL. A change in αL moves the thresholds in opposite directions. Thus,
max[P dL, P
d
H ] is minimized when the thresholds are just equal:







Lq + 2(1− αL)γ2H ]




q[(1− αL)γ2Hq + 2αLγ2L]








1.9.5 Proof of Proposition 1.4
We show that there exists a P e for which α∗L(P
e) = 1
2
and which lies in the
range [P , P̄ ]:















2) The threshold P e lies in the range [P , P̄ ] for all q ∈ (0, P ) and γL <
γH ≤ 1:















P e ≥ P ⇔ 2q(γ
2





1.9.6 Proof of generality of voting rule
Take any voting rule in which the probability that a project is chosen
increases if an agent votes for that project. We denote the probability that
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project P is implemented given agent i votes for project X and given agent
i’s expectation about the other agent’s vote as ρX . ρX is higher if an agent
votes for project P : ρP > ρQ. An agent then chooses project P if and only if
ρPEi[U
P
i ] + (1− ρP )Ei[UQi ] ≥ ρQEi[UPi ] + (1− ρQ)Ei[UQi ] (67)
⇔ (ρP − ρQ)Ei[UPi ] ≥ (ρP − ρQ)Ei[UQi ]
⇔ Ei[UPi ] ≥ Ei[UQi ].
Hence, agent i votes for the project from which he expects a higher utility.
Since the quality of project P is common knowledge, the expected utility
of project P is independent of any additional information agents might have:
Ei[U
P
i ] = αi(αiγ
2









In contrast, the expected utility of project Q depends on whether an
agent received evidence about the quality of project Q. If an agent remains
uninformed, his expected utility of project Q takes into account that if the
quality of project Q is low, the other agent was informed:
Ei[U
Q






































i ](no info)−Ei[UPi ] is decreasing in P . There is thus
a threshold P̃ such that the difference is positive for P ≤ P̃ . By Assumption
1 (P ≤ E[Q]) we thus know that Ei[UQi ](no info) > Ei[UPi ] for all possible
P since
P̃ > E[Q] ⇔ αi[7− dj + q(5− 3dj)](1 + dj)γ2i (3− di) (71)
+ 2αj(3− dj)γ2j [(3− di)(3q + 1)dj + (q + 3)di + 7− 3q] > 0.
Hence, if an agent is uninformed, he would vote for project Q.
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If an agent is informed and discloses, both agents know the qualities of
both projects and will provide individually optimal efforts. The agent will
then vote for the project with higher quality, i.e. for project P :
Ei[U
P
i ] > Ei[U
Q
i ](info, disclosed) (72)

















⇔ P > q.
If an agent is informed and does not disclose, his expected utility of
project Q takes into account that the other agent forms expectations about
the quality of project Q:
Ei[U
Q
i ](info, concealed) = αi(αiγ
2









If this was lower than the expected utility of project P , he would have
disclosed in the first place, making sure that the other agent also votes for
project P .
He knows, if he discloses, that project P will be chosen. If he conceals,
the other agent will vote for project Q and hence he can make sure that
project Q is chosen by also voting for project Q.
1.9.7 Proof of Lemma 1.2
Throughout this proof, we denote αL = α and αH = 1 − α. We show with
a series of lemmata that at least one agent fully discloses and none of them
fully conceals if P ∈ [P ,√q) and both disclose if P ≥ √q.
Lemma 1.3. If P ≥ P , agent L is willing to disclose at least partially.
Proof. P cL(α) is strictly decreasing in α (see 1.9.3) and P
c
L(α = 0) = P .
Hence, P cL(α) ≤ P for all α ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 1.4. If P ≥ P , agent H is willing to disclose at least partially.
Proof. P cH(α) is strictly increasing in α (see 1.9.3) and P
c
H(α = 1) = P .
Hence, P cH(α) ≤ P for all α ∈ [0, 1].
47
CHAPTER 1. PARTNERSHIPS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Lemma 1.5. If P ≥ P , at least one of the agents is willing to fully disclose.












P dL(α) ≤ P . Thus, for all α ∈ [0, 1], min[P dL(α), P dH(α)] ≤ P .
Lemma 1.6. If P ≥ √q, both agents are willing to fully disclose, independent
of α.
Proof. P dL(α) is strictly decreasing in α (see 1.9.3) and P
d
L(α = 0) =
√
q.
Hence, P dL(α) ≤
√
q for all α ∈ [0, 1]. P dH(α) is strictly increasing in α (see
1.9.3) and P dH(α = 1) =
√
q. Hence, P dH(α) ≤
√
q for all α ∈ [0, 1].
These Lemmata imply that in the range P ∈ [P ,√q), three types of
equilibria can arise: both agents disclose, agent L discloses while agent
H mixes and agent L mixes while agent H discloses. In the range P ∈
[
√
q, E[Q]), both agents always fully disclose information.
1.9.8 Proof of Proposition 1.5
Throughout this proof, we denote αL = α and αH = 1− α.
We showed in Section 1.5.1 that α is optimal in the range α ∈ [α, ᾱ], i.e.
if there is full disclosure.
If α ≤ α, agent L starts concealing partially. We prove in 1) that the
surplus when agent H is disclosing and agent L partially conceals is concave
in α. We also show that it is strictly increasing at α for P ∈ [P̂ , P̄ ], with
P̂ ∈ [P , P̄ ]. Hence, for such P , α < α would yield lower surplus than α. α
brings us back to full disclosure. For P ∈ [P , P̂ ], α < α would yield higher
surplus than α and hence some concealment is optimal.
If α ≥ ᾱ, agent H starts concealing partially. We prove in 2) that surplus
is decreasing at α ≥ ᾱ for all P ∈ [P , P̄ ). Hence, the maximal surplus we
get for α ∈ [ᾱ, 1] is at ᾱ. Since we are then back to full disclosure, α would
yield a higher surplus.
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1) Proof that α is optimal in [0, α] if P ∈ [P̂ ,√q).













We first show that this surplus is concave in α for P ≥ P . Then we find
conditions for the surplus to be increasing in α at α.
Surplus Smd is strictly concave in α for P ≥ P




















∂SP [eL(P ), eH(P )]
∂α
















The second derivative depends on P only via P 2. We therefore replace




that, if C(x∗) = 0 then ∂
2Smd
∂α2
(P ∗) = 0 with P ∗ =
√
x∗. Furthermore
C(x) > 0 ⇔ ∂2Smd
∂α2
(P ) > 0 for P =
√
x. Therefore, by showing that C(x)
is negative for x ∈ [P 2, E[Q]2), we also show that ∂2Smd
∂α2
(P ) is negative for
P ∈ [P ,E[Q]).
We can indeed show that C(x) is negative for x ∈ [P 2, E[Q]2) by proving
that 1) C strictly decreases in x and 2) C is strictly negative at x = P 2.
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Hence it is strictly negative also for all x > P 2. This implies that the second
derivative is strictly negative for P ∈ [P ,E[Q]).










q[αγ2 + 2(1− α)]3 < 0. (76)
2) At x = P 2, C(x) is strictly negative:
T ≡ 4
5
q[αγ2 + 2(1− α)]3C(P 2). (77)
Whenever T is strictly negative, C(P 2) is strictly negative too. We can





[αγ2 + 2(1− α)]q(2− γ2)(γ2 + 1)
[(1 + γ2)q2 + 3q(1− γ2) + 2− γ2] < 0. (78)











qγ4(γ2 + 1)[(γ2 + 1)q2 + 3(1− γ2)q + 2− γ2] > 0, (79)
T (α = 1) = − 4
15
qγ6[(3γ2 − 4q + 6)q + γ2(1− q2) + 1] < 0. (80)
Hence, T < 0 for all α ≤ 1. This implies that C(P 2) < 0 for α ∈ [0, 1].
We showed that C(x) is strictly decreasing in x and already strictly negative
at x = P 2. This implies that Smd is strictly concave in α for P ≥ P .
Surplus Smd is increasing in α at α if P ∈ [P̂ ,
√
q] with P̂ ∈ (P , P̄ ).
We want to show that the derivative of Smd wrt α at α (=S
′
md(α)) is
positive if the quality of project P is high enough. Define
D(x) ≡ 8q(1− q)[2(q − x) + γ2(x− q2)]S ′md(α, P ) (81)
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with x = P 2. Given x ∈ [P 2, q], in order to show that S ′md(α) is positive at
a certain P , we need to show that D(x) is positive at x = P 2.
We first observe (a) that D(x) is strictly increasing in x for x ∈ [P 2, q].
Then we show in (b) that D(x) is strictly positive at x = P̄ 2 and in (c) that
D(x) is strictly negative at x = P 2 if q > q̄. These observations tell us that
if q > q̄ there exists a threshold x̂ = P̂ 2 ∈ (P 2, P̄ 2) such that D(x) > 0 if
and only if x ∈ [P̂ 2, q), which implies S ′md(α) > 0 if and only if P ∈ [P̂ ,
√
q).
When q < q̄, D(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [P 2, q) and thus S ′md(α) > 0 for all
P ∈ [P ,√q).
a) D(x) is strictly increasing in x:
The first derivative of D(x) wrt x is convex x:
∂3D(x)
∂x3
= 18γ2(2− γ2) > 0, (82)



















q(1− q2)[(4− γ4)q + 4γ4 + 2− 3
2
γ2(1− q)] > 0. (84)
Hence the first derivative with respect to x is strictly positive for all
x ≥ P 2.
b) D(x) is strictly positive at x = P̄ 2:
D(P̄ 2) =










(1 + γ2)q2(1− q)2[7γ2 − 4− (2− γ2)q2 − (6− 4γ2)q] < 0
⇔ 0 > 7γ2 − 4− (2− γ2)q2 − (6− 4γ2)q
⇔ γ <
√
2(2 + 3q + q2)
7 + 4q + q2
≡ γ(q). (86)
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Homogeneity γ must be low enough to make it negative. If γ is
low enough γ < γ(q), there exists a unique P̂ ∈ (P , P̄ ) for which




13 + 10q + q2
21/2(7 + 4q + q2)3/2(2 + 3q + q2)1/2
> 0, (87)
2) Proof that ᾱ is optimal in [ᾱ, 1]
The ex-ante expected total surplus of the team if agent L always discloses











S1[eL(ÊL[Q]), eH(ÊH [Q])]. (88)
We want to show that Sdm is decreasing for α ∈ [ᾱ, 1] in the range
P ∈ [P ,√q). αdis is the lowest share for which the equilibrium in which L
fully discloses and H mixes exists given P ≥ P . If α was smaller (α < αdis),
agent H would want to disclose for all P ≥ P , i.e. P dH(α) < P . Hence,
ᾱ ≥ αdis and therefore it is sufficient to show that Sdm is decreasing for
α ∈ [αdis, 1].
Surplus Sdm is strictly decreasing for α ∈ [αdis, 1]




























While the first term is negative, the other terms can be positive or
negative. It is thus difficult to show directly that S ′dm is negative. However,
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[2αγ2 + (1− α)]4 > 0. (90)
We thus only have to show that S ′dm is negative at α = α
dis and α = 1.





{(2γ4 − 5)q4 − (γ2 + 7)q3 (91)
+ [12 + (4γ6 − 8γ4 − 15γ2 + 21)P 2]q2
+ P 2(3− 12γ4 + 9γ2)q − 3P 4(2γ2 − 1)γ2}.
We replace x = P 2 and hence have to show that S ′dm(α
dis) is strictly












The second derivative is positive if γ2 > 1
2
and negative if γ2 < 1
2
. If
it is negative ii), S ′dm(α
dis) is concave in x and we have to show that it
is decreasing and negative at x = P 2. If it is positive iii), S ′dm(α
dis) is
convex in x and we have to show that it is negative at x = P 2 and at
x = q.
i) S ′dm(α













dis) is strictly negative for all x ∈ [P 2, P̄ 2] if γ2 < 1
2
:
If γ2 < 1
2
, S ′dm(α
dis) is strictly concave in x. In this case we have
to show that S ′dm(α
dis) is a) decreasing in x at x = P 2 and b)
negative at x = P 2.
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a) S ′dm(α










⇔− 3 + 13γ




4 − 13γ2 − 3
4γ6 − 12γ4 − 13γ2 + 21 . (94)
This threshold for q is strictly negative for γ2 < 1
2
: Define
T (z) ≡ 20z2−13z−3
4z3−12z2−13z+21
. Then we have to show that T (z) < 0
for z < 1
2
. The denominator DN is always strictly positive
since it is concave in z (DN ′′ = −24(1 − z)) and it is
strictly positive at z = 0 (DN(z=0)=21) and at z = 1
2
(DN(z=1/2)=12). The nominator N is strictly negative since
it is convex in z (N ′′ = 40) and strictly negative at z = 0
(N(z = 0) = −3) and z = 1
2
(N(z = 1/2) = −9
2
) and hence




dis) is strictly negative at x = P 2:
S ′dm(α
dis, P 2) = − 1
36(1 + γ2)
[(2q2 + 4q)γ6 (95)
− (2q2 + 18q + 16)γ4
+ (11− 7q2 − 10q)γ2 + 3q2 + 12q + 21].
We replace z = γ2 and then have to show that R is strictly
positive for z < 1
2
:
R ≡ (2q2 + 4q)z3 − (2q2 + 18q + 16)z2 (96)
+ (11− 7q2 − 10q)z + 3q2 + 12q + 21 > 0.
R is strictly concave in z (R′′ = −[4(8−3q2z)+12q(3−2z)+
4q2]) and strictly positive at z = 0 (R(z = 0) = 3q2+12q+21)
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and at z = 1 (R(z = 1) = 16− 4q2 − 12q). Hence, R > 0 for
all z ∈ [0, 1].
It follows that S ′dm(α
dis, P 2) < 0 for q ∈ [0, p] and z ∈ [0, 1].
iii) S ′dm(α
dis) is strictly negative for all x ∈ [P 2, q] if γ2 > 1
2
:
If γ2 > 1
2
, S ′dm(α
dis) is strictly convex in x. We just showed that
S ′dm(α
dis) is strictly negative at x = P 2 for γ2 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, we
are left to show that S ′dm(α
dis) is also strictly negative at x = q.
Convexity then implies that S ′dm(α
dis) is strictly negative for all
x ∈ [P 2, q].
S ′dm(α
dis, q) = (97)
(18 + 8q − 2q2)γ4 − 4qγ6 + (16q − 12)γ2 + 5q2 − 14q − 15
24(1 + γ2)
.
We can show that this is a) strictly convex in q, b) strictly negative
at q = 0 and c) strictly negative at q = 1:
a) S ′dm(α









dis, q) is strictly negative at q = 0:
S ′dm(α





dis, q) is non-positive at q = 1:
S ′dm(α




2) S ′dm is strictly negative at α = 1:
S ′dm(α = 1) = −
1
8q
[7P 2q + P 2 + 4q(1− q)]. (101)
We showed that the surplus is decreasing in α. Hence, it is optimal to
choose ᾱ.
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1.9.9 Proof of Proposition 1.6
Throughout this proof, we denote αL = α and αH = 1 − α. P e (defined by
α∗(P e) = 1
2
) lies in the range [P̂ , P̄ ], if and only if S ′md(ᾱ) is increasing at
P e. We show that this is true whenever γ2 >
√
6 − 2 and q < q̃. If these
conditions are fulfilled, equal sharing is optimal at P e.
S ′md(α) is positive at P
e if γ2 >
√
6− 2 and q < q̃ ∈ (0, 1]:
S ′md(α, P
e) =
(q2 + 1)γ6 + (6− 2q2 + 2q)γ4 + (6− 2q2 − 4q)γ2 − 4q − 4
4(γ2 + 2)2
. (102)









e) is strictly positive at q = 0 if γ2 >
√
6 − 2 ≈ 0.4495. It is
strictly negative at q = 1 if γ2 < 1. Hence, if γ2 >
√
6 − 2, there exists a
threshold q̃ ∈ (0, 1) such that S ′md(α, P e) > 0 if q < q̃:
q̃ =
(4− γ12 − 4γ10 + 9γ8 + 24γ6 + 4γ4)1/2






6 − 2, S ′md(α, P e) is negative for all q, so equal shares are not
optimal.
1.9.10 Proofs when different ability to receive infor-
mation
We assume that given project Q is of low quality, agents receive information




Udi (α, P, ei(P ), ej(P )) ≥ πjdjUdi (α, P, ei(P ), ej(P )) (105)
+ πj(1− dj)U ci (α, q, ei(q), ej(q))
+ (1− πj)U ci (α, q, ei(q), ej(Êj[Q])).
While agent i knows that quality is q, agent j might remain uninformed
and has to form expectations over the quality of project Q. Agent i knows
that if agent j remained uninformed, by Basian updating, he will believe
quality of project Q is
Êj[Q] =
(1− diπi)(1− πj)q + 1
(1− diπi)(1− πj) + 1
. (106)
Agent i discloses iff P ≥ P di , with
P di =
[
q{qαiγ2i [2− πi − πj(1− πi)] + 2αjγ2j [1 + (1− πj)(1− πi)q]}
(αiγ2i + 2αjγ
2


























2[2− πi − πj(1− πi)]
> 0. (109)
Consider the benchmark of symmetrically informed agents (equivalent to
full disclosure). The probability that they remain uninformed even though
the quality of project Q is low is (1 − πL)(1 − πH). If agents remain
uninformed, they update beliefs about the quality of project Q to (106)
with dL = dH = 1. In this situation, α







CHAPTER 2. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND SALIENCE
2.1 Introduction
Evidence from field and laboratory experiments suggests that preferences can
vary with the context (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1990; Simonson and Tversky,
1992). For example, introducing a dominated product might increase another
product’s demand, giving rise to the so-called decoy (Huber et al., 1982)
and compromise (Simonson, 1989) effects. Such context effects cannot be
explained by standard preferences since the presence of a product should
leave consumer choice between the other products unaffected.
One possible way of explaining context effects is the assumption that
consumers attach a higher weight to the attributes of a product that are
salient and the salience of the attributes depends on the context.
There is evidence for the effect of salience on the weights given to different
attributes. Chetty et al. (2009) find evidence that consumers underreact
to changes in taxes if taxes are not salient. Hossain and Morgan (2006),
studying the behavior of consumers on eBay, argue that shipping costs are
less salient than opening bids. They show that consumers indeed react less
to changes in shipping costs than to changes in opening bids. Recent results
in neuroeconomics are consistent with the idea that attention modulates
the weight given to different attributes (Hare et al., 2009; Fehr and Rangel,
2011). Marketing practitioners engage frequently in differentiating from their
competitors’ by drawing attention to certain attributes of their products
(Zhou, 2008).
Evidence shows that salience depends on how much attributes vary within
the choice set. Schkade and Kahneman (1998) consider the choice between
living in California and the Midwest and show that individuals place a higher
weight on attributes that differ strongly across these two options.
Imagine a supermarket offers two versions of whiskey. They are both
single malt whiskeys but differ in their age, with higher age being associated
with higher quality. The lower quality version is 12 years old while the
higher quality whiskey was in the barrel for 18 years. They are offered
for ✩30 and ✩40, respectively. A consumer values the younger version at
36 and the older version at 54. If the consumer has standard quasi-linear
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preferences, he prefers the older whiskey since it yields a higher utility. If a
consumer has salience-driven preferences, the high quality difference attracts
the consumer’s attention. The older version is 50% more valuable than the
younger version but it is only 30% more expensive. Since quality gets more
attention, i.e. since quality is salient, the consumer gives a higher weight to
this attribute which makes the older whiskey even more attractive. A couple
of weeks later, the same consumer enters the supermarket and finds the two
whiskeys are on sale. They are now offered at ✩15 and ✩25, respectively. The
price difference and the quality difference are still the same. A consumer
with standard preferences would again opt for the older whiskey. However,
the difference in price now stings out. While the older version is still 50%
more valuable, it is now 66.7% more expensive than the younger version.
Price is salient to a consumer with salience-driven preferences and thus gets
a higher weight. The consumer is not willing to pay the extra ✩10 anymore
and buys the younger whiskey. In this whiskey example, the attention and
weight a consumer gives to an attribute depends on whether an offer seems
to be a good deal, i.e. has a good quality-price ratio.
Such behavior can be explained by the salience-driven preferences of
Bordalo et al. (2013b). In an influential paper, they have proposed a model
of salient thinking which incorporates these observations. In their model,
consumers give a higher weight to more salient attributes of a product. The
salience of an attribute depends on the difference of the attribute’s value
to the average value of the attribute within the choice set. This implies a
context effect because each attribute’s average value depends on all products
that are offered. If products are defined by only two attributes, quality and
price, the model provides the intuitive result that consumers’ preferences are
biased towards the product with the higher quality-price ratio.
Salient thinking becomes relevant as soon as there is more than one
product in the market. Consequently, Bordalo et al. (2016) study the
implications of salience-driven consumer preferences for competing firms.
However, there is another situation in which several products may coexist.
In a market with heterogeneous preferences, a monopolist may offer multiple
products in order to separate different types of consumers. It remains an open
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question how a multi-product monopolist would react to salient thinking if
consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of quality.
Continuing with the example, consider a second type of consumer who
has a higher valuation of whiskey. This type values the 12 years old whiskey
at 40 and the 18 years old whiskey at 60. Being aware of the differences in
valuations, the supermarket can adopt different strategies. He can try to pool
both types of consumers either on the young or on the old version of whiskey.
Alternatively, the supermarket can choose prices and qualities such that the
high valuation type self-selects into buying the old whiskey, while the low
type buys the young version. Finally, the supermarket can exclude the low
type and only sell one version of the whiskey at a high price. When choosing
its strategy, the supermarket has to take into account that the design of its
products also influences whether its customers focus on the price or on the
age of the whiskeys.
This paper is interested in a monopolist’s optimal design of a product
portfolio, taking into account its effect on the salience of attributes. It looks
at the situation when two versions of the product are possible, e.g. 12 years
old and 18 years old whiskey. If the monopolist decides only to sell one
version of the product, he could additionally offer a “decoy”, i.e. a second
version of the product that manipulates consumer’s focus without actually
being sold. In a next step, I consider the possibility to offer more variants of
the product.
In order to investigate the optimal strategy of a monopolist, I introduce
the salience-driven consumer preferences of Bordalo et al. (2013b) into the
standard monopolist price discrimination model of Mussa and Rosen (1978).
A monopolist offers a product portfolio with products that are characterized
by their qualities and prices. There are two types of consumers with different
valuations of quality. As in Mussa and Rosen (1978), a consumer’s valuation
of quality is proportional to his type. Consumers have salience-driven
preferences, i.e. they give a higher weight to the attribute which is salient.
Following Bordalo et al. (2013b), when consumers compare two products,
they give a higher weight to quality if and only if the high-quality product
has a higher quality-price ratio. Giving a higher weight to quality increases a
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consumer’s willingness to pay since they overestimate the quality. Focussing
on price decreases the willingness to pay since it lets consumers overestimate
the costs.
The first result of this paper is that in comparison with the benchmark
case of consumers with standard preferences, we observe less separation if
consumers have salience-driven preferences. Separation of consumers with
salience-driven preferences is less profitable than if consumers had standard
preferences. At the same time, profits from pooling and excluding low types
increase. Assuming that the monopolist faces consumers with standard
preferences thus overestimates his propensity to employ price discrimination.
Furthermore, when separating consumers with salience-driven preferences,
there is a “distortion at the top” in the sense that in case of separation, the
monopolist offers a lower quality to the high type than he would if this type
was alone in the market.
In a market with two products, the same attribute is salient for both
products (Bordalo et al., 2013b). Generally, allowing for heterogeneous
consumers entails the possibility that different types focus on different
attributes. However, in the simple case of linear preferences as in Mussa
and Rosen (1978), all consumers focus on the same attribute. Hence, it
becomes a sensible question to ask under what conditions we will observe a
price-salient or a quality-salient market.
Which attribute is salient relates directly to the optimal strategy of the
monopolist. If there is separation in the market, consumers always focus on
price. Separation is optimal for an intermediate range of heterogeneity and
share of high types. If there is pooling or exclusion of low types in the market,
consumers always focus on quality. This is optimal when heterogeneity is low
and the share of high types is large or when heterogeneity is high and the
share of high types is low.
For our whiskey example, this implies that a supermarket should
optimally adapt the strategy to changes in valuations and share of high types.
Assume that during the week, there are few high types. It would thus be
optimal to pool the types on the older whiskey and offer the younger version
with only a small reduction in price. The younger whiskey serves to attract
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consumers’ attention towards quality. At the weekend, more consumers
have a high valuation of alcoholic drinks, which makes it more profitable
to separate. In order to separate the high and the low type, the supermarket
makes the older whiskey relatively more expensive and the customers focus
on the high price difference. Suppose that after a couple of weeks, the share
of high value consumers has increased. This new development makes it more
profitable for the supermarket to exclude the few low types and sell the older
whiskey only to the high types. It decreases the difference in price, which
makes consumers focus on quality.
If the monopolist can offer more products, he might be able to separate
consumers while making quality salient. It turns out that it is not always
possible to find three products which make the optimally separating products
quality salient. However, if the monopolist is not restricted in the number
of products, he can always induce quality salience in the market by offering
multiple decoys. Hence, the model predicts separation with quality salience
if development costs of such decoys are low and separation with price salience
if development costs are high. As long as development costs are non-zero,
the monopolist is less likely to separate than in the benchmark case with
standard preferences.
Hence, this paper provides an explanation for the observation that there
is little price discrimination even in settings in which we expect consumers
to be heterogeneous as e.g. in cinemas or theaters (Huntington, 1993; Leslie,
2004). Pooling is more likely to be observed if there are many consumers
with low valuation in the market and heterogeneity is not too high. This is
in line with the observation that motels often only offer one category while
hotels or airlines offer several categories in order to price discriminate (Hahn
et al., 2018).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
literature on standard price discrimination and price discrimination when
consumers have non-standard preferences. Section 2.3 presents the model,
including a review of the salience model of Bordalo et al. (2013b). In Section
2.4, the benchmark with consumers with standard preferences is considered.
Section 2.5 derives the optimal strategy of a monopolist facing consumers
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with salience-driven preferences and Section 2.6 presents some robustness
results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
2.2.1 Price discrimination with standard preferences
Price discrimination can be defined as the strategy to offer two or more similar
goods at prices that are in different ratios to marginal costs (e.g. books in
hardcover and in paperback) (Varian 1989, p.598). Such price discrimination
can be observed in situations of imperfect information, i.e. when consumers
have different types and a firm cannot directly observe these types. However,
the distribution of these types is common knowledge. In order to maximize
profits, a monopolist can offer several products and choose the design in
such a way that different types of consumers choose different versions of the
product. Price discrimination can occur for example in terms of quality,
quantity or intertemporally.
One of the first papers studying this problem was Mussa and Rosen
(1978). They consider a consumer’s utility function u(q, p; θ) = θq − p,
where q is the quality and p the price of a product. Consumers differ in
their valuation of quality θ. Mussa and Rosen (1978) solve the monopolist’s
problem and compare the offered products under monopoly with the offered
products under competition. When there are only two types of consumers
and the monopolist wants to separate, he offers the efficient quality to the
type with the higher valuation, i.e. the same quality as under competition or
perfect information. It is a very general result, that the consumer type with
the highest valuation of quality faces a marginal price equal to marginal costs
(Varian 1989, p.614). Such “no distortion at the top” is usually also true if
interpreted as the same quality being offered to the highest type as if this
type was alone in the market. However, this result does not hold if consumers
exhibit salient thinking and the monopolist is restricted to two products. If
separation is optimal, price is salient and the quality which is offered to the
high type is lower than in the absence of the low type. If there was only the
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high type, the monopolist could offer products which make quality salient
and would offer a higher quality.
In the case of two consumer types, the monopolist separates consumers
with standard preferences with a high-quality product which has a lower
quality-price ratio than the low-quality product. Considering salience-driven
preferences, the separation of types also requires offering the higher quality
product at a lower quality-price ratio. However, if the monopolist wants
to pool both types on the high-quality product or exclude low types, it is
optimal for him to offer the higher quality product at a higher quality-price
ratio. This allows the monopolist to make consumers focus on quality.
2.2.2 Price discrimination with non-standard prefer-
ences
In recent years, a considerable literature on monopolistic price discrimination
with consumers with non-standard preferences has developed. Typically,
consumers exhibit some behavioral bias and the monopolist can try to exploit
and benefit from this bias. In the case of context-dependent preferences,
the monopolist has to take into account his influence on the context. The
monopolist then often benefits from offering a “decoy”, i.e. an additional
product that is not meant to be sold but affects the attention of consumers.
Closest to this paper are papers which consider the monopolist’s problem
when the relative weights which consumers give to attributes depend on the
attributes of the offered products. Consumers weight attributes according to
a specific rule, i.e. there is no strategic attention allocation. Dahremöller and
Fels (2015) assume that consumers give higher weights to attributes which
they value strongly and which vary strongly in the choice set. Furthermore,
the cost of considering an additional attribute increases in the number of
considered attributes. They show how a monopolist benefits from offering
different products even if consumers are homogeneous because it manipulates
the expectations of consumers. Considering heterogeneous consumers, they
restrict attention to the case in which the monopolist can only offer two
products with attributes quality and price. If the optimal products separate
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the types, the type with high valuation of quality will focus on quality while
the type with low valuation focuses on price. The monopolist will thus
over-provide quality for the high type and under-provide quality for the low
type. This is different to the results of this paper, which say that when the
monopolist can only offer two products, separation implies that both types
of consumers focus on price. The monopolist will therefore under-provide
quality for both types compared to the quality he would offer to consumers
with standard preferences. Given the definition of salience of Bordalo et al.
(2013b) and linear preferences, it is impossible for the monopolist to make
consumer types focus on different attributes. In contrast to that, Dahremöller
and Fels (2015) assume that higher weight is given to attributes which have
a high difference between highest and lowest type-specific value. This makes
it possible that different types focus on different attributes.
Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) develop a model with focus-weighted utility.
Consumers focus and thus give more weight to attributes which have a
greater range of consumption utility. The range is defined by the difference
of the maximal and the minimal utility which an attribute in the choice set
yields. Compared to Dahremöller and Fels (2015), the attention a consumer
allocates to an attribute is independent of other attributes’ characteristics.
Wisson (2015) applies that model of focusing to the monopolist’s problem.
He finds that if focusing is strong enough, it widens the valuation gap between
consumers. In equilibrium, the high type focuses on quality whereas the low
type focuses on price. Incentive compatibility constraints do not bind in that
case. The monopolist can offer the efficient product to high types and extract
almost all surplus, while still serving the low types. In contrast to the case
with standard preferences, separation now always dominates only serving
high types and pooling is optimal in some situations. An additional insight
of Wisson (2015) is that the monopolist does not benefit from offering a decoy
in most cases. The difficulty not to make the decoy more desirable than the
other products restricts the increase in profits. Again the predictions differ
from my result that the monopolist separates with products which make
price salient. Making quality salient for one type and price salient for the
other type makes it easier to separate and increases profits. However, one
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of my results says that the monopolist would optimally want both types of
consumers to focus on quality since this increases the willingness to pay.
He would thus always try to offer decoys which implement this pattern of
attention.
In the previous models by Dahremöller and Fels (2015), Kőszegi and
Szeidl (2013) and Wisson (2015), the salience of attributes depends on the
products in the choice set. The monopolist can influence salience by designing
these products. In contrast, Zhou (2008) assumes that salience can directly
be influenced by the monopolist. The monopolist can use advertising to draw
attention towards some of the product’s attributes.
This paper is related to a broader literature on monopolistic pricing in
the presence of consumers with non-standard preferences. Carbajal and Ely
(2012), Heidhues and Kőszegi (2004), Herweg and Mierendorff (2013), Hahn
et al. (2018) and Karle and Möller (2017) consider a monopolist facing loss
averse consumers. Hahn et al. (2018) find that loss aversion can explain why
we observe pooling more often than expected. Similar to our model, price
discrimination comes at a cost. Courty and Nasiry (2016) show how loss
aversion can explain uniform/compressed pricing of different quality levels.
Allowing the monopolist to offer decoys, our model predicts that he has an
incentive to reduce price variance in order to make quality salient. Rotemberg
(2011) finds the optimal products for fair consumers and DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2004) let consumers discount hyperbolically. Esteban et al.
(2007)’s consumers have self-control preferences in the sense of Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001). Grubb (2009) lets his monopolist sell to overconfident
consumers.
Salient thinking in the sense of Bordalo et al. (2013b) has been considered
in other settings as e.g. competitive markets (Bordalo et al. 2016, Herweg et
al. 2017) and asset markets (Bordalo et al., 2013a) or combined with limited
attention (Inderst and Obradovits, 2015) and attribute shrouding (Inderst
and Obradovits, 2016). Herweg et al. 2017 look at heterogeneous consumers
in a setting with a brand manufacturer and a competitive fringe and show
that the manufacturer benefits from introducing a decoy.
Alternative models of salience are developed e.g. by Kőszegi and Szeidl
68
2.2. RELATED LITERATURE
(2013), Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006).
2.2.3 Empirical evidence
The salience-driven preferences of Bordalo et al. (2013b) provide an ex-
planation to several observations which are hard to explain by standard
preferences. Some evidence on context effects and salience-driven preferences
has been mentioned in the introduction. Additional evidence on context
effects is provided for example by Thaler (1985). He finds that the willingness
to pay for a bottle of beer depends on the shop in which the consumer
buys it. Hastings and Shapiro (2013) report that when the price of gasoline
increased, surprisingly many consumers switched to cheaper low-quality
gasoline. Evidence that individuals focus on salient characteristics is shown
e.g. by Barber and Odean (2008). They find that investors simplify a decision
by choosing the salient option. A lot of research in political science has been
done on the choice of candidates on a ballot. Ho and Imai (2008) find that
being the first, and thus salient, candidate on the list improves the chances
to be chosen. Chetty et al. (2009) show that consumers react more strongly
to tax changes if taxes are salient. Finally, Dertwinkel-Kalt et al. (2017)
find strong support for the implications of salience-driven preferences in a
laboratory experiment.
It is difficult to find evidence on products which are offered only in order
to manipulate the consumer choices since firms are usually reluctant to reveal
their strategies. However, some evidence suggests that they actually do offer
such decoys. Ariely (2008) runs an experiment in which he tests the offer of
The Economist. He finds that the introduction of a third, dominated option
increases the share of consumers choosing the expensive offer. Vikander
(2010) considers Audi advertising a premium car in halftime of super bowl
as an example of a firm offering a high-quality product at a high price
to consumers who are not supposed to buy it. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011)
explain that Apple concentrates the advertisement for its MacBook Air on
the extreme feature of being very thin. This attracts consumers into the
store where they learn that the MacBook Air has, for example, no DVD
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drive. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) interpret the healthy food at McDonald’s as
a strategy to attract consumers with a healthy image, without the intention
to sell it. These decoy products have in common that they are rather bad
deals in the sense of a low quality-price ratio. While most of them are high-
quality products which are offered at a high price, also low-quality products
can serve as decoys. Heath and Chatterjee (1995) report a meta-analysis
of evidence for the effect of low-quality decoys. Jahedi (2011) conducts lab
experiments to show how bargains influence consumers’ decisions. He finds
evidence that participants rather buy a product if it is presented next to
a less attractive offer. Facing consumers with salience-driven preferences, I
find that the monopolist offers low-quality decoys whenever he wants to pool
or to exclude the low types. Thereby, he can attract consumer attention
towards quality.
2.3 Model
Following the seminal model by Mussa and Rosen (1978), consider a
monopolist facing consumers with different valuations of quality.
There is a continuum of consumers. A share α ∈ (0, 1) is of type H and
a share (1−α) is of type L. Consumer i’s experience utility from consuming
a product with quality q and price p is given by quasi-linear preferences for
i = L,H:
ui(q, p) = θiq − p, (1)
where θi denotes the valuation of quality. The two types of consumers value
quality differently with θH = 1 and θL = θ < 1. With such preferences,
the difference in types can be interpreted as difference in income and higher
income increases the demand.1
1I will show in Section 2.6.3 that the results hold for any quasi-linear utility function
u(q, θi) − p, with u(q, θi) increasing and concave in q, increasing in θi and satisfying the




The monopolist offers products with quality q and price p. The
production technology exhibits constant returns to scale and production costs
are increasing in quality at an increasing rate. For simplicity, assume that
costs take the form c(q) = 1
2
q2.2 The monopolist’s problem is to offer a
product portfolio that maximizes his profit. Since the monopolist cannot
observe the type of the consumer, he offers the same product portfolio to
all consumers. Consumers observe all products that are offered. Since in
Mussa and Rosen (1978) it is optimal for the monopolist to offer at most
two products, I start with the assumption that the monopolist is restricted
to two products. This restriction can be justified by high and increasing
development costs. While the development costs of a second product can be
covered by the additional profit, the development costs of a third product are
for now assumed to be too high. Alternatively, one can think of products,
where only two versions are possible. For example, there is typically only a
first and a second class in the train. Books are offered with paperback or
with hardcover. Food products have a standard and an organic version. In
Section 2.6, I consider the monopolist’s problem when he could offer three
or more products.
Following Bordalo et al. (2013b), consumers have salience-driven pref-
erences. If one attribute is more salient than the other, consumers give
more weight to that attribute. Their decision utility ud(q, p) therefore differs
from their experience utility. If quality is salient, price gets lower weight,
characterized by the salience parameter δ ∈ (0, 1]. If price is salient, quality
gets lower weight δ. A consumer of type i = H,L thus considers the following
decision utility3:




θiq − δp if quality is salient
δθiq − p if price is salient
θiq − p if price and quality are equally salient.
(2)
Which attribute gets more attention is not chosen by the consumer but is
endogenously determined by the monopolist’s choice of offered products. The
2In Section 2.6.4, I generalize the main results to any increasing, strictly convex cost
function, i.e. any c(q) with c′(q) > 0, c′′(q) > 0 and c(0) = 0.
3For simplicity, I use the same utility function as Bordalo et al. (2016).
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salience of an attribute a depends on its distance to this attribute’s value of a
reference product. The reference product is defined by the average values of
each attribute ā = 1
N
∑
j aj, where N is the number of products (j = 1, .., N)
in the consideration set. I assume that the consideration set consists of
the products offered by the monopolist. Nevertheless, the consumer can
always decide not to buy.4 The salience of an attribute a is then given by the
symmetric and continuous salience function σ(a, ā). There are two important
assumptions on this salience function: ordering and homogeneity of degree
zero. Ordering means that a higher distance from an attribute to its average
leads to a higher value of the salience function:
Assumption 1 (Ordering). Let µ = sgn(aj− ā). Then for any ǫ, ǫ′ ≥ 0 with
ǫ+ ǫ′ > 0, we have
σ(aj + µǫ, ā− µǫ′) > σ(aj, ā). (3)
Intuitively, higher differences attract the attention more strongly. The
second assumption captures the idea that the salience of an attribute is
independent of its unit of measurement:
Assumption 2 (Homogeneity of degree zero).
σ(αaj, αā) = σ(aj, ā) for all α > 0. (4)
Assuming that the salience function is homogeneous of degree zero and
satisfies ordering implies diminishing sensitivity for positive attribute levels.
The same distance to the average leads to a lower salience at higher levels of
a and ā:
Diminishing sensitivity : For any aj, ā ≥ 0 and all ǫ > 0, we have
σ(aj + ǫ, ā+ ǫ) > σ(aj, ā). (5)
Diminishing sensitivity incorporates Weber’s law into the salience func-
tion. Weber’s law says that the perceived change in stimuli gets smaller at
higher initial levels of the stimuli.
4This assumption differs from the assumption of Bordalo et al. (2013b). They consider
the outside option to be part of the consideration set.
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Considering only two attributes, quality and price, quality is salient for a
product j and a consumer i if and only if the salience function is higher for
quality than for price:
σ(θiqj, θiq̄) > σ(pj, p̄). (6)
Price is salient if and only if σ(θiqj, θiq̄) < σ(pj, p̄) and price and quality
are equally salient if and only if σ(θiqj, θiq̄) = σ(pj, p̄). In contrast to
Bordalo et al. (2013b), consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of
quality. It is assumed that the salience of quality is defined by the subjective
utility from quality θiq and not by objective quality q. However, it follows
directly from the assumption of homogeneity of degree zero and the linearity
of preferences that the value of the salience function is independent of the
type of a consumer:
σ(θiaj, θiā) = σ(aj, ā) for all θi > 0. (7)
Whether a product’s price or a product’s quality is salient does therefore
not depend on the type of the consumer. The same attribute is salient for all
types and which attribute is salient thus constitutes a feature of the market
under consideration.5
We can use Proposition 1 from Bordalo et al. (2013b) in order to
determine which attribute is salient. Homogeneity of degree zero of the
salience function implies that the salience of attributes is determined by the
quality-price ratio of a product. Given a product (qj, pj) is neither dominated
nor dominates the reference product (q̄, p̄), i.e. (qj − q̄)(pj − p̄) > 0, then








In the case of two products (qH , pH) and (qL, pL) with qH > qL and
pH > pL, the Proposition implies that quality is salient for both products if
5This result relies on preferences being linear in the taste parameter θ. Hence, it also
holds for experience utility given by θiu(q)−p. If experience utility is equal to u(q, θi)−p,
different types might focus on different attributes.
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whereas price is salient when the inequality is reversed. Quality is salient if
and only if the quality-price ratio of the high-quality product is higher than
the quality-price ratio of the low-quality product.
Without taking into account salient thinking, the monopolist will separate
by offering the high-quality product at a higher price per quality. Price will
then be salient, which reduces the willingness to pay of the consumers and
might thus not be in the best interest of the monopolist. In the next section, I
will derive this benchmark result when consumers have standard preferences.
2.4 Benchmark with standard preferences
The monopolist can offer two different products and induce types to separate
or he can pool by selling the same product to both types. As a third option, he
can exclude the low type from the market by offering a product(s) that only
the high type is willing to buy. In this section, I will review the results from
the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) with two types of consumers and use
it as a benchmark. In the following section, the optimal product portfolio for
consumers with salience-driven preferences is determined in order to compare
it with the benchmark.
If the monopolist wants to separate the two types, he has to take into
account the participation constraints (PC) and the incentive compatibility










s.t. θqL − pL ≥ 0 PCL
qH − pH ≥ 0 PCH
θqL − pL ≥ θqH − pH ICL
qH − pH ≥ qL − pL. ICH
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It is well known that the participation constraint of the low type and the
incentive compatibility constraint of the high type will be binding. The other
two constraints are then redundant. The optimal products satisfy the first
order conditions: qBH = 1 and q
B






(θ2 + α − 2αθ), where I use the superscript B to denote the
benchmark.
Such separation is possible only for θ ≥ α since the quality offered to
low types must be non-negative. If the valuation of the low type is lower,
the monopolist benefits from excluding the low type from the market and
designing a product for high types only. The participation constraint of
the high type is then binding. The following first order condition gives us





If the monopolist decides to sell the same product to both types of
consumers, the participation constraint of the low type is binding. The
optimal pooling product is characterized by the first order condition: qBP = θ.




Comparing the profits from the different strategies identifies the optimal
strategy of the monopolist. I assume that the monopolist always separates
when he is indifferent. The monopolist prefers separation to exclusion if and
only if
πBS ≥ πBE ⇔ (θ − α)2 ≥ 0. (10)
The monopolist prefers separation to pooling if and only if
πBS ≥ πBP ⇔ (1− θ)2 ≥ 0. (11)
Both conditions are always fulfilled, so whenever separation is possible
it is optimal for the monopolist. Finally, exclusion is preferred to pooling if
and only if
πBE ≥ πBP ⇔ θ ≤ α1/2. (12)
In case of quadratic costs and consumers with standard preferences, the
monopolist’s optimal strategy is to separate if θ ≥ α, and to exclude low types
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otherwise. The monopolist’s optimal strategy is thus to always differentiate
the consumers’ types. Proposition 1 summarizes these results:
Proposition 2.1. Given standard preferences, the optimal strategy of the
monopolist can be characterized as follows:




[1+θ2−(1+α)θ], qBL = θ− α1−α(1−θ) and pBL = θ2− α1−αθ(1−θ).
2. Exclusion: If θ < α, the monopolist only serves high types with qBE = 1
and pBE = 1.
If the valuation of the low types is high enough, it is optimal for the
monopolist to sell to both types and design the products such that high and
low types separate. The high type is offered the efficient quality while the low
type’s quality is distorted downwards to make sure the high type does not
deviate to the low-quality product. If the valuation of quality of the low type
is low, the monopolist does better by excluding low types and extracting the
whole rent from high types. The monopolist still offers the efficient quality to
high types, but can now ask for a higher price for the high-quality product.
2.5 Salience-driven consumer preferences
When consumers exhibit salience-driven preferences, the monopolist has
to take into account how the design of his product portfolio affects the
salience of the products’ attributes. Participation and incentive compatibility
constraints of the consumers depend on whether quality or price (or neither)
is salient. The monopolist can again choose between separation, exclusion
and pooling the two types of consumers. Considering these strategies
separately, it turns out that there are direct relationships between the
strategies and the salience of attributes. In the following subsections, these
relationships between strategies and salience, the profits and the optimal
products are derived.
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2.5.1 Separation with quality salience
If consumers have salience-driven preferences, it seems intuitive that letting
the two types focus on different attributes would make separation easier.
However, we already found that it is impossible to design two products
which make one type of consumer focus on quality and the other type focus
on price. The monopolist can only “choose”, by designing the products
accordingly, whether consumers focus on quality or on price (or on neither).
The consumers’ willingness to pay is higher if quality is salient because it
makes them discount, in relative terms, the payment they have to make. It
therefore seems promising for the monopolist to make quality salient. In
order to make quality salient, he has to design his products such that the







However, independent of the weight a consumer attaches to quality and
price, the following holds: any two products which satisfy condition (13)
cannot satisfy simultaneously the participation constraint and the incentive
compatibility constraint of the low type. Making quality salient requires
offering the higher quality at a lower price per quality. Since preferences
are linear, a product with higher quality offered at a lower price per quality
would be strictly preferred by the low type. Figure 2.1 shows that given a
low-quality product (qL, pL) which the low type would accept, any higher
quality product which makes quality salient is strictly preferred by the low
type.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose there is a product (qL, pL) which satisfies the participa-
tion constraint of a consumer with utility u(q, p) = θq− δp, δ ∈ (0, 1]. Then,
any product (qH , pH) with higher quality qH ≥ qL and higher price pH ≥ pL




, is strictly preferred to (qL, pL).
Lemma 2.1 implies that it is impossible for the monopolist to separate
consumers who focus on quality with two products which indeed make quality
salient. The same is true if consumers are focusing on price or on neither
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Figure 2.1: Separating consumers with salience-driven preferences. If the
participation constraint of the low type is satisfied, the incentive compatibility constraint
of the low type is steeper than the constant ratio line pL/qL. Then, any product which
would separate the two types needs to have a higher price-quality ratio than product L
and hence would make price salient.
of the attributes. Hence, the monopolist cannot separate consumers with
two products which make quality salient. The proof can be found in the
Appendix.
2.5.2 Separation with price salience
The analysis in the previous section has shown that the monopolist is
not able to separate consumers with products which make quality salient.
Furthermore, I show in the Appendix that the monopolist would never
separate with products which induce neutral salience. It remains to check
whether the monopolist can and wants to separate consumers while making
price salient. Price is salient if and only if the quality-price ratio of the
low-quality product is higher than the quality-price ratio of the high-quality
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product. Figure 2.1 shows that any higher quality product which satisfies
the conditions for separation lies in the area of price salience, given the
incentive compatibility constraint of the low type is not binding. Therefore,
any separating products will induce price salience. In order to find the
optimal products for the monopolist, we have to solve the profit maximization
problem of the monopolist given price salience. The monopolist faces the
participation and incentive compatibility constraints of consumers who give
a higher weight to prices:
δθqL − pL ≥ 0 PCLP
δqH − pH ≥ 0 PCHP
δθqL − pL ≥ δθqH − pH ICLP
δqH − pH ≥ δqL − pL. ICHP
Redefining types as θ′L = δθ and θ
′
H = δ, it is clear that the problem can
be solved in the standard way. In the optimum, the participation constraint
of the low type and the incentive compatibility constraint of the high type
are binding: pL = δθqL and pH = δ(qH − qL) + δθqL. The participation
constraint of the high type and the incentive compatibility constraint of the
low type are then redundant. The monopolist maximizes his profits:
max
qH ,qL
α[δ(qH − qL) + δθqL −
1
2




The first order conditions define the optimal qualities. The optimal prices
are then determined by the binding participation constraint of the low type
and the binding incentive compatibility constraint of the high type:
qH = δ, (15)
qL = δθ −
α
1− αδ(1− θ), (16)
pH = δ
2 1
1− α [1 + θ





The optimal separating products given price salience indeed satisfy the
79







⇔ 0 < (1− θ)
2
δθ[1− θ + θ(θ − α)] . (19)
The condition θ ≥ α is again necessary for separation to exist and be
possibly optimal because first, the monopolist cannot offer products with
negative quality and second he would make zero profit on low types if θ < α
and then prefers to exclude them (see Section 2.5.3).
Similar to the benchmark case with standard preferences, there is no
distortion at the top given price salience. The low quality is distorted
downwards relative to the efficient price-salient quality in order to discourage
the high types from deviating. When interpreting the “no distortion at the
top” result as quality being the same as when the consumer type was alone
in the market, the results change compared to the benchmark case. I show
in Section 2.5.3 that if the high type was alone in the market, the monopolist
would be able to make quality salient and would offer a higher quality in
order to benefit from the high willingness to pay. The presence of the low
type makes price salience necessary and reduces the quality offered to the
high type.
Compared to the benchmark case, the willingness to pay of consumers
who focus on price is lower. The quality offered to consumers with salience-
driven preferences is therefore lower, discounted by the salience parameter δ.






2 + α− 2αθ). (20)
If salience becomes more important, i.e. if δ decreases, profits decrease.
Taking into account the salience of the consumers, it turns out that a
monopolist cannot separate with quality salience and separating with neutral
salience is never optimal. The monopolist only separates with products that
make price salient.
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Proposition 2.2. If it is optimal for a monopolist to separate consumers,
he separates by use of a product portfolio which makes price salient.
Proposition 2.2 shows that if consumers have salience-driven preferences,
separation comes at a cost. In order to separate, the monopolist uses a
product portfolio which makes price salient and decreases the willingness
to pay of the consumers. This has a negative effect on his profits from
separation.
2.5.3 Exclusion
If the monopolist excludes the low types, he offers a product (qE, pE) which
satisfies the participation constraint of the high types but not of the low
types. The willingness to pay for the product of the high type is highest when
its quality is salient. Therefore, the monopolist could benefit from offering a
second product (qD, pD) which makes quality salient. This second product is
offered as a decoy, in the sense that it draws consumers’ attention towards
quality but is not meant to be sold. Hence, the decoy must be designed
such that quality becomes salient and both types do not choose to buy it.
Given the exclusion product (qE, pE) satisfies the participation constraint of
the high type, Lemma 2.1 (with θ = 1) implies that it is impossible to use a
higher quality product as a decoy. Any higher quality product which makes
quality salient would be preferred by the high type. In contrast to that,
Lemma 2.2 below shows that any lower quality product with qD < qE and
pD < pE which makes quality salient would not be preferred by the high
type.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose there is a product (qE, pE) which satisfies the partici-
pation constraint of a consumer with utility u(q, p) = q−δp, δ ∈ (0, 1]. Then,
any product (qD, pD) with lower quality qD ≤ qE and lower price pD ≤ pE




, is strictly dominated by (qE, pE).
The proof of Lemma 2.2 can be found in the Appendix. In order to make
sure that the low type does not buy the decoy, his participation constraint
must be taken into account. The exclusion product does not satisfy the
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participation constraint of the low type: qE
pE
< θ. Any lower quality product








All products in the shaded area in Figure 2.2 satisfy the conditions for




, qD < qE and pD < pE. Such an area always exists.
Consider e.g. a product (x, pE − ǫ) with 0 < x < qE. There always exists
a sufficiently small ǫ > 0 such that ǫ < pE
qE








Figure 2.2: Possible decoys given exclusion product (qE , pE). For any product E
which makes the participation constraint of the high type binding, there exists an area
(gray) with products that have a lower price, a lower quality and a lower quality-price ratio
than product E. The lower quality and the lower quality-price ratio imply that neither of
the consumer types would prefer a product in that area.
If the exclusion product (qE, pE) satisfies the participation constraint
of the high type, the monopolist always finds a low-quality decoy that
makes quality salient. He can thus choose the exclusion product in order
to maximize his profits, only considering the participation constraint of the
high type given quality is salient. The participation constraint of the high
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type will be binding pE =
1
δ









The optimal quality is defined by the first order condition and the optimal








The monopolist will offer the efficient quality for high types who focus on







If salience becomes more important, consumers give a higher relative
weight to quality in case of quality salience. The monopolist’s profit from
exclusion increases.
Proposition 2.3. The monopolist always excludes low types by use of a
product portfolio that makes quality salient.
If consumers have salience-driven preferences, the monopolist can increase
the consumers’ willingness to pay by excluding low types and making quality
salient. Exclusion thus entails the advantage of making quality salient. The
decoy which is offered together with the exclusion product needs to have the
following characteristics:










As it is typical for decoys, it is a “bad deal”, i.e. it has a lower quality-price
ratio than the product which is meant to be sold.
2.5.4 Pooling
If the monopolist pools the two types, he would again want to offer an
additional product (qD, pD) as a decoy to make quality salient. Since
the pooling product satisfies the participation constraint of both consumer
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types, Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 can be applied for both consumer types.
Given the pooling product (qP , pP ), Lemma 2.1 implies that all high-quality
products that make quality salient would be preferred by both types and
hence cannot be used as a decoy. Lemma 2.2, in contrast, says that any
lower quality product with qD < qP and pD < pP which makes quality salient
is not preferred by consumers. Thus it is sufficient to show that there always
exists a lower quality product which makes quality salient. Given (qP , pP ),
all products in the shaded area in Figure 2.3 are of lower quality and have a







Figure 2.3: Possible decoys given pooling product (qP , pP ). For any product P
which would pool the two types, there exists an area (gray) with products that have a
lower price, a lower quality and a lower quality-price ratio than product P . The lower
quality and the lower quality-price ratio imply that neither of the consumer types would
prefer a product in that area.
Again, such an area always exists. Consider e.g. a product (x, pP − ǫ)
with 0 < x < qP . There always exists an ǫ > 0 such that ǫqP < pP (qP − x),
which implies quality salience.
It is always possible to find a decoy that makes quality salient when
pooling. Therefore, the monopolist can choose the pooling product only
considering the participation constraints of both types given quality is salient.
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The participation constraint of the low type is more restrictive and will thus
be binding pP =
1
δ









The first order condition and the binding participation constraint of the








The monopolist will offer the efficient quality for low types who focus on
quality. Consumers’ willingness to pay is higher if they overvalue quality.
Quality and price are therefore higher than in the case of consumers with







A stronger distortion of weights compared to the benchmark case imply
that consumers have a higher willingness to pay in case of quality salience.
The monopolist’s profit from pooling increases in the strength of salience.
Proposition 2.4. The monopolist always pools by use of a product portfolio
that makes quality salient.
Salient thinking of consumers enables the monopolist to increase their
willingness to pay. In the same way as exclusion, pooling thus comes at the
benefit of making quality salient. Given the pooling product, the monopolist
offers a decoy with:










In the case of pooling and of exclusion, the monopolist benefits from
offering a second product with lower quality and lower price. Since the
exclusion product has higher quality and price than the pooling product, the
decoy can also have higher attribute values in this case. Decoys are used
to make quality salient and therefore only appear if they successfully do so.
There are no decoys when we observe price salience.
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2.5.5 Optimal strategy
In the last subsections, I derived the monopolist’s strategies and the profits
he can achieve by applying them. The monopolist can choose to separate by
use of a product portfolio which makes price salient. Alternatively, he can
exclude the low types or pool both types by use of product portfolios which



















In order to find the optimal strategy given the valuation θ and the share
of high types α, the monopolist compares these profits. When the monopolist
decides between separation with price salience and pooling with quality
salience, he prefers separation if and only if the relative valuation of low
types is low enough:
πS ≥ πP ⇔ θ ≤
δ2
√
α2δ4 + α(1− α− δ4)− αδ4
1− α− δ4 ≡ θ̂1(α). (32)
The difference πS − πP is decreasing in θ. Hence, it is positive if and only if
θ is not too high. In the benchmark case, separation was always preferred
to pooling. However, in the presence of salient thinking, separation requires
consumers to focus on price which reduces the profit. In contrast to that, the
profit from pooling increases since quality is salient which makes consumers
willing to pay more. Therefore, there is now a range of high valuations for
which pooling is the optimal strategy when consumers exhibit salience-driven
preferences.
Comparing the profits from pooling and exclusion, the monopolist prefers
to exclude if and only if the valuation of the low type is not too high:
πE ≥ πP ⇔ θ ≤ α1/2 ≡ θ̂2(α). (33)
Salient thinking of consumers does not change the payoff-comparison between
pooling and excluding. Both strategies make quality salient which increases
profits by the same factor.
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Finally, the difference πS−πE increases in θ whenever α ≤ θ, i.e. whenever
separation is possible. Hence, there is a third threshold for the valuation of
the low type θ̂3(α):







For valuations above this threshold, separation is preferred to exclusion.
Given salient thinking of consumers, the profits from exclusion increase if δ
decreases, while the profits from separation decrease. It is thus less likely than
in the benchmark case that the monopolist prefers separation, i.e. θ̂3(α) ≥ α.
Proposition 2.5 uses the three thresholds and provides a formal descrip-
tion of the monopolist’s optimal strategy:
Proposition 2.5. The optimal strategy of the monopolist given salience-
driven preferences can be characterized as follows:
1. Separation: If θ̂1 ≥ θ ≥ θ̂3, the monopolist separates with products L
and H: qH = δ and pH = δ
2 1
1−α
[1+θ2−(1+α)θ], qL = δθ− α1−αδ(1−θ)
and pL = δ
2θ2 − α
1−α
δ2θ(1− θ). Price is salient for both products.
2. Exclusion: If θ ≤ min[θ̂2, θ̂3], the monopolist only serves high types
with product E: qE =
1
δ
α and pE =
1
δ2
α. He additionally offers a
decoy D: 0 ≤ qD < 1δ and 1δ qD < pD < 1δ2 . Quality is salient for both
products.
3. Pooling: If θ ≥ max[θ̂1, θ̂2], the monopolist serves both types of
consumers with product P : qP =
1
δ




offers a decoy D: 0 ≤ qD < 1δθ and 1δθqD < pD < 1δ2 θ2. Quality is
salient for both products.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the optimal strategy for varying shares of high
types α and relative valuations θ. Consumers with standard preferences
(δ = 1) are separated if θ ≥ α. In all other cases, the monopolist excludes
the low types.
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Figure 2.4: Optimal strategy of monopolist if consumers have standard
preferences, i.e. δ = 1. A monopolist maximizes profits by separating consumers if
heterogeneity and the share of high types are low, and excluding low types otherwise.
















Figure 2.5: Optimal strategy of monopolist if consumers have salience-driven
preferences, i.e. δ < 1. A monopolist maximizes profits by pooling consumers if
heterogeneity and the share of high types are low, and excluding low types if heterogeneity
and the share of high types are high. Separation is optimal for an intermediate range of
heterogeneity and share of high types.
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If salience becomes stronger, i.e. δ decreases, the costs of price salience in
the separation case become more severe, while the gains of quality salience
with pooling and excluding increase. It follows that the monopolist will
choose separation less often if consumers have salience-driven preferences.
If salience is strong enough [δ < δ̂(α) ≡ 0.841(1 + α 12 ) 14 ], separation
is always dominated by exclusion or pooling. This follows from the fact
that given δ < δ̂(α), exclusion and pooling are preferred to separation at
θ̂2, i.e. where exclusion and pooling are equally beneficial. For θ < θ̂2,
exclusion is preferred to separation because profits from separation decrease
if θ decreases, while profits from exclusion remain constant. For θ > θ̂2,
profits from pooling are higher that profits from separation since profits from
pooling increase faster in θ. Hence, a range in which separation is optimal
exists if and only if δ ≥ δ̂(α). While the monopolist never sells the same
product to both types of consumers with standard preferences (i.e. he never
pools), pooling is optimal given salience-driven consumer preferences if the
valuation of the low type is high.
As shown earlier, both types of consumers focus on the same attribute. It
is thus of interest how the characteristics of a market determine the attribute
on which consumers focus.
















Figure 2.6: Salience in a monopolistic market. Price is salient in a market with
intermediate heterogeneity and an intermediate share of high types.
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Which attribute is salient relates directly to the strategy of the monop-
olist. Figure 2.6 shows which attribute is salient depending on the share of
high types and the valuation of low types. Due to the direct relation between
strategy and salience, Proposition 2.5 gives us some insights on when price
salience can be observed:
Corollary 2.1. Suppose that δ ∈ (δ̂(α), 1]. Whether we observe a quality- or
a price-salient market depends on the distribution of types and their degree
of heterogeneity. Quality is salient in markets with low heterogeneity and low
share of high types and in markets with high heterogeneity and high share of
high types. Price is salient in markets with intermediate heterogeneity and
intermediate share of high types.
If salience becomes stronger, the monopolist is more likely to induce
quality salience. In a quality salient market, the consumers overestimate the
value which the products will give to them. The monopolist benefits from
this misperception and achieves higher profits. In a price salient market, the
consumers underestimate the value of the products. The lower willingness
to pay reduces the return on quality for the monopolist and induces him to
provide lower quality.
The theory presented predicts that the monopolist will always offer two
products. Whenever consumers focus on quality, the low-quality product is a
decoy and not actually sold. The high-quality product is then a “better deal”
in the sense that it is offered with a quality discount relative to the low-quality
product. When consumers focus on price, the monopolist is separating the
types and the high-quality product is a “bad deal”, i.e. it is offered with
a quality premium. The range for which separation with price salience and
a quality premium is optimal becomes small if salience gains importance.
As Maskin and Riley (1984), we can interpret quality as quantity. Salience-
driven consumer preferences then provide an explanation for why quantity
premia are rare in reality. Gerstner and Hess (1987) studied the pricing of
a supermarket and found that only 1.7% of the packages were offered with
a quantity premium. Kokovin et al. (2008) observe that some expensive
liquor and expensive chocolate is offered with quantity premia. Verboven
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(1999) claims that many products, e.g. cars and hotel rooms, are offered
with extra options that seem to be overpriced. For these products, we would
predict separation with price salience if the monopolist is restricted to only
two variants.
The model also provides an explanation for the observation that, when
several products are offered, the price often varies with quality less than
expected (Orbach and Einav, 2007; Courty and Nasiry, 2016; Richardson
and Stähler, 2016; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2017). A monopolist who
faces consumers with salience-driven preferences has to take into account
that a high price difference attracts consumers’ attention towards the price.
Whenever he pools or excludes the low types, he thus offers two products
with a small price difference in order to make consumers focus on quality.
2.6 Robustness
So far, the analysis restricted attention to a monopolist who could not offer
more than two products. Avoiding price salience in case of separation requires
the development and introduction of at least one additional product. The
optimal strategy of a monopolist thus depends on how costly it is to develop
additional decoys. Without development costs, it turns out that it is always
possible to make quality salient by offering enough decoys. Assuming that
there are non-zero development costs, the result holds that the monopolist
will be less likely to separate than when consumers had standard preferences.
In this section, I first assume that there are no development costs and
allow for a third product. It turns out that there are situations in which
the monopolist cannot find a third product that would make the optimally
separating products quality salient. However, he can always offer a decoy that
makes the high-quality product quality salient and the low-quality product
price salient. Whenever separation is optimal, the monopolist benefits from
using such a decoy. This suggests that whenever there is separation, there
will be at least one decoy offered.
In a second step, I keep the assumption of no development cost but let
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the monopolist offer as many decoys as he wishes. I can show that it is then
always possible to separate optimally with quality salience.
If there were some development costs per decoy, the monopolist would
face a trade-off between the gain from more beneficial salience and the
development costs. Thus, in a situation in which separation would be
optimal, the predictions of the salience of attributes and of the number of
decoys depends on development costs. If development costs are high, we
expect to observe no decoys and price salience (and less separation than in
the benchmark case). If development costs are low, the monopolist would
offer decoys and a quality salient product portfolio. As in the case of two
products, we would only observe decoys if quality is salient for at least one
of the products that are sold. If price is salient for both products, the decoys
were useless and should thus not be offered.
Finally, I show the robustness of the results of Section 2.5 for a general
utility function and a general cost function.
2.6.1 Three products
The restriction that the monopolist can offer at most two products makes it
impossible to separate the types and make quality salient at the same time.
However, the monopolist might consider offering a third product as a decoy.
With a decoy, the monopolist can influence the salience of the attributes
while separating with two other products. Quality becomes salient if the
decoy increases the variation in quality sufficiently.
I assume that it is impossible to offer a product with negative quality. It
can then be shown that when offering the optimal separating products given






L), it is not always possible to find a decoy
which induces such salience. Thus, the monopolist cannot always reach the
optimal quality salience profit under separation. This suggests that there will
be less separation in the case of salience-driven preferences compared to the




Proposition 2.6. Given the optimal products for separation with quality
salience, it is impossible for the monopolist to make quality salient with a
single decoy with non-negative quality if α > 2θ − 1 and θ < δ2.
The lower bound on the share of high types is derived from the condition
that the decoy must have non-negative quality. If the share of high types is
high, the quality of product L is rather low and the decoy needs to have a very
low quality in order to bring more variation in the quality dimension. The
threshold is increasing in the valuation of the low type. A higher valuation
increases the quality of the low type’s product and makes it more likely
to find a decoy with non-negative quality that increases quality variation
sufficiently. Together with the condition θ < δ2, the lower bound on α is
sufficient to imply that all high-quality decoys would be preferred by the
high type.
In order to derive the conditions on the share of high types and the
low type’s valuation, we first have to determine the optimal products given
quality salience. The derivation is analogous to the case in which both
products are price salient. The incentive compatibility constraints imply that
qH ≥ qL. The incentive compatibility constraint of the high type and the
participation constraint of the low type are binding. This makes the incentive
compatibility constraint of the low type and the participation constraint of

















1− α [1 + θ







1− αθ(1− θ). (38)
I now derive the conditions on the share of high types and the low types
valuation. Given the three products H, L and D, the average quality is
q̄ = qH+qL+qD
3
and the average price is p̄ = pH+pL+pD
3
. We can consider the
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quality-price space for the decoy D to determine its consequences on the
salience of the attributes of products L and H. Proposition 1 of Bordalo et
al. (2013b) can be applied if (q − q̄)(p − p̄) > 0. It then tells us that for
product k = H,L, quality is salient if and only if



















≡ p̄k with qk ≷ q̄ and pk ≷ p̄. (40)
The symmetry of the salience function further allows us to determine the
salience of attributes for products with (q − q̄)(p − p̄) < 0. By definition,
quality is salient if and only if




Homogeneity of degree 0 of the salience function then gives us a condition


















when q ≷ q̄ and p ≶ p̄. (41)
In our case of three products, this implies that quality is salient for
product k if the price of the decoy satisfies
pD ≶
9qkpk
qk + q−k + qD
− pk − p−k ≡ p̄k with qk ≷ q̄ and pk ≶ p̄. (42)
Conditions (40) and (42) as well as the conditions for qk ≷ q̄ and pk ≷ p̄







with qH > qL and pH > pL, (43)
since this is always true for the optimal separating products given the same
attribute is salient for product L and H. If the decoy (qD, pD) lies in the
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gray area, the high-quality product H’s quality is salient. In the dotted area,











Figure 2.7: Possible decoys to make both products’ quality salient. Quality is
salient for product L if and only if product D lies in the dotted area. Quality is salient
for product H if and only if product D lies in the gray area.
In order to make quality salient for both products L and H, we need a
decoy where the two areas overlap. Additionally, if it should serve as a decoy,
it must not be preferred by neither of the types of consumers. We can derive
sufficient conditions under which such a decoy does not exist.
Lemma 2.3. Given separating products (qH , pH) and (qL, pL), quality is
never salient for both products if 2qL − qH < qD < 2qH − qL.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Lemma 2.3 implies that a low-
quality product can only serve as a decoy if it has quality qD ≤ 2qL − qH .
Given the optimal products for quality salience, this implies that there exists
no low-quality decoy with non-negative quality if the share of high types is
high:
0 > 2qqL − qqH ⇔ α > 2θ − 1 ≡ ᾱ1(θ). (44)
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This condition is always fulfilled if θ < 1
2
. Note that θ < 1 implies that there
is always a range of α for which separation is possible but no decoy exists:
α ∈ [2θ − 1, θ].
The high-quality decoys all have non-negative quality since they must
have qD > 2qH − qL > 0. However, since we cannot increase the price too
much without drawing attention towards the price, consumers might prefer
to buy the high-quality decoy. I define product y as the product with quality
qy = 2q
q
H − qqL and the price py = p̄L(qy). Consider situations in which the
high type prefers product y to the optimal quality salient product H even if
product y was price salient (this implies he would also prefer the decoy if its
quality was salient):
qqH − δpqH < δqy − py. (45)
This condition is true if and only if the share of high types is high enough:
α >
(1− θ)θδ + (2θ − δ2)(2− θ)− 1
(1− δ)(δ + θ) ≡ ᾱ2(θ, δ), (46)
and the valuation of the low type is not too high:
θ <
1 + δ + δ2
2 + δ
. (47)
From (40), we know that if qD > qy, a necessary condition for product
L to be quality salient is pD < p̄L(qD). Furthermore, given price salience,
product y lies on the indifference curve pD = δqD −Uy with Uy = δqy − py. If
θ < δ2, the indifference curve is steeper in qD than p̄L, so if type H prefers a
price salient product y over a quality salient product H, he would also prefer
any other high-quality decoy that makes quality salient, even if its price was
salient. θ < δ2 implies that (47) is satisfied and thus (46) and θ < δ2 are
sufficient conditions for the non-existence of a high-quality decoy.
The threshold ᾱ1(θ) together with the condition θ < δ
2 implies that
ᾱ1(θ) > ᾱ2(θ, δ). Hence, we found sufficient conditions and no decoy exists
if α > ᾱ1(θ) and θ < δ
2.
Since exclusion and pooling always allow for quality salience, the trade-
off between strategies is the same as in the benchmark case whenever a
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decoy can be found. However, in situations in which no decoy can be found,
the monopolist cannot separate and make quality salient for both optimally
separating products. The monopolist has to choose an alternative strategy if
he wants to separate, as for example adapt products such that a decoy exists
or choosing a decoy that makes type H focus on quality and type L focus on
price etc.6 These strategies give lower profits than separation with optimally
separating products given quality salience. Hence, separation is again costly
and will possibly not be chosen as often as in the benchmark case even if we
abstract from development costs for a third product.
It is always possible for the monopolist to find a decoy which makes
the high-quality product quality salient and the low-quality product price
salient given the monopolist’s optimal products for such salience. Whenever
separation with price salience is the optimal strategy given the restriction of
two products, the strategy to make product H quality salient is possible and
yields higher profits.
Proposition 2.7. The monopolist always benefits from offering a decoy
product.
The proof is in the Appendix. If the high-quality product becomes
quality salient, the monopolist can increase pH and benefit from the higher
willingness to pay of the high type. The monopolist will thus always offer a
decoy when separating consumer types. If it is optimal to make product H
quality salient and product L price salient, this decoy has an intermediate
quality and price but a low quality-price ratio. As shown before, the
monopolist also benefits from decoys when he optimally excludes or pools.
2.6.2 Multiple decoys
While the monopolist is not always able to induce quality salience with a
single decoy, it might be possible with multiple decoys. It turns out that
6The determination of the optimal strategy of the monopolist in this case is left to
future work.
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the monopolist can always make separating products quality salient if he can
offer enough decoys.
Proposition 2.8. The monopolist can separate while making quality salient







L), he can offer d̂ decoys with










− pqL − pqH
]
,
where d̂ is the smallest integer greater than or equal to











This is a sufficient condition.
To get these insights, I define an M -decoy, which is determined by all
decoys offered. The attribute values of the M -decoy are defined as the sum





i=1 pi. We can draw the graph with the sum of the decoy-qualities on
the horizontal and the sum of the decoy-prices on the vertical. In the same
way as for one decoy, we can then determine the areas in which the M -decoy







(qk − q̄)(pk − p̄) > 0, for product k = H,L, quality is salient if and only if
the M -decoy is such that
pM ≷ p̄k(qM) with qk ≷ q̄ and pk ≷ p̄. (48)
If (qk − q̄)(pk − p̄) < 0, quality is salient for product k if and only if the









− pqk − p
q
−k ≡ p̄Mk (qM) with qk ≷ q̄ and pk ≶ p̄. (49)
In order to make quality salient for both products H and L, the M -
decoy has to lie in the gray and dotted area in Figure 2.8, i.e. either qM <
(d + 1)qL − qH and p̄H(qM) < pM < p̄ML (qM) or qM > (d + 1)qH − qL and





(d + 1)pH − pL
(d + 1)pL − pH







Figure 2.8: Possible M-decoys that make both products quality salient. Quality
is salient for product L if and only if product M lies in the dotted area. Quality is salient
for product H if and only if product M lies in the gray area.
Product x is the low-quality M -decoy with the highest quality:







While the inverse of p̄H(q) is increasing in px, the inverse of p̄
M
L (q) is
decreasing in px. Hence, the minimum is maximized if the two arguments
are equalized and we get the following expressions for product x:









− pqH − pqL, (51)









− qqH − qqL. (52)
These values are always such that
qx ≤ (d+ 1)qqL − qqH (53)
and
(d+ 1)pqL − pqH ≤ px ≤ (d+ 1)pqH − pqL (54)
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and thus, quality is indeed salient for both products.
Adding more decoys increases the quality of product x. Thus, more decoys
make it more likely that it has non-negative quality. The number of decoys
d must be higher than d to guarantee the decoys have non-negative quality:











The lowest integer that is higher than d is thus a sufficient number of decoys.
In order to make sure that both types would not prefer the single decoys,
we can use zero quality for the M -decoy. Zero quality and a positive price for
the M -decoy makes sure that the single decoys would also have zero quality
and a positive price, which would give negative utility to consumers.
We know that (d+1)qqL−qqH > qx > 0 and this implies that p̄ML (0) > (d+
1)pqL−pqH . From conditions (48) and (49), we know that quality is then salient
for both products L andH either if (d+1)pqH−pqL > p̄ML (0) and p̄H(0) < pM <
p̄ML (0) or if (d + 1)p
q
H − pqL < p̄ML (0) and pM < min[p̄ML (0), p̄MH (0)] = p̄ML (0).
Hence, the highest price we can ask for that still makes quality salient for
both products given qM = 0 is determined by p̄
M
L (0):







− pqL − pqH . (56)
This price is increasing in d and thus always positive for d ≥ d since








H − qqL)(1− θ)
qqH
> 0. (57)
Condition (55) is sufficient but might not be necessary, since there could
be a high-quality M -decoy. If we assume there is an upper bound on quality
q̂, the assumption implies that the single decoys cannot have quality higher
than q̂, i.e. qM ≤ d · q̂. From the high-quality M -decoys which make quality
salient for H and L, product z is most likely to satisfy this condition:
pz = argmin q̃







Since the two inverse functions move in opposite directions when changing
p, the maximum in minimized if they are just equal. Given the optimal
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products, the lowest high-quality decoy has quality









− qqH − qqL. (59)
These values are always such that
qz ≥ (d+ 1)qqH − qqL (60)
and
(d+ 1)pqL − pqH ≤ pz ≤ (d+ 1)pqH − pqL (61)
and thus, quality is indeed salient for both products.




































(qH − qL) < 0. (63)
Hence, d > 1 will not fulfill the restriction whenever d = 1 does not, i.e.










− qqH − qqL. (64)
Therefore, condition (55) is necessary and sufficient to make quality
salient if the monopolist wants to separate with the optimal products L
and H and there is an upper bound on quality q̂ < qz(d = 1). Without the
upper bound on quality, (55) is sufficient but might not be necessary.
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2.6.3 General utility function
Given the salience of an attribute is determined by the subjective utility
from quality rather than the objective quality, the result that a monopolist
is less prone to separate if he faces consumers with salience-driven preferences
does not depend on the linearity of preferences. Consider consumers with
experience utility that is nonlinear in the taste parameter θi, i.e. u(q, θi)− p,
with u(q, θi) increasing and concave in q and satisfying the single crossing
property, i.e. the marginal utility of quality increases in θi. With such
experience utility, different types might focus on different attributes. Given
two products (qL, pL) and (qH , pH), with qH > qL and pH > pL, a consumer







I show in the following that the monopolist again always separates with
products that make both consumer types focus on price, while he excludes
and pools with a decoy that implies quality salience.
Similar to Lemma 2.1, the monopolist cannot separate the types without
making the low type focus on price. Consider a consumer with utility function
γu(q, θi) − ωp, with γ ∈ (0, 1] and ω ∈ (0, 1],7 and two products L and
H with qH ≥ qL and pH ≥ pL. It is impossible to make type L focus
on quality while satisfying his participation and his incentive compatibility
constraint. Assume (qL, pL) satisfies the participation constraint of type L,
i.e. γu(qL, θL) − ωpL ≥ 0. If the monopolist wants to separate, the high-




[u(qH , θL)− u(qL, θL)] + pL. (66)





7Note that γ = 1 and ω = δ captures quality salience while γ = δ and ω = 1 captures
price salience and γ = 1 and ω = 1 is equivalent to neutral salience. Hence, the following
analysis shows that separation results in type L focusing on price in all three cases.
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which violates the participation constraint PCL. Hence, it is impossible
to separate consumers and induce type L to focus on quality. Separating
with no attribute being salient for the low type is possible but would imply
that the monopolist optimally offers the same product to both consumers.
The neutral salience condition pH = pL
u(qH ,θL)
u(qL,θL)
and the ICL given neutral
salience together imply that pL ≥ u(qL, θL). Considering the PCL given
neutral salience, it follows that pL = u(qL, θL) and thus pH = u(qH , θL). It
is then profit-maximizing for the monopolist to offer the same product to
both types. However, this strategy is always dominated by pooling with a
decoy that makes quality salient (we see later in this section that pooling
with quality salience is always possible).
While type L thus necessarily focuses on price whenever separation is
optimal, the monopolist could design the products such that quality is salient
for type H. However, quality salience requires the price of the high-quality
product to be rather low. It turns out that this restriction on the price pH
is so strong, that the monopolist prefers to increase the price and let type H
focus on price too. To see this, note that type H focuses on quality if and





Inducing quality salience for the high type is beneficial if and only if the
quality salience condition (69) is less restrictive than the ICH given price
salience, i.e. if and only if
δ[u(qH , θH)− u(qL, θH)] + pL <
u(qH , θH)
u(qL, θH)




This is never true since condition (70) violates the participation constraint of
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Replacing the strict inequalities in (70) with weak inequalities shows that
this condition is again more restrictive than the ICH given price salience.
Hence, the result that the monopolist separates with price salient products
and thus separation is less beneficial than in the benchmark case holds for
more general utility functions.
When the monopolist wants to exclude low types or pools, it is again
possible to offer a decoy that makes quality salient for both types. I prove
the existence of such decoys in the Appendix. Since separation comes at
a cost while pooling and exclusion benefit from quality salience, it follows
that the monopolist is less likely to separate consumers with salience-driven
preferences.
Considering the trade-off between pooling and exclusion, nothing changes
when consumers have salience-driven preferences. When the monopolist
pools, he chooses the quality in order to maximize u(qP , θL) − 12q2P . When
he wants to exclude the low types, he offers the quality that maximizes
α[u(qE, θH)− 12q2E]. Since θL → θH implies that qP → qE, pooling is preferred
to exclusion if the valuations do not differ too much and the share of high
types α is low.
If the salience of quality is determined by the objective quality, the results
from Section 2.5 rely on the linearity of the indifference curves in quality.
Each indifference curve then only cuts the constant ratio line once, which
is important for Lemma 2.1. With decreasing marginal utility of quality, a
higher quality product with higher quality-price ratio would not necessarily
be preferred by the consumers.
2.6.4 General cost function
It is possible to show that the results from Section 2.5 hold for all cost
functions with c′(q) > 0 and c′′(q) > 0. The proofs of the Lemmas are
independent of the monopolist’s cost. The monopolist’s possible strategies
are thus still to separate with price salience, exclude or pool with quality
salient products. Price salience decreases the willingness to pay of a consumer
compared to the benchmark case. Therefore, separation will be less profitable
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in case of salience-driven consumer preferences. To show this, consider the
profit of separation with price salience, where q∗H and q
∗
L are the profit-
maximizing qualities given δ:
πS(δ) = α[δ(q
∗
H − q∗L) + δθq∗L − c(q∗H)] + (1− α)[δθq∗L − c(q∗L)]. (72)
If salience becomes weaker, i.e. δ increases by ∆δ, the monopolist can
increase the price pH by ∆δ[(q
∗
H − q∗L) + θq∗L] and price pL by ∆δθq∗L, which
strictly increases his profits and leaves the salience of attributes unchanged.
Additionally, the monopolist could adapt the qualities of the products he
offers, but he would do so only if it was profitable. The profit of separation
thus strictly increases if salience becomes weaker.
In contrast, quality salience increases the willingness to pay and exclusion
and pooling become more profitable. The maximal profit of exclusion given




q∗E − c(q∗E)]. (73)
If salience becomes stronger, i.e. δ decreases by ∆δ, the monopolist can







q∗E and the high type would still be willing
to buy it given its quality is still salient. In Section 2.5.3, we showed that
the monopolist can indeed always find a decoy that makes product E quality
salient whenever product E satisfies the participation constraint. Therefore,
stronger salience strictly increases the monopolist’s profit. Adapting qE could
additionally increase the profit.




θq∗P − c(q∗P ). (74)
If salience becomes stronger, i.e. δ decreases by ∆δ, the monopolist can







θq∗P and both types still buy product P given
quality is still salient. From Section 2.5.4, we know there is a decoy that
makes quality salient given a pooling product that satisfies the participation
constraints. Hence, stronger salience strictly increases profits and adapting
qP could even increase these gains.
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Profits from exclusion and pooling thus strictly increase in the strength
of salience, while the profit from separation decreases. There is again a cost
of separation and a benefit to exclusion and to pooling. In case of salience-
driven preferences and two products on offer, the parameter range for which
the monopolist chooses to separate the consumer types is smaller.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the effect of salient thinking of consumers on the
prevalence of (monopolistic) price discrimination. In my model, a monopolist
faces consumers with salience-driven preferences who are heterogeneous in
their valuation of quality. When designing his products, the monopolist has
to take into account the products’ influence on the salience of their attributes.
Consumers give a higher weight to the attribute which varies more within
the choice set. In the case of two types of consumers, it turns out that a
monopolist is less likely to price discriminate when consumers have salience-
driven preferences.
The optimally separating products always induce price salience, which
reduces the willingness to pay of the consumers. If the monopolist is
restricted to offer two products, he can thus not avoid price salience when
separating. When excluding low types or pooling, the monopolist can offer
a decoy that lets consumers focus on quality.
Allowing the monopolist to offer more products, he might be able to
induce quality salience also when separating by additionally offering decoy
products. It turns out that this is always possible if the monopolist can
offer sufficiently many decoys. Whenever it is costly to develop such decoys,
the monopolist is less likely to separate than in the case of consumers with
standard preferences.
Future research should concentrate on characterizing the complete opti-
mal strategy of the monopolist given more than two versions of a product are
possible. Furthermore, one could introduce an exogenous offer by another
firm. If this offer yields negative utility to the consumers, the monopolist can
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increase his prices. At a higher level of prices, it is less likely that the same
price difference induces price salience and the monopolist might be able to
separate with products that induce quality salience.
It would also be interesting to test empirically whether indeed consumers
focus on price if the monopolist separates. Furthermore, one could test
whether a monopolist always offers products with the intention to influence
attention. This should be more likely to be observed if development costs of
decoys are low.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Consider two products L and H with qH ≥ qL and pH ≥ pL. Assume (qL, pL)
satisfies the participation constraint γqL − ωpL ≥ 0, with γ ∈ (0, 1] and
ω ∈ (0, 1]:








(qH − qL) ≤
γ
ω
(qH − qL) (77)
⇔ γ
ω













qL − pL <
γ
ω
qH − pH (79)
⇔ γqL − ωpL < γqH − ωpH . (80)
The product (qH , pH) is strictly preferred by the consumer.
This lemma shows that both types would prefer product H, independent
of which attribute is salient. Considering the low type, γ = θ and ω = δ
captures the case of quality salience, γ = θ and ω = 1 captures the case of
neutral salience and γ = δθ and ω = 1 captures the case of price salience.
Considering the high type, γ = 1 and ω = δ captures the case of quality
salience, γ = 1 and ω = 1 captures the case of neutral salience and γ = δ
and ω = 1 captures the case of price salience.
2.8.2 Separation with neutral salience
If quality salience and separation is not possible, the monopolist can try to
separate while keeping salience neutral. Salience is neutral, i.e. consumers
give equal weights to quality and price, if the two quality-price ratios are
equal. The monopolist then takes into account the participation constraints
and the incentive compatibility constraints of the benchmark case.
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The ICL and the neutral salience condition pH =
qH
qL
pL imply that pL ≥
θqL. Together with the participation constraint of the low type, this means
that pL = θqL and hence pH = θqH .










It follows that the optimal product is the same for both types, i.e. the
monopolist would pool the types. Even though there exist two products with
which the monopolist can separate the types and make no attribute salient,
such separation is dominated by pooling with neutral consumers. I show in
Subsection 2.5.4 that the monopolist can always pool with quality salience.
Pooling with neutral consumers is thus always dominated.
2.8.3 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Consider two products E and D with qE ≥ qD and pE ≥ pD. Assume (qE, pE)








(qE − qD) ≤
γ
ω








qE − pE. (84)






qD − pD <
γ
ω
qE − pE (85)
⇔ γqD − ωpD < γqE − ωpE. (86)
This lemma shows that both types would strictly prefer product E,
independent of which attribute is salient. Considering the low type, γ = θ
and ω = δ captures the case of quality salience, γ = θ and ω = 1 captures
the case of neutral salience and γ = δθ and ω = 1 captures the case of price
salience. Considering the high type, γ = 1 and ω = δ captures the case of
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quality salience, γ = 1 and ω = 1 captures the case of neutral salience and
γ = δ and ω = 1 captures the case of price salience.
2.8.4 Proof of Lemma 2.3
Given separating products (qH , pH) and (qL, pL), quality is never salient for
both products if 2qL − qH < qD < 2qH − qL.
Consider qD ∈ [2qL − qH , 2qH − qL].
❼ Case 1 : pD < 2pL − pH
ProductH cannot be quality salient since quality salience would require
pD > p̄H . This is impossible with pD < 2pL − pH because then p̄H >
2pL − pH whenever qD > 3 qHpH pL − qH − qL which is true for our range






❼ Case 2 : 2pL − pH < pD < 2pH − pL
Product H’s quality is salient if pD > p̄H and product L’s quality is
salient if pD < p̄L. It is impossible to satisfy both conditions since





, which is true for any separating products.
❼ Case 3 : pD > 2pH − pL
Product L cannot be quality salient since quality salience would require
pD < p̄L. This is impossible with pD > 2pH − pL since p̄L < 2pH − pL
whenever qD < 3
qL
pL
pH − qH − qL which is true for our range of qD and







2.8.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Optimal separating products if quality is salient for product H and
price is salient for product L










s.t. δθqL − pL ≥ 0 PCL
qH − δpH ≥ 0 PCH
δθqL − pL ≥ θqH − δpH ICL
qH − δpH ≥ δqL − pL ICH
The PCL and the ICH imply that the PCH is redundant. The incentive
compatibility constraints imply that qH ≥ δqL. Increasing pH increases
profits, so the ICH will be binding. The ICL then becomes redundant.






qH − qL(1− θ)−
1
2




s.t. qH ≥ δqL (88)
The monopolist can choose qL and qH optimally:
qqpL = δθ −
α






These optimal qualities always satisfy the condition qH ≥ δqL, since we
always have qH ≥ 1 and qL ≤ 1.
Since I assume that qualities are non-negative, the maximization problem
has a corner solution, qqpL = 0, if the valuation of the low type is too low:
θ ≤ α
δ(1− α) + α ≡ θ̂4(α). (90)
However, the monopolist is then better off by excluding the low type.
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Existence of decoy that makes quality salient for product H and
price salient for product L
First note that given such salience, the ICL implies that pH ≥ θ(1δ qH − qL)+
1
δ






know from PCL that
pL
qL
≤ δθ. Thus, it must be that any separating products







Further, we found that the optimal products derived above are always
such that qH ≥ qL and pH ≥ pL since pH = 1δ qH − qL + 1δpL ≥ pL. Given the
optimal products, we want to find a decoy which makes quality salient for











qL < q̄ < qH , (93)
pL < p̄ < pH . (94)













2qH − qL > qD > 2qL − qH , (96)
2pH − pL > pD > 2pL − pH . (97)
Consider for example the product qD = qL and pD = 2pH − pL − e. It
easily satisfies conditions (96) and (97) when e → 0. Furthermore, it satisfies
(95) for e → 0:
















Without determining which attribute is salient for the decoy, it is enough














Figure 2.9: Possible decoys to make consumers focus on the quality of product
H and on the price of product L. Quality is salient for product L if and only if
product D lies in the dotted area. Quality is salient for product H if and only if product
D lies in the gray area. In the hatched area, quality is salient for product H and price is
salient for product L.
The high type does not prefer the decoy if and only if
qD − δpD < qH − δpH (99)
⇔ e < pH − pL +
1
δ
(qH − qL). (100)
The low type does not prefer the decoy if
θqD − δpD < δθqL − pL (101)













Plugging in the optimal products, the RHSs of (100) and (102) are strictly
positive and thus there exists an e → 0 for which neither of the types prefers





(1− θ)(δ2θ + (2− 2θ)δ + θ)
δ(1− α)2 > 0, (103)
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− θ2δ2 + (2θ2 − 2θ)δ − θ2 > 0, (104)
since RHS|α=0 is strictly decreasing in θ:
∂ RHS|α=0
∂θ
= −2δ2θ − 2δ(1− θ)− 2θ(1− δ) < 0, (105)




− δ2 − 1 > 0. (106)
Hence, there always exists a decoy that makes quality salient for product H
and price salient for product L.
Comparison with profit from separation with price salient products
The monopolist prefers to separate with a decoy if
πqpS − πS ≥ 0. (107)
This difference is decreasing in δ and equal to zero at δ = 1:
∂[πqpS − πS]
∂δ
= −α[(1− 2θ + (2− α)θ
2)δ4 + θ(1− θ)(1− α)δ3 + (1− α)]
(1− α)δ3 .
(108)
(Note that the expression in the square brackets is decreasing in α and
positive at α = 1). Hence, whenever both forms of separation exist, the
monopolist prefers to induce the high-quality product to be quality salient.
Existence of separation
We can show that whenever separation with price salience would be preferred
to exclusion or pooling with a decoy, separation with quality-price salience
would also be possible since: θ̂2(α) ≥ θ̂4(α), for all α ∈ [0, 1] and all δ ∈ (0, 1].
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To see this, note that the difference θ̂2(α)− θ̂4(α) strictly decreases in δ and









[δ(1− α) + α]2 < 0 (109)
⇔ T ≡ 4[δ + (1− δ)α]4 − α(1− α)δ6(1− δ4) > 0. (110)




=16[δ3(1− α)3 + 2α2δ(1− α)(1− δ) + α2δ(1− α) (111)
+ α3(1− δ2) + 2αδ2(1− α)2] + 10αδ9 + αδ2(16− 6δ3) > 0.
2.8.6 Proofs with a general utility function
The proof that price is salient for both types whenever the monopolist
optimally separates is presented in the main text. I show here that there
always exists a decoy that makes quality salient when the monopolist pools
or excludes low types.
Exclusion. The optimal excluding product given quality salience (qE, pE)
satisfies the participation constraint of type H given quality is salient, i.e.
u(qE, θH) − δpE ≥ 0. Consider a product (qD, pD) with pD = pE − ǫ and
qD ∈ (0, qE) that satisfies the following conditions:
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Since the RHSs for all four conditions are strictly positive, there always exists
an ǫ → 0 such that they are all satisfied.
Pooling. The optimal pooling product given quality salience (qP , pP )
satisfies the participation constraint of type L given quality is salient, i.e.
u(qP , θL) − δpP ≥ 0. Consider a product (qD, pD) with pD = pP − ǫ and
qD ∈ (0, qP ) that satisfies the following conditions:






























Since the RHSs for all four conditions are strictly positive, there always exists
an ǫ → 0 such that they are all satisfied.
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CHAPTER 3. MARKET INTERACTION AND THE FOCUS ON CONSEQUENCES
3.1 Introduction
The discussion about the effects of market interaction on moral behavior
can be traced back to Hume and Smith1. For some time, the dominant
opinion was that markets improve mutual understanding and cooperation
(e.g. Montesquieu, 1749; Smith, 1761, 1776). However, other researchers
started to promote the thesis that markets erode moral behavior (e.g. Veblen,
1899; Schumpeter, 1942; Hayek, 1948). They claim that market competition
promotes the “winner-take-all” mentality, decreases concerns for others and
lets people treat moral issues in terms of cost and benefits (Chen, 2011).
In recent years, this debate resurfaced and economists contributed with
numerous theoretical (e.g. Bowles, 1998; Shleifer, 2004) and experimental
studies. Some of these experimental studies find that market interaction
indeed decreases the concern for others (e.g. Falk and Szech, 2013; Bartling et
al., 2014) while others find a moral enhancing effect of markets (e.g. Henrich
et al., 2001; Francois et al., 2009).
Most of this work in economics does not distinguish between preferences
over the consequences of an action and the moral costs of taking the
action. However, some economists (e.g. Alger and Weibull, 2013; Falk and
Tirole, 2016; Casal et al., 2016; Bartling and Özdemir, 2017; Chen and
Schonger, 2017) started to consider concepts of morality which originate from
philosophy and explicitly distinguish between these two aspects of an action.
There are two fundamentally different concepts in philosophy on how to
evaluate the morality of an action: consequentialism and deontology. These
concepts can take opposing views on whether an action is morally right or
wrong. Immanuel Kant importantly shaped the theory of deontology, which
suggests that the morality of an action must be evaluated by the action
itself (Kant, 1870/1785, 1872/1788). That means, for example, one should
kill under no circumstances since killing is not conform with moral norms.
In contrast, according to consequentialism (to which utilitarianism belongs),
the morality of an action is evaluated by its consequences. That is, killing is
1For a collection of early statements on the effects of markets on culture see Hirschman
(1977) and Hirschman (1982).
118
3.1. INTRODUCTION
bad, but if by killing one person, the death of several other persons can
be prevented, killing is considered to be morally right. Evidence shows
that many people consider both in their decisions, the consequences and the
moral costs of an action (e.g. Ritov and Baron, 1999; Bartels, 2008; Chen
and Schonger, 2017). Those individuals choose an action which contradicts
moral norms if the effect on consequences is sufficiently beneficial. Such a
consequentialist-deontological type might for example not kill one person in
order to save two persons but is willing to kill one person to save three.
In one situation he behaves according to deontological principles whereas in
another he makes decisions according to consequentialism.
We do not intend to take a stance for either moral concept. However,
it is important to distinguish between the different concepts, since pure
consequentialist logic - which predominated the economic literature for a
long time - sometimes fails to explain observed behavior. Furthermore,
“theorists argue over deontological and consequentialist theories for criminal
policy, contract law, property rights, procedural justice, constitutional
interpretation and international law.” (Chen 2011, p.4).
Whether decision makers apply either deontological or consequentialist
principles is influenced by the context. Paxton et al. (2012) find that
completing a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral
dilemmas increases consequentialist responding, i.e. individuals who reflected
more on the CRT made more consequentialist judgments. Also emotions
can influence which of the two concepts is used in moral decision making.
Negative emotions lead to more deontological decisions (Wheatley and Haidt,
2005), the unavailability of emotions comes along with more consequentialist
moral judgments (Koenigs et al., 2007). Greene et al. (2001) show how a
higher emotional involvement changes decision making. Capraro and Sippel
(2017) find that women are more likely than men to apply the deontological
concept when emotions are salient in the moral dilemma. The effect of
cultural differences is reported by Gold et al. (2014) and Hauser et al. (2007).
Such context dependence shows that studying the determinants of moral
judgment is of high relevance.
While other studies concentrate on the question whether moral behavior
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can persist in markets, we investigate whether and how the experience of
interacting in a market influences moral decision making outside the market,
i.e. in subsequent decisions.
We design an online experiment in which we let participants play either
a market or a non-market game and subsequently confront them with
a hypothetical moral dilemma in order to elicit their moral preferences.
By letting participants play a market game, more specifically a double
auction, we intend to shift the participants’ mindset towards cost-benefit
considerations. This is related to the method of priming from social
psychology which argues that the use of a concept in one task increases the
probability of using the same concept in a subsequent, unrelated task (Bargh
and Chartrand, 2000). Economists have started to adapt this method to
experimental economics (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2010; Chen, 2011; Cohn and
Maréchal, 2016). Benjamin et al. (2010) show that priming can influence
the salience of attributes, which in turn influences the primed individual’s
preferences. Their results are in line with the hypothesis that the salience of
an attribute increases the weight that is given to this attribute. Instead
of the traditional way of priming, which induces a mindset for example
by letting participants think or read about a market, we let them have
the experience of market interaction directly. In a market, individuals
are confronted with cost-benefit considerations. We conjecture that such
an experience makes consequences salient. We consider salience together
with the moral preferences from Chen and Schonger (2017) to derive our
hypothesis. Individuals who only care for the consequences or only care
for the action itself should not be influenced by salience and therefore
do not react to a change in the mindset. However, individuals with
preferences for both attributes are influenced. Market priming, and thus
salient consequences, shifts their moral decisions towards consequentialism.
Giving a higher weight to consequences would imply that certain values
or norms (such as you should not lie or steal), that can only become manifest
in an action but do not translate into consequences, would lose importance
and vanish in decision-making processes. Focusing on consequences could




In a related study, Chen (2011) investigates the effect of labor competition
on moral decision making. He finds that the effect of competition on moral
decisions is affected by how participants relate to markets. In order to
account for such a moderator effect of different attitudes towards markets,
we use the Fair Market Ideology (FMI) scale of Jost et al. (2003).
The results of the experiment will significantly depend on whether we
succeed in changing the mindset of individuals by the use of traditional
behavioral games. In order to verify a shift towards a market mindset, we
will apply a manipulation check to a sub-sample of our study participants.
The manipulation check consists of a word completion task and is designed
such that it should detect changes in mindsets regarding markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section,
we give an overview over the recent literature about the effect of markets
on morality and other determinants of moral judgment. In Section 3.3, we
describe the design of the experiment. Section 3.4 introduces the preferences
from Chen and Schonger (2017) and shows how salience affects them. In
Section 3.5, we derive our hypotheses and Section 3.6 presents the pre-
analysis plan. Section 3.7 discusses limitations and Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Literature
As mentioned in the Introduction, some experiments find that markets
have a detrimental effect on moral behavior. Several of these experimental
studies consider moral behavior defined as concerns for negative externalities
of trade. Those studies analyze the prevalence of moral behavior when
varying different influential aspects of a market: competition, diffusion of
responsibility, social information and market framing. Plott (1983) find that
experimental markets converge to the competitive equilibrium even if trade
induces a negative externality of trading for all other market participants.
Participants seem to just ignore the externality. Sutter et al. (2016) find
that if trade has a negative externality on a third party, volume of trade is
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reduced but prices in the market depend rather on the relative number of
buyers and sellers and not on the existence of a negative externality. Falk and
Szech (2013) let participants of their experiment play a double auction and
vary the degree of competition by increasing the number of participants in a
market. Participants bargain over the live of a mouse and it turns out that
they are more willing to sacrifice the mouse if competition is high. Bartling
et al. (2014) consider an experimental market where trade leads to a negative
externality to a third party. They find that social concerns prevail in a market
but decrease in the degree of competition. Bartling et al. (2017) use the same
setting and vary the degree of diffusion of the negative externality. They
find that such diffusion leaves the level of social concerns almost unaffected.
Irlenbusch and Saxler (2015) run an experiment and try to disentangle
three characteristics of markets: diffusion of responsibility, social information
and market framing. In contrast to Bartling et al. (2017), they find that
diffusion of responsibility makes participants rather accept the presence of
negative externalities. The same effect is found if transactions are framed
as markets. Social information in turn increases social concerns. Reeson
and Tisdell (2010) report less contributions to a public good if the game is
framed as a market. These studies have considered moral decision making
in the market, whereas we consider moral decision making after market
interaction. Such subsequent decision making has also been investigated by
other researchers. Brandts and Riedl (2017) compare the effect of favorable
and unfavorable experience in a market on the willingness to cooperate in a
social dilemma game. They find that cooperation decreases if participants
play the social dilemma game with participants from the same market but
increases if participants were in a different market before. This suggests
that the experience of competing with one another has a negative effect on
cooperation. Cappelen et al. (2007) let participants play a dictator game in
which they can contribute what they produced before in a production stage
where participants can invest and get a return. Compared to the situation
when participants were just endowed with some money, they find a significant
reduction in the concerns for fairness in the dictator game. Hoffman et
al. (1994) find the same effect when framing the pre-dictator-game-stage
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in terms of a market. Furthermore, giving a price to moral behavior can
crowd out intrinsic motivation (e.g. Frey et al., 1996; Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Mellström and Johannesson, 2008;
Bowles, 2008). Researchers also find that making people think of money
makes them behave more individualistic (e.g. Vohs et al., 2006; Kube et al.,
2012).
However, there are also studies that find markets lead to more moral
behavior in the market. Pigors and Rockenbach (2016) run a lab experiment
with consumers who buy a product from a firm that produces at a certain
wage paid to its workers. They vary the opaqueness of the production process
to the consumers and whether there is competition between firms. It turns
out that social responsibility (i.e. caring for the wage of the production
workers) only arises if there is supplier competition. Other studies find
that markets also lead to more moral behavior in subsequent decisions. In
an experimental study with 15 small-scale societies, Henrich et al. (2001)
find that there are higher fairness and cooperation in communities with a
higher market integration. Buser and Dreber (2014) also find that market
priming increases the willingness to cooperate. Furthermore, market priming
increases the weight participants give to efficiency and the trust in strangers
(Al-Ubaydli et al., 2013).
Hence, there are contradicting results when considering moral decision
making in the market and in subsequent decisions. One characteristic of the
presented studies is that they typically use a concept of preferences over final
payoffs in order to define moral behavior. This can be inequality aversion,
preferences for efficiency or a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off.
Together with self-interest, these preferences all belong to a consequentialist
view of morality. Most of the literature thus only considers whether the
market changes preferences within the consequentialist view, e.g. from
other-regarding preferences to self-regarding preferences, without taking into
account whether the moral costs of the action itself change. In contrast to
that, we explicitly distinguish between the consequences and the moral costs
of an action, i.e. between the concepts of consequentialism and deontology.
Bartling and Özdemir (2017) and Casal et al. (2016) also distinguish between
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these concepts. Bartling and Özdemir (2017) investigate the possibility
that if one refrains from a selfish action that induces a negative externality,
another market actor could step in. From a consequentialist perspective, an
action that imposes negative externalities is not immoral if another person
would impose the same externality otherwise. However, deontologists would
argue that the action itself is immoral. Bartling and Özdemir (2017) find
that participants are more likely to take the selfish action if no social norm
exists. This suggests that social norms increase the importance of the moral
costs of the action. Casal et al. (2016) consider a three-player ultimatum
game and find that responders’ concerns for negative externalities increase if
they are better informed about the externality.
While Bartling and Özdemir (2017) consider moral decision making
in markets, we contribute to the discussion by investigating whether the
experience of interacting in a market influences moral decision making in
subsequent problems that are unrelated to the market. Our study is thus
closely related to Chen (2011), who considers the effect of labor competition
on subsequent moral decision making.
In order to derive our hypotheses, we use the preferences of Chen
and Schonger (2017), who model deontological preferences as lexicographic.
Other economists also model deontological value choices (e.g. Alger and
Weibull, 2013; Falk and Tirole, 2016). Stringham (2011) provides an overview
of different ways of modeling morals, for example as internal constraints or
as preferences (e.g. White, 2004; Rabin, 1995; Zamir and Medina, 2008).
Furthermore, he discusses where internal constraints might come from.
As mentioned in the Introduction, several factors have been found to have
an impact on moral decision making. Greene et al. (2009) find that spatial
distance plays a role. Physical contact between the decision maker and the
victim has been considered by Cushman et al. (2006). Sinnott-Armstrong
(2008) study the temporal order of events. Costa et al. (2014) show that
using a foreign language makes individuals rather respond according to
consequentialist principles. The consequences are also relevant for decision
making, which corresponds to the theory that some individuals consider both,
the consequences and the action. An increasing number of lives that can be
124
3.3. DESIGN
saved increases the probability of consequentalist decisions (Bartels, 2008).
Furthermore, the relation/closeness to the victims matter (Kurzban et al.,
2012). Swann Jr et al. (2010) find that the lives of ingroup members are
valued more than the lives of outgroup members. Competition in the labor
market right before making a moral decision makes individuals rather decide
deontological if they have negative emotions towards the market (Chen,
2011). We add to the discussion of the determinants of moral decision making
by investigating the effect of market interaction.
3.3 Design
The study will be conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a
labor market intermediary (see e.g. Horton et al., 2011). We implement the
experiment with the software o-Tree (Chen et al., 2016). In the first stage,
participants are randomly assigned to either a market game (experimental
treatment) or a non-market game (control treatment). In the second stage,
we confront participants with a moral dilemma in order to elicit their moral
preferences. Finally, participants fill in a questionnaire.
After the market/non-market game, we let a sub-sample of the partic-
ipants do a word completion task, which serves as a manipulation check.
Thereby, we verify whether the market game indeed succeeds in shifting
participants’ mindset towards cost-benefit considerations.
The study is designed to be between-participants in order to rule
out potential confounding interaction effects between the various design
elements. That means that each participant will only participate in one
of the two treatments (either market or non-market). A sufficient number
of observations and a proper randomization procedure guarantee causal
interpretations.2
2A power analysis with power 0.9 shows that we need a minimum sample size of 445
participants per treatment to find an effect of 10%-points. We used a baseline share of
consequentialist decisions of 37%. This share was found in a pretest on MTurk in which
we presented the moral dilemma to 109 participants without previous manipulation.
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3.3.1 Market game
“Markets are institutions where sellers and buyers interact and can trade
items. Trade occurs whenever a seller and a buyer agree on a price.” (Falk and
Szech 2013, p.707) Following Falk and Szech (2013) and other researchers, we
choose a double auction to represent a market. Double auctions incorporate
several typical market aspects such as e.g. the privacy of the own valuation
of the good, the interaction and competition among participants and the
consideration of costs and benefits of a good. Asks, bids and occurring
trades are public information. These auctions are well known for their rapid
convergence towards the competitive equilibrium and their high efficiency
(Ketcham et al., 1984).
We base the design of the double auction on a computerized version of
Smith (1962). 18 participants are assigned to one auction (market) with
9 buyers and 9 sellers of a fictional good and 10 trading rounds. At the
beginning of each round, each buyer privately learns his valuation v of the
good and each seller learns her production costs c. The valuations are
randomly drawn from the set {30, 40, 50, . . . , 110} and the costs are randomly
drawn from the set {10, 20, 30, . . . , 90}. In the standard double auction, the
valuation and costs are the same in each round. In contrast to that, we follow
Cason and Friedman (1996) and Kagel (2004) and make a random draw in
every round. This should make the market interaction more interesting and
more similar among buyers and sellers. In each round, every value from the
sets can appear only once among the buyers and sellers. The demand D
and supply S at the beginning of each round are thus commonly known and
depicted in Figure 3.1. In the competitive equilibrium, the equilibrium price
p∗ is equal to 60 and there are 5 to 6 trades.
Sellers are told that they can sell one unit of the fictional good in each
round. When the market opens, sellers can submit asks, i.e. the price
at which they are willing to sell the product. The asks appear in a table
labeled “Current bids and asks”, which is visible to all market participants.
Simultaneously, buyers are told that they can buy one unit of the fictional
good in each round. Buyers can submit bids, i.e. the price at which they
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Figure 3.1: Demand and supply in double auction market.
are willing to buy one unit of the good. The bids also appear in the table
“Current bids and asks”. Figure 3.2 shows the double auction screen for a
buyer. A trade occurs if a seller submits an ask that is lower than a current
bid in the table or if a buyer submits a bid that is higher than a current ask.
The trade is made at the price that was in the table first. Furthermore, a
trade occurs if a seller/buyer directly accepts a bid/ask from the table. As
long as they did not trade, buyers and sellers can change their bids/asks as
many times as they wish until the market closes. If a trade occurs, a buyer’s
payoff is πB = valuation - price. A seller’s payoff is πB = price - costs. If
no trade occurs, payoffs are zero, i.e. the valuation and production costs
only materialize in case of trade. After each trading round, participants
receive feedback about their payoff and the trading prices in that round.
Each participant takes part in 10 trading rounds. One round is randomly
drawn at the end of the experiment to determine the amount that is added
to the participant’s participation fee.
It is challenging to predict the behavior of participants in a double auction
theoretically. However, experimental evidence shows that there is a rapid
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Figure 3.2: Double auction screen for a buyer
convergence towards the competitive equilibrium in the standard version
of the double auction with constant valuation and costs over all rounds
and unknown distribution (e.g. Smith, 1962). Such rapid convergence has
also been found given known distribution of v and c and random draws of
valuations and costs in each round (Cason and Friedman, 1996; Kagel, 2004).
A soon as the competitive equilibrium has been reached, we can determine
the ex-ante expected payoff per round in equilibrium. In the competitive
equilibrium, buyers and sellers with high valuations / low costs for the
good end up trading. The expected price is p∗ = 60. Before learning her
production costs, a seller expects to have costs above the equilibrium price
with probability 3
9
. She will then expect not to trade and has zero payoff.
With probability 6
9
, a seller will have costs lower or equal to the equilibrium
price and can sell the good. A seller thus has the ex-ante expected payoff
of 6
9
E[p∗ − c|c ≤ 60] = 50/3. A buyer has the ex-ante probability of 6
9
that he has a valuation above or equal to the equilibrium price and buys
at price p∗. With probability 3
9
, a buyer has a valuation lower than the
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equilibrium price and does not buy. The expected payoff of a buyer is thus
6
9
E[v − p∗|v ≥ 60] = 50/3. The ex-ante expected variance of the payoff in






E[(p∗ − c − 50
3









E[(v − p∗ − 50
3
)2|v ≥ 60] = 1000
3
for a buyer.
In the competitive equilibrium, there are at most six trades per round.
To give participants sufficient time to decide and trade, each market round
lasts 60 seconds3.
3.3.2 Non-market game
We designed a non-market game which serves as a baseline to the market.
The interaction and competition between participants are two crucial aspects
of a market setting, as well as the focus on costs and benefit. While these
aspects should be ruled out in a non-market setting, we want to keep constant
the risk (same expected income and same variance) and the group feeling.
Furthermore, the cognitive depletion/load should be similar since it has been
found that cognitive load can have an impact on moral judgment (Greene et
al., 2008).
We thus let participants play 10 rounds of the following lottery game:
Participants are assigned to groups of 9. In each round, participants are
asked to guess a number out of the set L ∈ {20, 30, 40, . . . , 100}. Afterwards,
a random device allocates every value of the set L to one of the participants
in the group. If the guess coincides with the allocated value, the participant





0 with prob. 1/2
10 with prob. 1/8
20 with prob. 1/8
30 with prob. 1/8
40 with prob. 1/8.
(1)
The expected payoff in each round of the lottery is equal to E[π] =
1
9




(10 + 20 + 30 + 40) = 50
3
, i.e. identical to the ex-ante expected
3Plott and Gray (1990) suggest 8 seconds per equilibrium trade as a rule of thumb for
the round length in computerized double auctions.
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payoff in equilibrium in the market game. The expected variance in each




. The expected payoff and the expected
variance of the payoff are thus equivalent in the market and non-market
game. Similar to the market game each participant receives feedback about
the assigned number and the resulting payoff in that round. At the end of the
experiment, one of the 10 rounds is randomly chosen to count for payment.
In this non-market game, participants do not compete or interact.
Furthermore, they get a benefit without having to pay anything and they are
not confronted with market terminology. However, the lottery incorporates
the same risk and should also create a group feeling through the draw of the
random number.
Since there is no direct interaction in the lottery, participants play the
10 rounds a lot faster than the 10 rounds of the double auction. In order to
keep the depletion as constant as possible, we let participants of the lottery
group play a real effort task before they enter the lottery. This real effort
task is not incentivized since it has the mere purpose of making depletion
similar in the two treatments.
Bartling et al. (2014) use an alternative non-market treatment in which
they ask participants to choose a distribution of payoffs between three
players. In Falk and Szech (2013)’s non-market condition, participants are
asked to decide whether they would prefer to receive CHF 10 or to save
the life of a mouse. Both studies try to create a non-market environment
where decisions are comparable to the decisions in the market environment.
However, it is difficult in our setting to let participants make the same
distributional decisions since the double auction results in rather complicated
interactions. Furthermore, we do not focus on the decisions in but on the
decisions after the market/non-market interaction.
3.3.3 Manipulation check
Following e.g. Tulving et al. (1982), Bassili and Smith (1986) and Shu et al.
(2012), we use a word completion task in order to test whether the market
(non-market) game indeed results in a market (non-market) mindset. We
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constructed the word completion task using the guidelines of Koopman et al.
(2013).
We present 14 word fragments in random order to the participants. Nine
of these word fragments (MA L, CAS , ONEY, AX, SUPP , SAL , BR
CH, DGET, and SH P) can be completed to words related to markets
and trade (MALL, CASH, MONEY, TAX, SUPPLY, SALE, BRANCH,
BUDGET, and SHOP) or neutral words (as e.g. MAIL, CASE, HONEY,
FAX, SUPPER, SALT, BRUNCH, WIDGET, and SHIP). These words were
chosen such that without any treatment intervention before, at least 17%
of the participants fill in market-related words4. If the market interaction
indeed manipulates the mindset, participants in the market treatment should
be more likely to complete these word fragments with market-related words
compared to participants in the non-market treatment. Another set of five
word fragments (FR T, T LE, BE , BREA , and CAB ) with
neutral meaning (e.g. FRUIT, TABLE, BEAR, BREACH, and CABLE) is
part of the manipulation check to see whether participants in the market
treatment and in the non-market treatment complete these word fragments
similarly. This allows us to exclude that the market interaction also affects
the completion of neutral words. Furthermore, it mitigates the problem that
filling in market-related words could also have a priming effect, leading to
a higher probability of filling in market-related words in subsequent word
fragments.
We interpret a higher share of market-related words in the market
treatment as a robustness check for the priming due to the experience of
market interaction.
4We conducted a pretest on Amazon MTurk with 98 participants to verify this.
Koopman et al. (2013) suggest that at least 25% of the participants should fill in market-
related words. In our pretest, this was true for most of our market word fragments.
Exceptions were MA L and SH P, where only 17% filled in MALL and SHOP.
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3.3.4 Moral dilemma
After the treatment intervention (market or non-market game), we present
a moral dilemma to the participants that was first used by Thomson (1985).
This moral dilemma has been of interest to many researchers from philosophy
(Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985), neuroscience (Greene et al., 2001; Borg et al.,
2006; Ciaramelli et al., 2007), psychology (Cushman et al., 2006; Hauser et
al., 2007; Greene et al., 2009) and recently also from economics (e.g. Lanteri
et al., 2010; Chen, 2011; Barak-Corren et al., 2018), in order to study moral
decision making. The moral dilemma is as follows:
A boxcar breaks loose and is heading toward five workers on the tracks.
They do not have enough time to get off the track. However, the participant
has the opportunity to save these workers. The participant could use a
lever to steer the boxcar to another track where only one worker is working.
Many experiments find, that a vast majority of participants would do so. In
contrast, most participants remain passive if, in order to save the workers,
they have to push a fat man down a platform. These results are very
robust (e.g. Petrinovich et al., 1993; Greene et al., 2001; Cushman et al.,
2006) and researchers worked a lot on arguing why there are such strong
differences between these situations. They argue that two factors are of
special importance: physical involvement and the fact that in the push
variant, the fat man is used as means to an end. The moral costs of the
action are then especially high (Cushman et al., 2006).
In order to get a more balanced distribution of decisions to start with, we
use a variant of the train dilemma in which there is a person on a platform
above the tracks, standing on a trap door. The participant could open the
trap door such that the person would fall down on the tracks, slow down the
boxcar and thereby save the lives of three workers. Hence, there is no physical
involvement but the person on the platform is used as means to an end. This
variant has been used for example by Greene et al. (2009), Schwitzgebel
and Cushman (2015) and Everett et al. (2016). They all find that in this
moral problem, deontological and consequentialist answers and/or ratings are
more balanced than in the lever or the push variant. The trapdoor variant
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allows eliciting whether people are willing to use others as means to an end
without the emotional salience that comes from the physical involvement.
The dilemma can be illustrated as in Figure 3.3. Together with the figure,
Figure 3.3: Moral Dilemma - Trapdoor
participants are presented the following instructions and have to decide
whether to actively intervene or whether to stay passive (the instructions
are taken with slight adaptations from Barak-Corren et al. (2018)):
You are working by the train tracks when you see a boxcar filled with
coal break loose and speed down the tracks. The boxcar is heading toward
three workers who do not have enough time to get off the track. Above the
track is a platform with another worker. This worker is not threatened by
the boxcar. However, he is standing over a trap door.
You have two options:
Actively intervene: You use a switch that opens the trap door and
drops the one worker in front of the boxcar. Thereby, the worker’s body gets
caught in the wheels of the boxcar and slows it down. As a consequence, the
one worker dies and the three workers stay unharmed.
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Stay passive: You stay passive and let the boxcar head toward the three
workers. As a consequence, the worker over the trap door stays unharmed
and the three workers die.
Sidenote: In any case, you are sufficiently protected and stay unharmed.
Assume that you will not face any legal consequences for either action.
Now you are asked to take one of the above options. In order to do
so, imagine that you find yourself in the previously described situation.
Please accept only the information given and try not to introduce additional
assumptions that go beyond the problem as stated.
In contrast to many other studies, we ask participants what they would do
rather than what they consider to be the morally right thing to do. Several
researchers found differences in answers to these two questions (e.g. Kurzban
et al., 2012; Tassy et al., 2013; Gold et al., 2013, 2015). We add the question
about the morally right decision in the subsequent questionnaire. There
is some criticism of the external validity of the hypothetical moral trolley
problem. We will discuss this criticism in Section 3.7.
3.3.5 Questionnaire
As the last step, we elicit some socio-demographic data such as gender, age,
education, religion, nationality, native language and income. We also ask
them to rate their willingness to take risk and their trust in other people.
Market and trading experience is elicited by questions about the frequency
of trading at eBay or bargaining in markets. As a common procedure in
priming studies, we ask whether participants were aware of the purpose of
the study, especially of our intention of priming.
We add the questionnaire from Jost et al. (2003) to elicit the participants’
attitude towards markets. This measure of fair market ideology was also used
by Bartling et al. (2014). Participants have to rate their agreement with 15
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statements about the market procedure and the fairness of 10 statements
about market outcomes. This allows us to assess possible negative or positive
emotions towards markets. Furthermore, we ask participants whether they
think they did well in the market/lottery game and we ask them to rate their
mood during the experiment. These two questions should capture emotions
towards the experience in the experiment. The complete questionnaire can
be found in the Appendix.
3.3.6 Procedural details
We plan to conduct the experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk with a
total of 1200 participants. 500 participants will take part in the non-market
treatment, 500 participants will take part in the market treatment. 200
additional participants will be presented with the manipulation check directly
after the market / non-market game (100 participants per treatment). We
use the software oTree (Chen et al., 2016) to program the experiment. We
will conduct one treatment with 18 participants per session. We will invite
the participants via MTurk. Sessions are expected to last 45 minutes on
average. For the market treatment, we need 18 participants to start at the
same time. In order to reduce the waiting time for the first arrivers and thus
to reduce drop-outs, we will fill the empty spots with automated players
(“bots”) 10 minutes after the arrival of the first participant. After reading
the instructions, participants will be asked to answer some control questions
to make sure they understood the rules of the game. Only participants who
complete all parts of the experiment receive payment. They will be payed
via their MTurk account. Participants’ expected earnings are ✩5 on average
across sessions, with a participation fee of ✩3.
3.4 Theory
Chen and Schonger (2017) distinguish between three types of preferences:
consequentalist, deontological and consequentialist-deontological preferences.
We use their definition of the types.
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Definition 1 (Consequentialist preferences). A preference is consequentialist
if there exists a utility representation u such that u = u(x).
x = x(d) represents the consequences of a decision d. Next to one’s own
payoff, it also includes e.g. reputation and others’ payoffs.
In the moral dilemma described before, an individual with consequential-
ist preferences would prefer to actively intervene (A) and open the trap door
over staying passive (P) if and only if
u1(x1(A)) ≥ u1(x1(P )). (2)
Assuming that the consequentialist prefers less over many deaths, he would
always choose to actively intervene (A).
For a deontologist, preferences are lexicographic. The preferences over
decisions depend on the decision d itself. If an individual is indifferent
between two decisions, consequences x are considered.
Definition 2 (Deontological preferences). A preference is called deontological
if there exist u, f such that u = u(d), and f = f(x), and for all (x, d), (x′, d′):
(x, d) % (x′, d′) if and only if u(d) > u(d′) or [u(d) = u(d′) and f(x) ≥ f(x′)].
There is evidence that actively deciding to kill someone rather than letting
it happen, is considered as more immoral (Cushman et al., 2006; Moore et
al., 2008). Hence, we consider actively intervening as more painful to a
deontologist than staying passive:
u2(A) = −M2(A) < −M2(P ) = u2(P ). (3)
where M2(d) are the moral costs of decision d for a deontologist. A
deontologist would thus always choose to stay passive (P) and does not care
for the consequences.
There is a third type whose utility function incorporates both: conse-
quences x and the moral costs from decision d.
Definition 3 (Consequentialist-deontological preferences). A preference is
consequentialist-deontological if there exists a utility representation u such
that u = u(x, d).
136
3.4. THEORY
We consider an additive utility function u3(x, d) = x3(d)−M3(d), where
x3(d) are the consequences and M3(d) are the moral costs of decision d for
the consequentialist-deontological type. Such a type would choose to become
active, if and only if the difference in utility from consequences is higher than
the difference of moral costs:
u3(A) = x3(A)−M3(A) ≥ x3(P )−M3(P ) = u3(P ) (4)
⇔ x3(A)− x3(P ) ≥ M3(A)−M3(P ).
For the consequentialist-deontological type, we again need the assumption
that he prefers less over many deaths. He would choose to become active if
the improvement in consequences becomes more important than the cost of
taking an immoral decision.
A psychological concept used by several economists (e.g. Kőszegi and
Rabin, 2006; Bordalo et al., 2013b) suggests that individuals focus on
attributes which are more salient. We follow the model of salience-driven
preferences of Bordalo et al. (2013b) and assume that individuals indeed
give a higher weight to the attribute that has a higher salience.
Changing the weights of consequences and moral costs has no influence
on the decision of pure consequentialists and pure deontologists since they
only consider one attribute in their decision. However, it has an influence
on the decision of consequentialist-deontological types. If consequences are
salient, the moral costs are discounted with δ ∈ (0, 1]:
u3(d) = x3(d)− δM3(d). (5)
If the moral costs from the decisions are salient, consequences are
discounted with δ ∈ (0, 1]:
u3(d) = δx3(d)−M3(d). (6)
Given consequences are salient, consequentialist-deontological types are
more willing to actively intervene:
u3(A) = x3(A)− δM3(A) ≥ x3(P )− δM3(P ) = u3(P ) (7)
⇔ x3(A)− x3(P ) ≥ δ[M3(A)−M3(P )].
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This condition is more likely to be satisfied than condition (5) and hence we
would expect more active interventions if consequences are salient.
There are different theories about what determines the salience of an
attribute. Bordalo et al. (2013b) argue that an attribute has a higher salience
if it varies more within the choice set. We do not argue against the effect
of variation on salience. However, since all participants consider the same
moral dilemma, the variation within attributes remains constant between our
treatments and should thus not play a role. Researchers from psychology and
economics (Benjamin et al., 2010) argue that priming can affect the salience
of attributes. Evidence is provided by Benjamin et al. (2010), who use a
similar model in order to explain the influence of priming on the choice
of individuals. In their model, an individual’s utility has two parts: first,
they get disutility from choosing another than their individually preferred
action. Second, they get disutility from departing from the preferred action
of their social category. Benjamin et al. (2010) argue that priming the social
category increases the salience of the social category and thus the weight that
individuals give to the disutility from deviating from their social category’s
optimal choice.
3.5 Hypotheses
Our main hypothesis is based on the predictions we get from the preferences
of Chen and Schonger (2017) combined with a theory of salience. The
hypothesis that the experience of interacting in a market increases the share
of individuals who choose to become active corresponds to markets making
consequences salient.
Hypothesis 1. Participants who were exposed to the market environment
are more likely to make consequentialist decisions in the moral dilemma than
participants who were exposed to the non-market environment.
As explained before, the theory of priming says that if a concept was
used recently, it is more likely to be used in the next decision again.
Bowles (1998), Chen (2011) and other economists support the view that
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markets let consumers focus on the cost-benefit concept and thus on
consequences. Following Benjamin et al. (2010), this makes consequences
salient in subsequent decisions.
We follow the argumentation of Chen (2011) when we derive the second
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Market interaction leads to more consequentialist decisions
if participants have a positive attitude towards markets.
Chen (2011) argues that the affective state changes moral decision
making. When a person has positive associations with something, he rather
uses the concept of consequentialism (Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006) while
negative emotions trigger more deontological decisions (Wheatley and Haidt,
2005). We measure the attitude of a participant towards markets with the
Fair Market Ideology scale in the questionnaire.
The performance in the treatment game could also have an influence on
emotions. This implies the following prediction:
Hypothesis 3. Better performance in the market/non-market game leads to
more consequentialist decisions.
Bowles (1998) suggests that the effect of market interaction can differ
significantly depending on whether a participant performs well or poorly in
the market. However, Brandts and Riedl (2017) find that positive experience
in the market only has a positive effect on the contributions in a social
dilemma if participants did not compete in the same market before.
3.6 Pre-analysis plan
In this section, we first describe the variables and then describe how we will
analyze the data and test our hypotheses.
We will exclude the observations of participants who did not correctly
answer the moral dilemma comprehension questions in the questionnaire.
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Furthermore, we will only consider participants who played at least eight
rounds of the market/non-market game5.
3.6.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 3.1 lists the variables that will be elicited, including their descriptions.
Variable Description
active Decision dummy: Decision in the moral dilemma:
0 - passive; 1 - active
market Treatment dummy: 0 - non-market; 1 - market
perform Average payoff in market/non-market game
mood Self-reported mood during the experiment:
from 1 - very bad to 5 - very good
fmi Mean of FMI scale (25 items): from -5 to 5
gender Self-reported gender: 0 - male; 1 - female; 2 - other
age Self-reported age
income Self-reported income: 0 - No answer; 1 - Less than ✩10,000;
2 - ✩10,000 to ✩19,999; ... ; 14 - ✩100,000 to ✩149,999;
15 - ✩150,000 or more
education Self-reported highest completed education:
1 - Less than High School;
2 - High School/GED; 3 - Some College (no degree);
4 - Bachelor’s Degree; 5 - Master’s Degree;
6 - Advanced Graduate work or Ph.D.; 7 - Other
trust Self-reported trust attitude: from 0 - “You can’t be too careful”
to 10 - “Most people can be trusted”
Table 3.1: List of variables.
5If a participant closes the browser, a bot takes his place and the game continues. If




risk Self-reported risk attitude rank: from
0 - “not at all willing to take risks”
to 10 - “very willing to take risks”
nation Self-reported nationality: 1 - US American; 0 - Other
english Self-reported native language: 1 - English; 0 - Other
religious Self-reported frequency of attendance of religious services:
1 - Never; 2 - Once a year; 3 - Once a month; 4 - Once a week;
5 - Multiple times a week
familiar Self-reported familiarity with “moral trolley problem” dummy:
0 - No; 1 - Yes
Table 3.1: List of variables (continued).
We define the variable performi as the average payoff across all periods
of participant i in the market/non-market game. Furthermore, the variable
fmii is constructed by participant i’s average rating of the 25 items of the
fairness market ideology scale. We will also have information about the
number of bots in a market, the number of trades per round and the trading
prices.
In order to test for successful randomization, we will compare the
explanatory variables between the two treatments. More specifically, we
will use Fisher’s exact tests for gender and Mann-Whitney U test6 to verify
that income, education, and age do not differ significantly between the two
treatments.
We will also compare drop-out rates in the treatments with a Mann-
Whitney U test. If drop-out rates differ systematically, we have to conclude
that there was different attrition in the two treatments.
6The parametric alternative of a t-test requires the variable to be interval scaled and to
be normally distributed in the population. Throughout the analysis, we will use the t-test
instead of the Mann-Whitney U test whenever we can verify that these two requirements
are satisfied.
141
CHAPTER 3. MARKET INTERACTION AND THE FOCUS ON CONSEQUENCES
3.6.2 Market game
We are not primarily interested in the behavior of participants in the double
auction directly. However, it is still important to look at the price and trading
dynamics in order to test whether the markets converge to the competitive
equilibrium. If they converge, we can be confident that payoffs in the market
and the non-market treatment are distributed approximately equally.
We will use one-sample t-tests to compare the prices and the number
of trades in the last trading periods with the equilibrium price of 60 and
the equilibrium number of trades between 5 and 6. The coefficient of
convergence α of a trading round is the ratio of the standard deviation of
prices to the predicted equilibrium price (in percentage). α is thus a measure
of exchange price variation relative to the predicted equilibrium exchange
price. α is predicted to decline with trading periods. The efficiency of the
market is defined as the sum of realized incomes divided by the maximal
aggregate income. Efficiency should increase in the number of periods and
approximately reach 100%. We will test the predictions of convergence using
random effects regressions on a linear time trend with clustered standard
errors on market level.
The convergence to the competitive equilibrium is of relevance since
we designed the payoffs in the non-market game such that the payoff
distributions are equal in expectation. We can also test directly whether
the expected payoff of participants is indeed 50
3
with a one-sample t-test. We
expect it to be smaller since the competitive equilibrium is typically only
approximated (at least in some periods).
3.6.3 Moral dilemma
In order to test our main hypothesis, we will compare the shares of active
and passive decisions in the market and in the non-market treatment. If
the randomization works properly, the difference in shares will be caused by
the treatment intervention. We will test whether the difference in shares
is statistically significant with a Fisher’s exact test. We will interpret a
significant difference as evidence for our hypothesis that market interaction
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lets participants rather make decisions according to consequentialism.
We will also compare the shares to the results from the pre-study on
MTurk with 109 participants. Without any manipulation before the trap
door moral dilemma, we found that 37% of the participants chose to actively
intervene.
3.6.4 Regression analysis
We will run logit regressions in order to test our hypotheses more rigorously.
We will cluster standard errors on the market/lottery level to account for
possible correlation of the error term across participants from the same
market or the same lottery. Furthermore, we will include session dummies to
account for fixed effects due to dynamics particular to each market session
(as for example the number of bots).
The dependent variable activei is a dummy variable that is 1 if participant
i chose to actively intervene in the moral dilemma and 0 if participant i stayed
passive. The probability that participant i chooses to actively intervene given
Xi is
P (activei = 1|Xi) =
exp(X ′iβ)
1 + exp(X ′iβ)
, (8)
where Xi is a vector with all explanatory variables and a constant. The
marginal effect of explanatory variable l is




1 + exp(X ′iβ)
. (9)
The marginal effect depends on the level of X. We will report marginal
effects evaluated at means. When Xil is a dummy variable, the marginal
effect is defined as
P (activei = 1|Xil = 1, Xi)− P (activei = 1|Xil = 0, Xi). (10)
We will run logit regressions, where we add additional explanatory
variables step by step. In the first logit regression, Xi will consist solely of
the market dummy marketi. In a second step, we want to test the hypothesis
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that the attitude towards markets moderates the effect of market interaction.
Controlling for such moderator variables is especially important if the effect
goes in opposite directions. We will add the fairness market ideology measure
fmii and an interaction variable fmii#marketi. The interaction variable
captures the effect of market attitude given a participant was assigned to
the market treatment. Our hypothesis 2 suggests that fmii#marketi has a
positive effect on the probability of actively intervening.
Since the argument that negative/positive emotions affect moral decision
making also holds for participants in the non-market treatment, we will
run a third logit regression and add the variables moodi and performi and
their interactions with marketi to the explanatory variables. These variables
capture the self-reported mood during the experiment and the performance
of the participant in the market/non-market game. We will interpret positive
coefficients for these variables as further evidence for our hypothesis 3.
Finally, we estimate the model including the control variables gender,
age, religion, nationality, native language, income, employment, trust, risk
aversion and market experience.
3.6.5 Manipulation check
The manipulation check serves as a robustness check for the priming of
participants. Each participant could maximally fill in 9 market-related words
out of 14 words in total. We will construct a market-priming-score which is
computed simply by the number of completed market-related words (hence
from 0 to 9). Afterwards, we will compare the average number of individual
scores between treatments. In addition, we compare both mean scores with
our baseline mean score from the pretest without manipulation stage.
In the baseline study with 98 participants and no priming, we found a
mean score of 3.49. We will test for the significance of the differences with
a Mann-Whitney U test. We expect that the mean score in the non-market
treatment does not significantly differ from the baseline, whereas the mean





The attempt to prime participants through experimental games is a new
method and is different from previous approaches7. We are aware of the
fact that by explaining the double auction, several market-related words are
pinned in the recognition memory and make it easier to be recognized in
the manipulation check. We counter this effect by using only market-related
words which were not used in the instructions or appeared in the instructions
of both treatments.
Cohn and Maréchal (2016) raise some other worries when it comes to
priming. First, several priming studies could not be replicated (Yong, 2012).
Second, there is doubt on whether priming really works through the proposed
mechanism. They suggest mitigating the latter by using a manipulation
check, which we will implement with the word completion task. The problem
of replication can be reduced by the provision of all material necessary for
replication.
Another possible confounding factor is that cognitive depletion might
have an influence on moral decisions (Greene et al., 2008). The transcription
task and the lottery might not cause the same cognitive depletion as the
double auction and this could result in different decisions. However, one
could argue that cognitive depletion is also present in a real market and is
thus illustrated realistically by the experimental double auction.
Several studies question the external validity of the moral trolley problem
because of its hypothetical nature (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Bauman et al.,
2014; Gold et al., 2015). Bauman et al. (2014) revisit the external validity
of moral trolley problems, observing that 1) participants are often amused,
2) trolley problems differ from moral problems which are encountered in
reality and 3) that they elicit different psychological processes than real-world
situations. Several researchers try to make the moral problems more realistic.
Gold et al. (2013) and Gold et al. (2015) introduce trolley problems with
7In one study e.g., participants had to arrange words to form a proper sentence. In one
condition the available words were neutral, in the other related to markets and trade (see
Al-Ubaydli et al. 2013).
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economic incentives and real-life consequences. While harm in the traditional
moral trolley problem is typically deaths, they generalize the problem to
economic harm. They find that the difference in moral judgments between
the lever and the push scenario remains high. Navarrete et al. (2012) let
participants play the lever scenario in a virtual reality environment and find
that 90.5% of the participants turn the trolley. This result is in line with the
90% typically found in the classic hypothetical moral trolley dilemma.
With our setting, we cannot make inferences about the long-run effect of
priming by market interactions. It would be interesting for further research
to investigate long-lasting effects by letting participants take moral decisions
repeatedly over time or by letting more time pass before presenting them
with the moral decision.
We will use the online labor market MTurk. Benefits are that experiments
are easy to implement and data can be generated at a low hourly pay of
the participants. Drawbacks are that the researcher cannot control for the
environment in which the participants are, whether they pay attention and
that participants are mainly from the US. However, Berinsky et al. (2012)
examine experimental data generated by Mechanical Turk users and find
that results are comparable to data generated in a common laboratory. This
is also reflected by numerous publications using Mechanical Turk data (e.g.
Ambuehl et al., 2015; Chandler and Kapelner, 2013; Dreber et al., 2013).
Real-time interaction has not been tried often on MTurk yet. A recent
paper by Arechar et al. (2018) discusses the methodological challenges. They
find that in spite of all the problems, results from a public goods game are
similar to the results in the laboratory. One problem of real-time interaction
is the drop-out of participants. In our double auction, 18 participants have to
be present at the same time in MTurk. We program bots which will take over
in case some participants drop out. These bots will make bids/asks equal to
their valuation/costs at a random point in time within a fixed (and commonly
known) time-frame. The bots will be indicated as such, so that participants
know whether they are playing with bots or real persons. However, our main
question is not about the behavior in the double auction and we expect that




Instead of using a general subject pool, we could also test whether market
professionals are more consequentialist than non-professionals. However, we
would have to encounter the problem of self-selection. Furthermore, running
an online experiment in a non-field setting gives us more control over the
decision environment and the treatment intervention. Additionally, more
and more people all over the world gain access to markets and engage in
some form of market interactions. Understanding the influence of market
interaction on moral decision making is therefore especially important for a
general, representative subject pool.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an experimental design to test the hypothesis that
market interaction leads to more consequentialist decisions in a subsequent
moral dilemma. The design also allows detecting possible moderator effects
of positive/negative emotions towards markets. Furthermore, the results
of the experiment will give some insights on whether it is possible to
prime participants, i.e. to change their mindsets, by letting them play an
experimental game. This would have implications for experimental research
in general.
If market interaction indeed increases the weight that individuals give
to consequences, implications for general decision making depend on the
preferences over consequences. If individuals only care for their own payoff,
giving a higher weight to consequences makes them more likely to engage
in individually profitable actions, even if these actions contradict moral
norms as e.g. imposing negative externalities, lying or not cooperating. If
individuals also care for the payoff of others, it might not necessarily be the
case that more immoral actions are taken. On the one hand, there are less
concerns for taking immoral actions. On the other hand, individuals might
try to avoid actions that have inefficient consequences.
It is possible that the experience of market interaction also has an effect
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on other variables that are elicited in the questionnaire. For example, Al-
Ubaydli et al. (2013) would suggest that trust in other people is increased
by market interaction and Francois et al. (2009) show that higher market
competition leads to higher trust.
Future research should concentrate on the effect of market interaction
on other moral dilemmas, e.g. whether participants are willing to lie in
order to improve consequences. Specifically, we could give one person the
opportunity to lie which increases his/her monetary payoff and the payoffs of
all players of his/her group (Erat and Gneezy, 2012). We would expect that
the salience of consequences increases the probability that a person is willing
to lie. This extends our study with a consequential/deontological choice to
an economically incentivized setting. Alternatively, the moral dilemma could
be made more realistic and incentivized non-economically, e.g. by physical
pain through electrical shocks. Instead of the hypothetical decisions on the
lives of workers, participants could be confronted with the decision whether
they let three other participants receive an electrical shock or whether they




3.9.1 Instructions Double Auction
Welcome and thank you for your participation!
This is a study of decision-making. Please read the following instructions
carefully.
The study consists of 3 parts:
❼ Part 1: An interactive game
❼ Part 2: A decision scenario
❼ Part 3: A short questionnaire
We will explain each part of the study before the respective part will start.
You will receive a fixed participation reward of ✩3.00 at the end of part 3. In
part 1, you can earn additional points which will be converted to real money.
One point equals ✩0.20.
The money you will earn in part 1 will be added to the fixed participation
reward of ✩3.00. In parts 2 and 3, no additional money can be earned. You
must finish all 3 parts of the study to receive payment. You will receive a
personal code that allows you to receive your payment through MTurk at
the end of the study.
General rules
In this part, you will be interacting in an online market consisting of 9 buyers
and 9 sellers. These are real people interacting in real-time. You will be
randomly assigned to the role of a buyer or the role of a seller. You will keep
this role throughout the entire duration of the game. You will learn your role
after reading the instructions.
149
CHAPTER 3. MARKET INTERACTION AND THE FOCUS ON CONSEQUENCES
There will be 10 trading rounds in which you can earn points by trading.
One of these 10 rounds will be randomly chosen at the end of the study to
count for your payment. In each of the 10 trading rounds, the market opens
for 60 seconds, during which trading between buyers and sellers is possible.
Figure 3.4: Market with buyers and sellers
What can a buyer do?
In each trading round, each buyer can buy one unit of a fictional good. By
buying and hence owning this good, buyers receive a benefit in terms of
a valuation. At the beginning of each trading round, each buyer learns
how much the good is worth to him, i.e. he learns his own valuation.
These valuations are different for each buyer and measured in points. The
valuations will be randomly assigned to the buyers in each round and can be
30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100 or 110 points. Among the buyers, each number
is assigned only once within a round, i.e. one buyer is assigned a valuation
of 30 points, another buyer is assigned a valuation of 40 points, yet another
buyer is assigned a valuation of 50 points and so on.
What can a buyer earn?
A buyer can earn points by trading, i.e. by buying the good from a seller.
If a trade occurs, a buyer gets the valuation (measured in points) minus the
price (measured in points):
Buyer’s earnings in points = valuation - price
If no trade occurs, a buyer earns 0 points.
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How does trading work for the buyer?
Trading is done on an online market platform. A buyer can trade in two
possible ways :
1. He can accept an ask that has been submitted by a seller. The trade
then occurs at the price of the ask.
2. Alternatively, he can submit a bid, i.e. the price at which he is willing
to buy. If a seller accepts this bid or submits a lower ask, the trade
occurs at the price of this bid.
The two possible ways of trading will be explained in more detail later on
the screen.
The following screenshot shows what the online market platform looks like:
Figure 3.5: Double Auction Screen Buyer
In each trading round, buyers are numbered consecutively from 1 to 9. The
numbers change each round such that no buyer can be identified. In the
example, the buyer has number 2. The valuation of the buyer in this round
is 50, as you learn from the message on the screen “Your valuation is 50.”
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You see a list of all market participants at the right side of the screen. Bids
and asks of the buyers and sellers are displayed in the table “Current bids
and asks”.
At the beginning of each round, there is a countdown of 10 seconds during
which each buyer learns his valuation. Then the market opens for 60 seconds.
While the market is open, each buyer can trade one unit of the good by
accepting an ask of a seller or by submitting a bid (these are the two possible
ways of trading shortly described before):
1. Each buyer can accept an ask from the table “Current bids and
asks”. He does so by clicking on the accept button that shows up next
to the lowest ask in the table. The good then trades for the price of
the ask.
2. Alternatively, each buyer can submit a bid, i.e. a price at which
he is willing to buy the good. In order to do so, he can enter a value
and click on Submit. The bid then appears in the table “Current bids
and asks” and is visible to all sellers and buyers. Within a trading
round, a buyer can revise his bid as many times as he likes and replace
it by a new one. If a seller accepts the bid of the buyer, trade occurs
at the price of the bid. To avoid a loss, a buyer can only submit bids
that are equal to or lower than his valuation.
If a buyer submits a bid and there are lower asks in the table, trade
occurs at the price of the lowest ask. In principle, it is the same as if
the buyer had directly accepted the lowest (and thus currently best)
ask in the table.
When the market closes, each buyer receives feedback about his payoff and
all trades from that round.
What can a seller do?
In each trading round, each seller can produce one unit of a fictional good
that he can sell in the market. At the beginning of each trading round, each
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seller learns how much it costs for him to produce this good, i.e. he learns his
own production costs. These production costs are measured in points. They
will be randomly assigned to the sellers in each round and can be 10, 20, 30,
40, 50, 60, 70, 80 or 90 points. Among the sellers, each number is assigned
only once within a round, i.e. one seller is assigned production costs of 10
points, another seller is assigned production costs of 20 points, yet another
seller is assigned production costs of 30 points and so on.
What can a seller earn?
A seller can earn points by trading, i.e. by selling the good to a buyer. If a
trade occurs, a seller gets the price (measured in points) minus the production
costs (measured in points):
Seller’s earnings in points = price - production costs
If no trade occurs, the good is not produced, i.e. the seller does not pay the
production costs. Thus, if no trade occurs, a seller earns 0 points.
How does trading work for the seller?
Trading is done on an online market platform. A seller can trade in two
possible ways :
1. He can accept a bid that has been submitted by a buyer. The trade
then occurs at the price of this bid.
2. Alternatively, he can submit an ask, i.e. the price at which he is willing
to sell. If a buyer accepts this ask or submits a higher bid, the trade
occurs at the price of this ask.
The two possible ways of trading will be explained in more detail later on
the screen.
The following screenshot shows what the online market platform looks like.
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Figure 3.6: Double Auction Screen Seller
In each trading round, sellers are numbered consecutively from 1 to 9. The
numbers change each round such that no seller can be identified. In the
example, the seller has number 5. The production costs of the seller in this
round are 20, as you can see from the message on the screen “Your production
costs are 20.” You see a list of all market participants at the right side of
the screen. Bids and asks of the buyers and sellers are displayed in the table
“Current bids and asks”.
At the beginning of each round, there is a countdown of 10 seconds during
which each seller learns his production costs. Then the market opens for 60
seconds. While the market is open, each seller can trade one unit of the good
by accepting a bid of a buyer or by submitting an ask:
1. Each seller can accept a bid from the table “Current bids and asks”.
He does so by clicking on the accept button that shows up next to the
highest bid in the table. The good trades at the price of the bid.
2. Alternatively, each seller can submit an ask, i.e. a price at which he
is willing to sell the good. In order to do so, he can enter a value and
click on Submit. The ask then appears in the table “Current bids and
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asks” and is visible to all sellers and buyers. Within a trading round,
a seller can revise his ask as many times as he likes and replace it by
a new one. If a buyer accepts the ask of the seller, trade occurs at the
price of the ask. To avoid a loss, a seller can only submit asks that are
equal to or above his production costs.
If a seller submits an ask and there are higher bids in the table, trade
occurs at the price of the highest bid. In principle, it is the same as if
the seller had directly accepted the highest bid in the table.
When the market closes, each seller receives feedback about his payoff and
all trades from that round.
Control questions
Please answer the following questions:
1. You are a buyer. Your valuation for the good is 50 points. You submit
a bid of 40 points and a seller accepts this bid. What are your earnings
(in points)?
2. You are a seller. Your production costs for the good are 20 points. You
submit an ask of 25 points and a buyer accepts this ask. What are your
earnings (in points)?
3. You are a buyer. Your valuation for the good is 40 points. Is it possible
to submit a bid of 60 points? Yes/No
What comes next
❼ If you click on the next button, you will enter a waiting screen. Please
be patient and wait until everyone finished reading the instructions
and answering the questions. You will have to wait for 10 minutes at
maximum.
❼ Afterwards, you will learn your role: Seller or buyer.
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❼ There will be two test trading rounds to make you familiar with the
screen and the rules. The earnings from the test rounds do not count
for payment.
❼ After the two test rounds, there will be 10 trading rounds.
❼ Remember: One out of the 10 trading rounds will be randomly chosen
at the end of part 3 to count for payment. The chosen round determines
the money that will be added to your participation reward of ✩3.00.
One point equals ✩0.20. You will learn which round was chosen and
the money you earned after finishing part 3.
❼ Due to technical problems or other reasons it can happen that
participants drop out of the study. To carry on with the game,
automated players will take the open spots. Such a “bot” will always
offer the good at a price equal to his production costs as a seller and
bid a price equal to his valuation as a buyer. Bots will be indicated as
such. (Therefore, all other players are real human players.)
3.9.2 Instructions Lottery
Welcome and thank you for your participation!
This is a study on decision-making. Please read the following instructions
carefully.
The study consists of 3 parts:
❼ Part 1: A task + a game
❼ Part 2: A decision scenario
❼ Part 3: A short questionnaire
We will explain each part of the study before the respective part will start.
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You will receive a fixed participation reward of ✩3.00 at the end of part 3.
In part 1, you can additionally earn points which will be converted to real
money.
One point equals ✩0.20.
The money you will earn in part 1 will be added to the fixed participation
reward of ✩3.00. In parts 2 and 3, no additional money can be earned. You
have to finish all 3 parts of the study to receive payment. You will receive
your personal code that allows you to receive your payment through MTurk
at the end of the study.
General rules
This part consists of two sections. First, we will ask you to spend 10 minutes
on a transcription task. Second, you will play a lottery game in which
you can earn points. For the lottery, you will be randomly assigned to a
group of 9 participants. The other participants are real people (MTurkers).
Within this group, each participant plays 10 rounds of the lottery game,
which we will explain to you later. One of these rounds will be randomly
chosen at the end of the study to count for your payment.
How does the transcription task work?
You will see some text passages and we ask you to transcribe (copy) these
passages into an input field. Try to be exact and make sure to get all
characters and spaces correctly. Note that copy-paste is not possible. Your
earnings do not depend on your performance. However, we ask you to
transcribe as many words as possible within the 10 minutes. After the
transcription task, you are assigned to a group of 9 participants and the
lottery will start.
How does the lottery work?
At the beginning of each round, each participant has to choose a number
that can be 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 or 100 and enter this number in an
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input field on the screen.
Figure 3.7: Lottery Screen
Then, the computer randomly assigns a number that can be 20, 30, 40, 50, 60,
70, 80, 90 or 100 to each participant. Among the 9 participants of a group,
each number is assigned only once within a period, i.e. one participant is
assigned number 20, another participant is assigned number 30, yet another
participant is assigned number 40 and so on.
Figure 3.8: Lottery Group
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What can a participant earn?
Case 1: Number chosen = number assigned by computer
If the number a participant chooses coincides with the number that was
randomly assigned to him, this participant earns 50 points.
Case 2: Number chosen 6= number assigned by computer
If the number a participant chooses does not coincide with the number that
was randomly assigned to him, this participant earns:
❼ 0 points with probability 50%
❼ 10 points with probability 12.5%
❼ 20 points with probability 12.5%
❼ 30 points with probability 12.5% or
❼ 40 points with probability 12.5%.
Note: The earnings of one participant are independent of all other partici-
pants’ earnings.
Example 1
If a participant chooses number 20 and is then assigned number 80, he
receives:
❼ 0 points with probability 50%
❼ 10 points with probability 12.5%
❼ 20 points with probability 12.5%
❼ 30 points with probability 12.5% or
❼ 40 points with probability 12.5%.
Example 2
If a participant chooses number 70 and is then assigned number 70, he
receives 50 points.
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Control questions
Please answer the following questions to make sure you understood the rules
of the game correctly.
1. You choose number 60. The computer randomly assigns number 40 to
you. Your earnings are then 50 points. Yes/No
2. You choose number 20. The computer randomly assigns number 20 to
you. What are your earnings (in points)?
3. If you are assigned number 80, can another participant be assigned
number 80? Yes/No
What comes next
❼ If you click on the next button, you will directly continue with the
transcription task.
❼ Once you finished the transcription task, you will proceed with the
lottery: There will be two test rounds of the lottery to make you
familiar with the screen and the rules. The earnings from the test
rounds do not count for payment.
❼ After the test rounds, there will be 10 rounds of the lottery.
❼ Remember: One out of the 10 rounds will be randomly chosen at the
end of part 3 to count for payment. The chosen round determines the
money that will be added to your participation reward of ✩3.00. One
point equals ✩0.20. You will learn which round was chosen and the




1. Moral Dilemma Questions
(a) Please, explain based on what you made your decision in the
boxcar situation. Text field
(b) Please remember the boxcar situation: How many persons would
be killed if you stayed passive? Text field, only numbers possible.
(c) Please remember the boxcar situation: How many persons would
be killed if you actively intervened? Text field, only numbers
possible.
(d) I seriously thought about my decision. 7-point scale from strongly
disagree to strongly agree
(e) I am satisfied with my decision. 7-point scale from strongly
disagree to strongly agree
(f) Which of the actions is the morally right one? Stay passive,
actively intervene, neither, both (in random order)
(g) In your opinion, how did you perform in the game before? Very
poorly, poorly, fairly, well, very well
(h) How was your mood during the study? 5-point scale from very
bad to very good
2. Experiences in/with markets
(a) Do you negotiate prices of products you want to buy? Never,
rarely, sometimes, often, always
(b) Do you use online shopping platforms like e.g. Ebay (as buyer or
seller)? Never, rarely, sometimes, often, always
(c) Do you trade in the stock exchange market? Never, rarely,
sometimes, often, always
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3. Fair Market Ideology (FMI) Scale
Please evaluate the following statements on the 11-point scale ranging
from -5 (“Completely disagree”) to +5 (“Completely agree”):
(a) The free market system is a fair system.
(b) Common or “normal” business practices must be fair, or they
would not survive.
(c) In many markets, there is no such thing as a true “fair” market
price.
(d) Ethical businesses are not as profitable as unethical businesses.
(e) The most fair economic system is a market system in which
everyone is allowed to independently pursue their own economic
interests.
(f) Acting in response to market forces is not always a fair way to
conduct business.
(g) The free market system is an efficient system.
(h) The free market system has nothing to do with fairness.
(i) Acting in response to market forces is an ethical way to conduct
business.
(j) In free market systems, people tend to get the outcomes that they
deserve.
(k) The fairest outcomes result from transactions in which the buyers
pay the “fair” market price.
(l) Profitable businesses tend to be more morally responsible than
unprofitable businesses.
(m) Regulated trade is fair trade.
(n) Economic markets do not fairly reward people.
(o) Whatever price a buyer and seller agree to trade at is a fair price.
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Please evaluate the following statements on the 11-point scale ranging
from -5 (“Completely unfair”) to +5 (“Completely fair”):
(a) When a company raises the prices that it charges its customers
for its goods, because management has obtained market research
which suggests that its customers are willing to pay more, it is. . .
(b) When a professional athlete receives a raise because a raise has
been received by another league player of comparable ability, but
none the other team members receive comparable raises, it is. . .
(c) The fact that scarce goods tend to cost more in a free market
system is. . .
(d) When a company downsizes in order to reduce its costs to be more
competitive with rival companies, it is. . .
(e) When concessions at airports and concerts charge higher prices
for beverages because they know that their customers have no
alternatives, it is. . .
(f) The fact that wealthier people live in bigger homes and better
neighborhoods than poorer people who cannot afford to pay the
same prices is. . .
(g) When a company lays off higher-cost employees in the U.S. and
replaces them with lower wage workers in a foreign country in
order to make higher profits, it is. . .
(h) The fact that housing prices in Palo Alto, California are four to
six times those for comparable houses in Chicago is. . .
(i) The fact that more educated employees tend to earn higher wages
than less-educated employees is. . .
(j) The fact that some working families can afford to hire more
household help than others is. . .
4. Risk Aversion
How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully
prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please
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tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: “not at all willing to
take risks” and the value 10 means: “very willing to take risks”.
5. Trust
Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? Please tick a
box on the scale, where the value 0 means: “You can’t be too careful”
and the value 10 means: “Most people can be trusted”.
6. Sociodemographic variables
(a) Please tell us with which gender you identify yourself. Male,
Female, Other (with text field)
(b) Please tell us your age. Text field, only numbers
(c) What is your native language? English, Other (with text field)
(d) What is your nationality? US American, Other (with text field)
(e) Would you please give your best guess on your annual income of
the previous year? Please indicate the answer that includes your
entire household income before taxes. 12 Categories in steps of
10,000: Less than ✩10,000; ✩10,000 to ✩19,999;...; ✩100,000 to
✩149,999; ✩150,000 or more
(f) What is your highest level of education you completed? Less
than High School, High School/GED, Some College (no degree),
Bachelor’s Degree, Master’s Degree, Advanced Graduate work or
Ph.D., Other (with text field)
(g) What is current employment status? Employed for wages, Self-
employed, out of work and looking for work, out of work but not
currently looking for work, a homemaker, a student, military,
retired, unable to work, Other (with text field)
(h) What religion do you associate yourself with? Christian, Jewish,




(i) How often do you attend religious services? (Answers may be
approximate.) Never, Once a year, Once a month, Once a week,
Multiple times a week
(j) Are you familiar with any version of the so-called “Moral Trolley
Problem” or “Trolley Problem”? Yes, No
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wurden, habe ich als solche gekennzeichnet. Mir ist bekannt, dass andernfalls
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